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Abstract Lim and Rosenhaft introduce “mnemonic solidarity” as a scholarly 
and political program, situating it in the context of the wider project and 
publication series “Entangled Memories in the Global South.” Their pro-
grammatic approach arises from the observation that a global memory for-
mation has emerged since the late twentieth century, involving interchanges 
of various kinds between national memory cultures and structured by the 
terms of Holocaust memory. This development and its political implications 
have been addressed in various ways by scholars under the rubrics of “cosmo-
politan,” “multidirectional,” “traveling,” “prosthetic,” “transnational,” and 
“agonistic” memory, but the new field of memory studies remains Eurocentric 
and relatively insensitive to the double-edged character of globalized mem-
ory—the interplay between de-territorialization and re-territorialization. 
This volume aims to reset the agenda.
Keywords Global memory formation • Mnemonic solidarity • Global 
South • Territorialization • Local memory
This volume introduces a new publication series and a new emphasis in 
memory studies. The title of the series is Entangled Memories in the Global 
South. The term “mnemonic solidarity” which gives this book its title signals 
one response to the observation that historical memories have become 
entangled. It proposes that that entanglement invites us to rethink memory 
studies as a field of scholarship and also the sociocultural and political prac-
tices through which communities engage with their respective and shared 
histories. The central question implicit in the term “mnemonic solidarity” is 
how and how far it is possible to find a common ground for articulating the 
hurts of the past in ways that are productive for the future. The question itself 
is not a new one; it has been posed and answered in decades of practical and 
theoretical work on projects for transitional, commemorative, compensatory 
and restorative justice, and for historical reconciliation in particular conflict 
zones. The question takes on new dimensions with the emergence of the 
global memory formation: Historical experiences are being articulated as 
E. Rosenhaft (*) 
School of Histories, Languages & Cultures, University of Liverpool,  
Liverpool, UK
e-mail: dan85@liverpool.ac.uk
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memory not only through interactions among the subjects of those histories 
but also in conversation with the historical memories of others around the 
world. And in those conversations the lives and voices of historical actors in 
the global South are increasingly heard in their own terms.
Here, we need to clarify our use of the term “global South.” It does not 
in any sense represent a geo-positivist fixation, although it corresponds 
largely to the tri-continent: Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the series, we 
use “North” and “South” as liquid geo-positions and historical constructs 
depending on the ways in which, at a given historical moment, events, ques-
tions, and actors are discursively located in global interactions.1 At the 
founding conference of the Non-Alliance Movement in Bandung in 1955, 
for example, Japan and China belonged to the global South; this is no lon-
ger the case. Global interventions expressing mnemonic solidarity between 
interwar African Americans and Japanese Americans self-defining as Pacific 
Negroes, between the Irish in the potato famine and the Choctaw native 
nation after the “Trail of Tears,” between Hiroshima and Auschwitz, 
between Muslim women victims of sexual violence in former Yugoslavia and 
East Asian comfort women witnessing in the transpacific space have taken 
place in the Northern hemisphere. But we include these interactions among 
“entangled memories in the Global South” because they represent sup-
pressed voices and memories which have become to be heard with the emer-
gence of the global memory formation. The essays in this volume explore 
the dimensions and implications of that global memory formation from a 
variety of disciplinary and regional perspectives. The authors, representing 
two generations of scholars, base their reflections on their study of particular 
histories and memory formations and also on experiences of active engage-
ment in public history and commemoration.
The global memory formation of which we speak reflects the ways in 
which globalization has dramatically reconfigured the landscape of mem-
ory in the third millennium. The space in which collective memories take 
shape is no longer national but global, and memories have become entan-
gled, reconciled, contested, conflicted, and negotiated across borders, 
connecting historical actors and events across time and space. “Formation” 
1 See Arif Dirlik, “Global South: Predicament and Promise,” The Global South 1, no. 1 
(2007): 12–23; Anne Garland Mahler, “Beyond the Color Curtain. The Metonymic Color 
Politics of the Tricontinental and the (New) Global South,” in The Global South Atlantic, 
eds. Kerry Bystrom and Joseph R.  Slaughter (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2018), 99–123.
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needs to be understood in this context as process rather than structure, 
and the process was accelerated (if not set in motion) by a particular his-
torical moment: As Jie-Hyun Lim shows in his chapter, it was the thaw of 
memories that had been frozen under the restraint of Cold War ideologies 
that accelerated this global memory formation and gave new impetus to 
rewritings of the past, as suppressed memories of the Stalinist terror and 
Nazi collaboration in Eastern Europe joined new articulations of colonial 
trauma in the tri-continent of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Memory is the posthumous history of history, where interventions are 
constantly made to rearticulate what happened in the past. In these terms, 
the emerging global memory formation has two defining features. The first 
is a complex interplay between de-territorialization and re- territorialization. 
Across the globe, vernacular and institutionalized memories of past traumas 
are being shaped in conversations both within and across national, regional, 
and continental borders. Collective memories shaped in specific local, 
regional, or national contexts have become interwoven with one another 
through processes and practices of translation, cross-referencing, adaptive 
imagination, unilateral “re-purposing” and active dialogue, as well as compe-
tition. Almost without exception, the global South tends to create its own 
mnemoscape through the dynamics of comparison, cross-referencing, juxta-
position to and repulsion from the Holocaust in the global North. Many 
memory activists in the global South have adopted these practices as a delib-
erate tactic for marking out their own position in the global memory forma-
tion. And in fact testimony to and memories of human rights abuses in the 
global South have attracted the attention of the global public sphere largely 
when and as they became more interactive or entangled with the Holocaust 
as the ethical norm of memories. There is a degree of randomness in the way 
in which the remembrance of transatlantic slavery, the Nanjing massacre, the 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and even the comfort women 
have adopted the language of Holocaust. But as Eve Rosenhaft’s analysis of 
Black Holocaust fictions proposes, that discursive nexus has an imaginative 
power that reflects an authentic de-territorialization—of the tools or terms of 
memory, at least.
At the same time, though, the global memory formation has contributed 
to re-territorializing the mnemoscape by providing a new frame for height-
ened competition among the parties to contending national memories. 
Perhaps the best example of this is the way in which the globalization of 
Holocaust discourse has been accompanied by its appropriation in political 
conflicts within and between nation-states. The results of such juxtapositions 
can be simply scandalous. In Eastern Europe post- Communist states have 
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nationalized Holocaust remembrance to justify a resurgent old-fashioned 
ethnic nationalism and provide a screen memory that obscures their own war 
crimes. Even among Europeans for whom the Second World War and the 
Holocaust are, after all, part of their local memory, the dimensions of the 
claims to victimhood that can be made in terms of Holocaust are practically 
kaleidoscopic, showing new complications as each national trauma enters 
into the conversation. It is disturbing, for example, to witness the efforts of 
the “Jasenovac Committee of the Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church” since the end of the Balkan civil wars to rehabilitate the Serbian-
Chetnik fascists as concentration camp victims—in close collaboration with 
the World Holocaust Remembrance Center at Yad Vashem.2
This is the first ground on which the project represented by this volume 
responds to established currents in memory studies: The perception that 
key components of cultural memory—identificatory narratives about 
the past generated in one place or by one mnemonic community3—can be 
and have been appropriated by cultural and political actors outside 
that community has generated some key terms in the developing field of 
memory studies. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Daniel Levy 
and Natan Sznaider identified a formation of “cosmopolitan memory” in 
the global circulation of Holocaust discourse.4 In 2009, Michael 
Rothberg introduced the term “multidirectional memory” to character-
ize the overlaps and exchanges between Holocaust and (post)colonial 
memory.5 Astrid Erll’s reflections on the future of memory studies in the 
light of the manifest porousness of the nation-state “container” led her by 
way of “transcultural memory” to the influential coinage “traveling 
memory.”6 And the concept of “prosthetic memory” proposed by Alison 
Landsberg was essentially an answer to the question of how members of 
one mnemonic community can internalize the “memories” of another. 
2 Jovan Byford, “When I Say ‘the Holocaust’ I Mean ‘Jasenovac’: Remembrance of the 
Holocaust in contemporary Serbia,” East European Jewish Affairs 37, no. 1 (2007): 51–74.
3 The earliest deployment of the term is by Eliatar Zerubavel, “Social Memories: Steps to 
a Sociology of the Past,” Qualitative Sociology 19, no. 3 (1996): 283–99 (here 289–91).
4 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation 
of Cosmopolitan Memory,” European Journal of Social Theory 5, no. 1 (2002): 87–106; 
Idem., The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age, trans. Assenka Oksilloff (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2006).
5 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of 
Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
6 Astrid Erll, “Travelling Memory,” Parallax 17, no. 4 (2011): 4–18.
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Although it emerged from a study of American memory cultures, 
Landsberg’s proposition rested on observations about global transforma-
tions in the conditions for memory, notably in the technologies through 
which experience is communicated.7 The investigation of these dynamics 
has also been carried out under the rubric “transnational memory.”8
The mnemonic solidarity project builds on the insights and methods of 
all of those scholars, but it starts from an acute awareness that the global 
memory space is a double-edged formation which promotes the de- 
territorialization and re-territorialization of remembrance simultaneously. 
Our concern is less with the traces of cosmopolitan memory than with 
continuing challenges to productive interchange between communities of 
memory. The forms of selective remembering that we call re- 
territorialization need to be anatomized and critiqued before we can move 
on to construct genuinely usable narratives of the pasts we share. These 
developments call for a program of critical rethinking which is both schol-
arly and political: How have particular memories and memory practices 
emerged out of particular historical experiences, how have they come to 
be appropriated as official or cultural memory or for deployment in civil 
and international conflicts, and what specific role does transnational 
exchange—the entanglement of memories—play in the formation of 
memory and memory practices?
Those earlier models took as their starting point questions of Holocaust 
memory. Reflections on how, where, when, and by whom that epochal 
moment in European history has been remembered have been founda-
tional for the field of memory studies since the 1970s. Mainstream studies 
have built on theoretical foundations laid in the European sociological 
tradition and persistently focused on the European and American experi-
ences.9 This leads us to the second feature of the new global memory 
7 Alison Landsberg, Prosthetic Memory. The Transformation of American Remembrance in 
the Age of Mass Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
8 Chiara de Cesari and Ann Rigney, eds., Transnational Memory: Circulation, Articulation, 
Scales (Berlin and Boston: de Gruyter, 2014).
9 Reference here is to the work of Maurice Halbwachs in the 1920s, as critiqued and elabo-
rated by Jan and Aleida Assmann in the 1990s: Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 
ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Jan Assmann, 
“Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” New German Critique 65 (1995): 125–33; 
Aleida Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) (originally published in German in 1999). 
For a recent critique of the Western-centrism of memory studies, see Hunmi Lee et al., 
“Conference Report: The Third Annual Conference of the Memory Studies Association in 
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formation that this volume addresses and which is at the core of its under-
lying rationale: Even as the pull of the European (Holocaust) experience 
continues to be powerful in global articulations of trauma, that experience 
is being increasingly de-centered. That same post-Cold War thaw that 
released suppressed memories of Stalinist terror and Nazi collaboration in 
Eastern Europe presaged new articulations of the violence of colonialism 
and neo-imperialism in other parts of the world. The rhythms and out-
comes of these articulations were not uniform. In Latin America’s 
Southern Cone, for example, the 1990s democratization was followed by 
an initial closing down of public discussion of Pinochet’s dictatorship in 
Chile, while Argentina, whose dictatorship had ended a decade earlier, 
experienced a generational shift from the preoccupation with justice to 
concerns with memory.10 In general, though, memorial practices and the 
critical study of them have increasingly partaken of international conversa-
tions in which scholars and activists from the global South have taken a 
lead. New work in this area reflects on the utility and capacity of both new 
technologies and repurposed everyday practices to articulate identities and 
empower activists at the regional level, exploring the paradoxes of re- 
territorialization through transnational media.11
This opening up has also led to new, non-hierarchical appreciations of 
the comparability of historical traumas. The Holocaust is ceasing to be the 
model of which other traumas were versions, and has become subject to 
postcolonial readings itself. These locate the Holocaust in the history of 
global colonialism, elaborating its place in a continuous development 
beginning (for Germany) with genocidal campaigns in German Africa and 
situating the German invasion and occupation of the Slavic East firmly in 
Madrid, 2019,” accessed November 11, 2020, http://cgsi.ac/bbs/board.php?bo_ 
table=eng_e_Pub&wr_id=6.
10 Eugenia Allier Montaño and Emilio A. Crenzel, eds., The Struggle for Memory in Latin 
America. Recent History and Political Violence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
11 Claire Taylor and Thea Pitman, “Conclusion: Latin American Identity and Cyberspace,” 
in Latin American Cybercultures and Cyberliterature, eds. Claire Taylor and Thea Pitman 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 263–67; Claire Taylor, Place and Politics in 
Latin American Digital Culture. Location and Latin American Net Art (New York: 
Routledge, 2014); Tania Pérez-Bustos, Eliana Sánchez-Aldana and Alexandra Chocontá-
Piraquive, “Textile Material Metaphors to Describe Feminist Textile Activisms: From 
Threading Yarn, to Knitting, to Weaving Politics,” TEXTILE 17, no. 4 (2019): 368–77; Thi 
Ry Duong, Edward Little and Steven High, eds., Remembering Mass Violence: Oral History, 
New Media and Performance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). We regret that 
it was not possible to include a contribution from Latin America in this volume.
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the European colonialist tradition. In Chap. 2, Jie-Hyun Lim elaborates 
this re-visioning of the Holocaust and some of the ways in which this new 
formation is manifested in public discourse.
Equally significant is the audibility of new actors—the global South—in 
the global memory formation. As Eve Rosenhaft proposes in her anatomy 
of “Europe’s melancholias,” people voicing the colonial and postcolonial 
experience from positions within the global North are now part of conver-
sations about how past and present connect. Their perspectives on the 
Holocaust and its lessons, brought into contention with received narra-
tives in a moment of political crisis, mark a mnemonic moment which is 
arguably as much post-Holocaust and post-postwar12 as it is postcolonial 
and (surprisingly) postimperial. Global perspectives open up new tempo-
ralities, which in turn make us newly attentive to what has been forgotten 
or suppressed in the construction of memories.
Carol Gluck’s meticulous account of how the East Asian comfort 
woman came to be a new global icon for historical trauma and account-
ability draws together key elements of the global memory formation. It 
exposes the importance of particular conjunctures—temporal moments—
in the public understanding and speakability of human rights and war 
crimes. Central to the story is, of course, the global visibility of the East 
Asian experience of war and the entry of East Asian (women) actors into 
transnational mnemonic conversations. As Jie-Hyun Lim also intimates, 
memory developments in East Asia are in important ways fundamental to 
the global memory formation. Not only has the western Pacific rim been 
the site of intense memory conflicts arising out of the complex imperial, 
colonial, and postcolonial relationships among China, Japan, and Korea, 
but patterns of memory politics there have been very much informed by 
discourses of victimhood and responsibility that originated in the West. At 
any rate, this is how things look through the lens of Western scholarship.
If the first three substantive chapters in this volume map out some fairly 
familiar territory in the global mnemonic landscape, then, they also point 
in the direction of new themes and questions that are foundational for the 
mnemonic solidarity project. One of these is how the field of memory 
12 In the light of the developments explored in this volume, there is some irony in the 
observation with which Tony Judt introduced the coda to his 2005 study of Europe’s suc-
cessful reconstruction based on “selective forgetting”: “As Europe prepares to leave World 
War Two behind … the recovered memory of Europe’s dead Jews has become the very defi-
nition and guarantee of the continent’s restored humanity.” Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of 
Europe since 1945 (London: Heinemann, 2005), 804.
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studies itself may change as experiential perspectives and scholarly voices 
from Africa, Asia, and Latin America enter into the discussion—or, more 
radically, when we take them as our starting point. A first step here will be 
to take them seriously in their own terms, articulating, for example, what 
distinguishes East Asian memory regimes and the preconditions for mem-
ory practices as well as how they have appropriated Western models of 
“memory contest.” For example, Carol Gluck reminds us that “the geo-
political postwar era in East Asia and Eastern Europe really began only 
after 1989.”13
In Chap. 5, Lauren van der Rede and Aidan Erasmus invite us to take 
“Africa” on its own terms. Mainstream memory studies that focus on 
Africa have begun with institutions and practices prompted by interven-
tions from diasporic and international agencies (the memorialization of 
transatlantic slavery), literary mediations in forms marketable to European 
and American audiences, or post-conflict and post-genocide issues of jus-
tice and representation drawing on international models and compari-
sons.14 (A notable exception here is South Africa, where the injustices of 
apartheid were the object of global interventions before they became the 
subject of memory and both scholars and activists have historically oper-
ated transnationally—often representing the global South in the global 
North and vice versa.) Examining the cases of Ethiopia and South Africa, 
van der Rede and Erasmus provocatively characterize Africa as a “disobe-
dient object” of memory studies, posing a series of radical challenges to 
the terms and methods of the field. At the empirical level, they point out 
how these cases inflect our Europe-centered models of trauma and mem-
ory. In the Ethiopian context, the forensic vocabulary introduced by post- 
Holocaust human rights law and discourse have been redefined in the 
13 See also Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter, “Introduction: Re-Envisioning Asia Past 
and Present,” in Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia, eds. Sheila 
Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 1–14. 
Questions of the regional particularities of the East Asian memory wars and possible 
approaches to reconciliation are also explored in Northeast Asia’s Difficult Past. Essays in 
Collective Memory, eds. Mikyoung Kim and Barry Schwartz (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) and East Asia beyond the History Wars. Confronting the Ghosts of Violence, 
eds. Tessa Morris-Suzuki et al. (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2013).
14 Marie-Aude Fouéréa and Lotte Hughes, “Heritage and memory in East Africa today: a 
review of recent developments in cultural heritage research and memory studies,” Azania: 
Archaeological Research in Africa 50 (2015): 542–58; Erica L. Johnson and Éloïse Brezault, 
eds., Memory as Colonial Capital. Cross-Cultural Encounters in French and English (Cham: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
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legislative negotiation between “genocide” and “terror.” In South Africa, 
the institutions and mentality that underpinned the apartheid system can 
be seen as resting in turn on a mnemonic infrastructure in which colonial 
hybridity and the identity of a nation in arms were entangled in very par-
ticular ways. Beyond this, positing Africa “not as a cartographic and geo-
logical location but as a concept and methodology,” van der Rede and 
Erasmus challenge the liberal universalism implicit in the problematics of 
memory studies (and indeed in the notion of mnemonic solidarity) with 
an insistence on hearing/listening rather than speaking that draws on 
postcolonial theory and the new methods of sound studies. Mnemonic 
solidarity retains more than heuristic power as a normative real, but it is 
precisely the ways in which the de-centering of global North perspectives 
tests it to its limit that constitute the intellectual promise of a genuinely 
globalized memory studies.
One thing that is at issue in van der Rede and Erasmus’ critique of lib-
eral universalism is the obligation to speak which the emphasis on witness-
ing in Holocaust-informed memory studies places on the subjects of 
memory. This addresses the second key move in the mnemonic solidarity 
project: critical attention to specific actors and material processes. Who are 
the rememberers and what are they able to say? In memory studies as in 
other disciplines that employ the language of globalization, there is a dan-
ger that “territorialization” and its variants come to denote disembodied 
forces.15 Our model of global memory formation is a dynamic one; far 
from being a simple piling-up of individual national memories, it regulates 
and stimulates national remembrance by co-figuring national memories—
most obviously, in the self- and other-identities of perpetrator and victim 
nations. That formation depends in turn on the internal dynamics of 
national and local memory communities. Even if we fix our attention at 
the level of the national, the analysis of re-territorialization needs to take 
into account the mechanisms through which official memory regimes 
selectively appropriate, pre-empt and silence vernacular memory. But of 
course there are contests, too, among and within “grass-roots” memory 
communities, most acute among survivors of political repression and 
genocide. And memory communities themselves are subject to being 
15 See, for example, the critique by Stef Jansen and Staffan Löfving cited by Chiara de 
Cesari and Ann Rigney in their introduction to Transnational Memory (1–25, here 13), and 
the emphasis that that volume places on concrete, actor-led processes of articulation and 
circulation and the conditioning element of “scale.”
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reshaped and fractured through temporal processes of generational and 
demographic change, such as Eve Rosenhaft explores in Chap. 3.
This calls for caution. Acknowledging the agency and eliciting the 
voices of subaltern and marginalized historical actors, irrespective of where 
they were positioned in moments of historical trauma (whether as “vic-
tims,” “perpetrators,” or “bystanders”), are essential to the democratiza-
tion of both narratives and resources that is part of the mnemonic solidarity 
project. But we need to be alert to ambivalences at the vernacular level, 
too. Speech may prove pointless and dialogue incapable of generating soli-
darity.16 The tendency of the global memory formation to enable conver-
sations between local memory communities is apparent in new forms of 
transnational memory activism, like the multiple border-crossings of the 
South Korean comfort woman statue discussed here in the chapters by 
Jie-Hyun Lim and Carol Gluck. But the popularization of national victim-
hood narratives and the mobilization of grass-roots actors to defend them 
in acts of performative nationalism, such as we see in the case of the com-
fort women, bespeaks the double-edged quality of memory formation at 
this level.17
Attention to the possibilities for making memory “from below” raises 
the question of what tools the memory makers have available: the mate-
rial, institutional, and cultural conditions for the construction of vernacu-
lar memories and their articulation in and with national and global 
conversations. These questions are sometimes answered by giving atten-
tion to actors and events at the very local level, and this is a frontier of 
research whose importance we want to signal although it is not repre-
sented elsewhere in the present volume. On the one hand, locality itself is 
an important determinant of identity and an object of memory. The 
neighborhood around the Bataclan nightclub in Paris, site of a terrorist 
attack in November 2015, and the South Korean city of Gwangju, subject 
16 In memory studies, the power of dialogic confrontation between contending memories 
is being explored in discussions of “agonistic memory”: Anna Cento Bull and Hans Lauge 
Hansen, “On Agonistic Memory,” Memory Studies 9, no. 4 (2016): 390–404; Cristian 
Cercel, “The Military History Museum in Dresden: Between Forum and Temple,” History 
& Memory 30, no. 1 (2018): 3–39.
17 On the performative as a negotiation of popular and institutional visions of nation, see 
Homi Babha, “DissemiNation: Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation,” in 
idem., The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 199–244 (here 210–17). See 
also Jie-Hyun Lim, “Transnational Memory Activism and Performative Nationalism,” in 
Handbook of Memory Activism, eds. Jenny Wüstenberg et al. (forthcoming 2021).
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to violent repression of a democracy movement in 1980, provide examples 
of the power of local memory, though with notable differences.18 In the 
case of cities, what is remembered locally is often the struggle to retain the 
physical fabric of memory itself: the visible traces of a community. This is 
well represented in protests against redevelopment which articulate the 
nexus between identity and the configuration of urban space—examples of 
what Edward S. Casey calls “place memory” and of Andreas Huyssen’s 
“urban imaginary.” These forms of memory are haunted by the global, as 
resistance has often adopted the voice of nostalgia for neighborhood pasts 
characterized by cosmopolitan values and ethnic and social diversity.19
And there are other ways in which “glocal,” that coinage of the 1990s, 
is relevant to questions of memory and mnemonic solidarity. Where most 
of the contributions to this volume refer to the traumas of war and geno-
cide, “rebel cities” typically articulate the material and psychological trau-
mas incurred by neoliberalism at the intersection of aesthetics and everyday 
life—where the city itself is a victim of global capital flows that drive the 
privatization and homogenization of urban space.20 Per contra, in the 
form of housing activism, urban memory movements have acquired global 
networks and vocabularies.21 It is also the case that some icons of trauma 
which circulate globally have very particular associations for the memory 
communities in the places where the event took place—associations shaped 
by pre-existing discourses of local identity. An example of this is the 2001 
18 Sarah Gensburger, Memory on My Doorstep: Chronicles of the Bataclan Neighborhood, 
Paris 2015–2016, trans. Katharine Throssell (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2019); Linda 
S. Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju Uprising 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002), especially 135–51 on the simultaneous con-
solidation of a local identity around the trauma and efforts to insert the commemoration in 
the global human rights program.
19 Edward S.  Casey, Remembering. A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2000), 181–215; Andreas Huyssen, “Introduction,” in Other Cities, Other 
Worlds, ed. Andreas Huyssen (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 1–23; Dolores 
Hayden, The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History (Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 1995), 44–81; Yuan Yao and Rongbin Han, “Challenging, but not Trouble-Making: 
cultural elites in China’s urban heritage preservation,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, 
no. 98 (2016): 292–306; Martin Zebracki, “Urban preservation and the queerying spaces of 
(un)remembering: Memorial landscapes of the Miami Beach art deco historic district,” 
Urban Studies 55, no. 10 (2018): 2261–85.
20 Cf David Harvey, Rebel Cities. From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution 
(London: Verso, 2012).
21 Katia Valenzuela-Fuentes, Dominika V. Polanska and Anne Kaun, “The right to housing 
in theory and in practice: going beyond the West,” Interface 9, no. 1 (2017): 359–67.
 J.-H. LIM AND E. ROSENHAFT
13
attack on the World Trade Center, whose identificatory power and mne-
monic complexities for New Yorkers are being evoked by the city’s experi-
ence of the coronavirus pandemic as this volume goes to press.22 It is at the 
local level, too, that insurgent memories arise out of everyday hurts. 
Formulated as demands for justice that expose structural inequalities in 
democratic societies and reinforced in commemorations that enact 
counter- national identities, these, too, can now go global. Here, the edi-
tors of this volume cannot fail to mention the solidary encounters between 
the Liverpool families of the victims of the 1989 Hillsborough Disaster 
and those of the people (mainly teenagers) who drowned in the sinking of 
the Sewol Ferry off the South Korean coast in 2014.23 Theirs are also 
voices of a global South.
22 Setha M. Low, “The Memorialization of September 11: Dominant and Local Discourses 
on the Rebuilding of the World Trade Center Site,” American Ethnologist 31, no. 3 (2004): 
326–39; Simon Stow, “From Upper Canal to Lower Manhattan: Memorialization and the 
Politics of Loss,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 3 (2012), 687–700.
23 “Sewol and Hillsborough: families see common threads in tragedy,” Hankyoreh, May 16, 
2016, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/743734.html. The 
meeting was part of a European tour by the Sewol families in which they met with the fami-
lies of victims of the 1994 sinking of the MS Estonia and of the Paris terror attacks: “Families 
of Sewol Ferry Victims Meet with Families of Hillsborough and MS Estonia Disaster 
Victims,” accessed May 14, 2020, https://rememberingsewoluk.files.wordpress.
com/2016/05/20160430_pressrelease_engl.pdf.
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Fig. 2.1 Descendants of the 1904–1908 genocide in Namibia at the Holocaust 
Memorial in Berlin 2011, on the occasion of the first repatriation of deported 
human remains to Namibia (Reinhard Kößler)
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Abstract Lim sets out the origins and progress of the mnemonic conflu-
ence of three historical traumas—the Holocaust, the crimes of colonial-
ism, and Stalinist terror. He traces this process back to the “thaw” in 
memory cultures precipitated by the end of socialism after 1989, and 
adopts a postcolonial perspective to analyze how victimhood memories 
arising out of these experiences have become entangled globally. Against 
the flat model of the cosmopolitanization of the Holocaust, Lim argues 
for the non-hierarchical comparability of historical traumas. He concludes 
by proposing “critical relativization” and “radical juxtaposition” as ways of 
de-hegemonizing and de-centering universal memories and deconstruct-
ing mnemonic nationalism.
Keywords Global memory formation • Holocaust • Stalinism 
• Genocide • Postcolonialism • Critical relativization • Radical 
juxtaposition
Victimhood claims at the thaw of cold 
war memory
One of the salient features of postwar global memory formation is that the 
Holocaust has provided a memory template for historical traumas every-
where.1 American slavery, the genocide of the indigenous nations of the 
New World, countless colonial atrocities in the global South, the Japanese 
A-bomb victims, the Nanjing Massacre, American war crimes in Vietnam, 
and the Korean comfort women (victims of military sexual slavery) are 
commemorated in terms drawn from the vocabulary of Holocaust mem-
ory. In Central and Eastern Europe, the painful memories of the Allied 
bombing and Vertreibung in Germany, the mass killing and enslavement 
of the Slavs in “Germany’s Wild East,” and the Ukrainian Holodomor and 
1 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age, trans. 
Assenka Oksiloff (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006).
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other Stalinist crimes have invoked the memory of Holocaust.2 But Daniel 
Levy and Natan Sznaider’s remark that, by transposing Holocaust mem-
ory onto memories of other genocides, “Never again Auschwitz provided 
the foundation for emerging cosmopolitan memories” is both right and 
wrong.3 In the fifteen years since their book was written, it has become 
clear that Holocaust discourse is increasingly providing the mnemonic 
leverage for the re-territorialization and nationalization of collec-
tive memory.
Holocaust memory has been instrumentalized, vulgarized, and abused. 
Through the narcissistic identification with Jewish suffering, post- 
communist politics in Eastern Europe nationalized Holocaust remem-
brance to justify a resurgent old-fashioned ethnic nationalism and activate 
a screen memory to cover up their own war crimes.4 Also, one cannot but 
to see an inherent contradiction between the global ubiquity of the 
Holocaust and its supposed uniqueness. This chapter scrutinizes the mne-
monic confluence and entanglements of three historical traumas—the 
Holocaust, colonial genocide, and Stalinist terror—in the global memory 
space. In particular, it explores the ways in which memories of those events 
have been deployed to underpin the claims of whole polities (nation- 
states) to the status of victim and to the material and ethical entitlements 
arising from that status. As these claims have become entangled in 
2 It is not my purpose here to assess the objective force of historical comparisons/analo-
gies, a theme which has also, of course, been present in recent political theory and historiog-
raphy. See, for example, Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); A.  Dirk Moses, 
“Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the ‘Racial Century’: Genocides of 
Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust,” Patterns of Prejudice 36, no. 4 (2020): 7–36; Jan 
Burzlaff, “The Holocaust and Slavery? Working Towards A Comparative History of Genocide 
and Mass Violence,” Journal of Genocide Research (2020), https://doi.org/10.108
0/14623528.2020.1718355; Steven T. Katz, “Response to Jan Burzlaff ’s Review of Steven 
T.  Katz, The Holocaust and New World Slavery,” Journal of Genocide Research (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2020.1718357.
3 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “Memory Unbound: the Holocaust and the Formation 
of Cosmopolitan Memory,” European Journal of Social Theory 5, no. 1 (2002): 87–106 
(here 99).
4 Lea David, “Holocaust Discourse as a Screen Memory: the Serbian Case,” in History and 
Politics in the Western Balkans: Changes at the Turn of the Millennium, eds. Srdan M. Jovanovic 
and Veran Stancetic (Belgrade: The Center for Good Governance Studies, 2013), 64–88 
(here 65, 67, 69, 71, 79); Jelena Subotic ́, Yellow Star, Red Star: Holocaust Remembrance 
after Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 5–11.
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globalized discourse, competition for recognition of national grievance has 
intensified.
The key moment in this development came in the 1990s, as official 
memories frozen by the Cold War ideology began to thaw. This thaw 
released suppressed memories all over the world. In the former Soviet 
bloc, the official myths of anti-fascist struggle lost their power as screen 
memories,5 and vernacular remembrance of the Stalinist terror erupted 
into the public sphere. At the same time, there emerged previously unspo-
ken memories of Nazi collaboration in Eastern Europe, triggering an East 
European version of the Historikerstreit which had convulsed West 
Germany in the decade before the Wall came down. In the tri-continent of 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the fall of communism also signaled the 
release of memories of the atrocities committed by Western colonialisms. 
Memories of colonial genocide and anti-communist political atrocities 
could no longer be marginalized, because the propaganda imperative to 
defend Western civilization against Soviet barbarism lost its power. The 
colonial scars sutured by the worldwide anti-communist alliance became 
porous, and it became possible to articulate the hurts of colonial occupa-
tion and economic imperialism as such before a global public.
In the post-Cold War environment, the victimhood claims arising from 
those historical traumas become entangled, producing a global memory 
formation. By this I mean neither the global memory space as a fact or a 
condition, nor the simple compilation or comparative juxtaposition of 
separate memories within it. Formation here denotes process, and scrutiny 
of how this triad of victimhoods has become entangled can shed new light 
on the dynamics of that process in the twenty-first century. Global mem-
ory formation is in a constant state of becoming, and its outcomes depend 
on specific mnemonic interactions between the global template (in this 
case Holocaust and to a lesser extent colonialism) and local sensitivities. 
This chapter traces some key interactions and considers the possibilities for 
mnemonic solidarity they contain (and how they have been frustrated). 
The Historikerstreit of the 1980s introduced the term “relativization” to 
characterize arguments that juxtaposed the crimes of the Nazis and 
Bolshevik terror with the purpose of diminishing the enormity of the 
Holocaust and “moving beyond” West Germany’s public culture of 
5 On the origins and uses of the term “screen memory,” see Michael Rothberg, 
Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), 12–16.
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historical self-reflection and apology. This chapter ends by affirming the 
value of remembering historical traumas together and in relation to one 
another, but calls for a critical approach that resists political instrumental-
ization and the temptation to create hierarchies of victimhood by deploy-
ing strategies of “critical relativization” and “radical juxtaposition.”
(Post)colonial and holocaust identities:  
alibis and alliances
Amid the refugee crisis that shook Europe in September 2015, a debate 
broke out among Polish historians on how to interpret Eastern European 
apathy or even antipathy toward Islamic refugees. Gazeta Wyborcza’s 
report about remarks by Jan Gross sparked the controversy. In an article 
in Die Welt, he had claimed that East European hostility toward the refu-
gees originated in a failure to come to terms with the Holocaust past. 
Gross argued that critical reflection on Eastern Europeans’ complicity in 
the murder of the Jews might have resulted in more empathy with refu-
gees. He asserted that Poles even murdered more Jews than Germans, 
challenging the myth of the unity of the resistance to German occupa-
tion.6 Since Gross has been arguing for Polish complicity in the Holocaust 
since the publication of Neighbors in 2000, his article in Die Welt is not 
very surprising.
Even so, Gross’s point is intriguing. He was suggesting that Eastern 
European attitudes to Islamic refugees reflect a “wrong” memory prac-
tice—challenging the relativization or marginalization of the Holocaust in 
the Polish mnemoscape. In Eastern Europe, Nazism and communism fig-
ure as twin evils in post-Communist memory, with communism widely 
regarded as the greater evil in its duration, intensity, and temporal proxim-
ity. Particularly in the Baltics and Poland, the Holocaust has been regarded 
as peripheral to national suffering under Stalinist oppression.7 Gross’s 
argument targeted the relativization or marginalization of the Holocaust 
in the Polish mnemoscape.
6 Bartosz T. Wieliński, “‘Polska nie chce uchodźców, bo nie rozliczyła sie ̨ze zbrodni na 
Żydach.’ Oburzenie po tekście Grossa,” Wyborcza.pl, September 15, 2015, http://wybor-
cza.pl/1,75968,18817369,skandalista-gross.html#ixzz420HIHBty.
7 Siobhan Kattago, “Agreeing to Disagree on the Legacies of Recent History Memory, 
Pluralism and Europe after 1989,” European Journal of Social Theory 12, no. 3 (2009): 
375–95 (here 382); Martin Evans, “Memories, Monuments, Histories: the re-thinking of 
the Second World War since 1989,” National Identities 8, no. 4 (2006): 317–48 (here 320).
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Polish historians Marcin Zaremba and Aleksander Smolar came to the 
defense of the Poles by pointing to the absence of a colonial past in Poland 
and other Eastern European countries. Unlike Western Europeans (includ-
ing Germans), who have historical experience of ruling over colonial sub-
jects, they argued, Poles have had no chance to become familiar with 
people of different cultures, religions, and/or race. Poland has never been 
a colonial power that had to deal with a native Other.8 Paradoxically, the 
discursive connectivity of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia is no secret in 
contemporary Poland, as manifested in the widespread joke that “we are 
ready to accept refugees because we have always had concentration 
camps.”9 But the implication of Zaremba and Smolar’s argument was a 
specifically anti-colonial indictment: “You are guilty of colonialism, but we 
are innocent. So the refugee problem belongs to you.” From the postco-
lonial viewpoint, we can say that their anti-colonial rhetoric bespeaks the 
ambivalence of Polish Orientalism: the aspiration to be included into 
Western Europe while orientalizing the imagined internal other 
within Poland.
A cursory look at the history of Poland’s partition by Russia, Austria, 
and Prussia, the trajectories of national irredentism, and the suffering of 
the Polish nation at large may give credence to the notion of Poland’s 
colonial innocence. But Poland was the colonizer against the Lithuanian 
and Ukrainian neighbors in the kresy (borderland) at the same time as 
German settlers were colonizing Poland. Treated as a hinterland, the first 
model of underdevelopment, and “a neglected suburb of Europe,” Poles 
have never been free of the West’s “intellectual project of demi- 
Orientalization.”10 But they have responded by developing disrespectful 
attitudes toward other “more eastern” and “less western” Slavic neigh-
bors. And this reflects Poland’s status as subaltern empire: subaltern 
8  Wieliński, “‘Polska nie chce uchodz ́ców, bo nie rozliczyła sie ̨ze zbrodni na Z ̇ydach.’; 
Aleksander Smolar, “Smolar: Gross szokuje,” Wyborcza.pl, September 16, 2015, http://
wyborcza.pl/1,75968,18824173,smolar-gross-szokuje.html.
9 Marek Rymsza, “Dyskusja: czy to nasza sprawa?” Wiez̨ ́ 4, no. 662 (2015): 36–46 
(here 42).
10 Lucy Mably et  al., “‘Other’ Posts in ‘Other’ Places: Poland through a Postcolonial 
Lens?” Sociology 50, no. 1 (2016): 60–76 (here 66); Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: 
The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1994), 9; Jerzy Jedlicki, A Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-Century Polish Approaches to 
Western Civilization (Budapest: Central European University Press. 1999), xiii.
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vis-à- vis Germany and the “West,” yet fully incorporated in the global 
structure of domination as the repressive local agent of the great powers.11 
It is this complex situation that fueled Vladimir Putin’s anti-Polish cam-
paign in the run-up to the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz 
in 2020. Poland’s ambivalent position under Nazi occupation provided 
the excuse for Putin to whitewash Stalin’s handshake with Hitler and erase 
the first two years of World War II.12
Internal colonialism, too, was entirely characteristic of Poland’s 
Second Republic (1918–1939). This was a multi-ethnic state, where 
ethnic Poles formed only about 68.9% of the whole population. The 
rest were Ukrainians, Jews, Belorussians, Germans, and others. Polish 
nationalists regretted that it remained “not a nation-state but a state 
of nationalities.”13 Józef Piłsudski’s Sanacja regime responded to the 
demands of ethnic minorities by setting up the internment camp at 
Bereza Kartuska in 1934. Internal colonialism, demi-Orientalism 
against the kresy (borderlands) and Eastern Slavic neighbors, and the 
fusion of anti-Semitism and anti- Bolshevism in official discourse col-
luded rhetorically with the anti-Slavic and anti-Semitic propaganda 
that would mark the Nazi colonial occupation of Poland itself. Polish 
nationalism was no exception to the “ambivalent hybrid” of desire and 
resentment typical of subaltern imperialists.
What Poland lacks is not colonial experience, but postcolonial criticism 
toward internal colonialism. In the communist era, hundreds of thousands 
of contract workers from Asia and Africa flowed into East Germany, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic Soviet republics. This evidences 
the existence of a “global socialist ecumene” which promoted 
11 For Subaltern Empire, see Viatcheslav Morozov, “Subaltern Empire? Toward a 
Postcolonial Approach to Russian Foreign Policy,” Problems of Post-Communism 60, no. 6 
(2013): 16–28; Jordan Sand, “Subaltern Imperialists: The New Historiography of the 
Japanese Empire,” Past and Present, no. 225 (November 2014): 273–88.
12 Anshel Pfeffer, “In New Battle Over Auschwitz Legacy, Poland Falls Victim to Holocaust 
Geopolitics,” Haaretz, January 22, 2020, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.pre-
mium-the-dir ty-politics-behind-israel-s-capitulation-to-putin-s-wwii-revision-
ism-1.8406565/.premium-the-dirty-politics-behind-israel-s-capitulation-to-putin-s- 
wwii-revisionism-1.8406565; Ofer Aderet, “The Dirty Politics Behind Israel’s Capitulation 




13 Janusz Pajewski, Budowa Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918–26 (Kraków: PAU, 1995), 164.
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transnational flows of ideas, knowledge and cultural artifacts and the trans-
national mobility of people. And this ecumene did not come to an end 
even after the collapse of the communist bloc. The fact that Poland has 
accepted 100,000 Chechen refugees or exiles since 1996 refutes the prop-
osition that Islamophobia is a fixed memory template in post-communist 
Poland. But while these numbers are impressive, the recent refugee crisis 
has seen a dramatic shift from empathy to apathy in the Polish attitude 
toward Chechens.14
In short, the debate over the refugee question is not a factological, but 
an epistemological one, in which collective guilt for anti-Semitism and 
colonial innocence are competing to provide the narrative template for 
post-communist collective memory. Gross’s criticism that Polish society’s 
hostility to Islamic refugees represents its failure to come to terms with the 
past of the Holocaust makes sense, but it is only partially correct. The 
blunt insensitivity toward them even among critical intellectuals really 
does bespeak the absence of postcolonial self-criticism. It is the combina-
tion of tropes that counts, though: the memory of colonial victimization 
under Nazism and Stalinism operates as a screen memory to suppress the 
knowledge of complicity in the Holocaust. The “Historikerstreit po pol-
sku,” a heated debate around Jan Błoński’s seminal essay “Biedny polacy 
patrza ̨na getto” (poor Poles look at the ghetto) in 1987, followed by the 
reception of Jan Gross’s book Sas̨iedzi (Neighbors) in 2000, led to “a 
genuine moral revolution” in post-communist Poland by breaking through 
the anti-fascist screen memory and bringing suppressed guilt to the sur-
face. However, even the metamorphosis of Polish self-definition from 
innocent victim to “Homo Jedvabnecus” after 2000 did not produce a 
critical postcolonial response. Poland is still waiting for a mnemonic con-
fluence of the Holocaust and the postcolonial that does justice to the 
complexity of its wartime experiences.
Outside the realm of political rhetorics, postcolonial readings of the 
Holocaust have elaborated the historical continuities between German 
colonial genocide, the Nazis’ Eastern occupation policy, and the Holocaust, 
helping us to situate the German invasion and occupation of the Slavic 
East firmly in the European colonialist tradition.15 The Generalplan Ost 
14 See a Chechen refugee resident in Poland—Malika Abdoulvakhabova’s witness: Rymsza, 
“Dyskusja: czy to nasza sprawa?” Wiez 662 (2015): 36–46 (here 36, 38, 39).
15 Jürgen Zimmerer, “Die Geburt des Ostlandes aus dem Geiste des Kolonialismus: Die 
nationalsozialistische Eroberungs- und Beherrschungspolitik in (post-)kolonialer 
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assumed that the SS would run latifundia in the occupied territories 
exploiting native Slav labor until the Germans were numerous and mecha-
nized enough to do without them. To German settlers in the occupied 
Generalgouvernement, pioneering in the East was “colonial work” like 
work under the African sun. As Reich Economic Minister Walter Funk 
wrote, “vast territories of the European East will be Europe’s promising 
colonial land of the future.”16 By blaming Poland’s backwardness on the 
Jewish influence, moreover, some Nazis could combine the rationale of 
Germany’s civilizing mission with crusading anti-Semitism. In short, 
Nazism was an “intra-European colonialism.”17
In Europe, there has been emotional resistance to situating Nazism and 
the Holocaust within the context of global colonialism. An implicit 
Eurocentrism insists that “the Holocaust stands out from other genocides 
because it was committed in the heart of civilized Europe rather than in 
the midst of (supposedly) primitive or barbaric societies.”18 Zygmunt 
Bauman anticipated this argument thirty years ago, with his warning that 
Holocaust-style genocide is a logical outcome not of premodern barbarity, 
but of Western modernity.19 And as early as 1950 Aimé Césaire pinpointed 
the dilemma of Eurocentric intellectuals: “[The European bourgeois] has 
a Hitler inside him ... and … what he cannot forgive Hitler for is not the 
crime in itself, the crime against man, it is not the humiliation of man as 
such, it is the crime against the white man, and the fact that he applied to 
Europe colonialist procedures which had until then been reserved 
Perspektive,” Sozial Geschichte 19, no. 1 (2004): 10–43; Benjamin Madley, “From Africa to 
Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and 
Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe,” European History Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2005): 
429–64; Enzo Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence (New York: The New Press, 2003); 
Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, “Der Holocaust als kolonialer Genozid? 
Europäische Kolonialgewalt und nationalsozialistischer Vernichtungskrieg,” Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 33 (2007): 439–66; A. Dirk Moses, “Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and 
the Philosophy,” in Empire, Colony, Genocide, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York and Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2008), 3–54.
16 David Furber, “Near as Far in the Colonies: The Nazi Occupation of Poland,” The 
International History Review 26, no. 3 (2004): 541–79 (here 541, 544, 549).
17 Moses, “Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy,” 34.
18 Dan Stone, “The Historiography of Genocide: Beyond ‘Uniqueness’ and Ethnic 
Competition,” Rethinking History 8, no. 1 (2004): 127–42 (here 133).
19 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2000), xi–xii, 28, 152 and passim.
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exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the ‘coolies’ of India, and the ‘niggers’ 
of Africa.”20 Remarkably, People’s Poland published a translation of 
Césaire’s Discours sur le colonialisme early in 1950—an example of how 
Poland’s communist postcolonialism drew an analogy between the Slavic 
East under the Nazi occupation of the “Third Europe” and the postcolo-
nial states of the “Third World.”21 This analogy is strikingly absent from 
the work of post-communist liberal historians in Poland, who still (or 
again) suffer the ambivalent feelings of envy, admiration, and distrust 
toward Western Europe which shaped the mentalité of the nineteenth-
century intelligentsia and which bespeak the country’s triple position as 
former colony, former colonizer, and subject to Western hegemons.
But as the case of Aimé Césaire reminds us, the perception of a family 
resemblance between Nazi racism and colonialism in Europe and the 
oppressions of (internal) colonialism and the racial state elsewhere was 
present in the observations of Afro-diasporic intellectuals from a very early 
stage. The confluence of anti-Semitism and racism can be found in 
W. E. B. Du Bois’ memory of an incident during his trip to Galicia in 
1890, when a small-gown cabman asked if Du Bois wanted to stop “Unter 
die Juden,” in a local hotel run by a Jew. To that cabman, Du Bois, an 
African-American, was no different from a Jew. And the fact that Germans 
were more hostile to Jews than to him as a “Negro” taught him that rac-
ism is about more than color prejudice.22 Galician Jews and African 
Americans were entangled that way in the late nineteenth century. Nor 
was Du Bois the first to recognize those entanglements. The Black Atlantic 
slave communities strengthened their self-esteem by seeing their oppres-
sion and their hopes through the lens of the Jewish exodus from slavery in 
Egypt, revaluing their suffering as a redemptive experience.23
Di Shklaferay, the Yiddish version of the Uncle Tom’s Cabin, is a good 
example of the “return traffic” in this exchange. Ayzik-Meyer Dik adapted 
the novel to Jewish circumstances, making the master a Jew, and having 
Uncle Tom escape to freedom in Canada with the Jewish master’s kind 
20 Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. J. Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review, 
2000), 36.
21 Adam F.  Kola, Socjalistyczny Postkolonializm: Rekonsolidacja pamiec̨i (Toruń: NCU 
Press, 2018), 2–3.
22 W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto,” in The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois 
Reader, ed. Eric. J. Sundquist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 470.




help. Di Shklaferay became a bestseller among immigrant Jews to America 
in the late nineteenth century. The New York Yiddish newspaper Forverts 
compared the emancipation of American slaves with the Jewish Exodus 
from Egypt and in 1927 urged American Jews to watch the film of Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin. Radical Jews sent their children to racially integrated sum-
mer camps. The spirit of solidarity between African Americans and Jews 
continued in the work of the NAACP, in which many liberal and radical 
Jews participated. In 1952 Louis Harap, the managing editor of Jewish 
Life, invited Du Bois to a concert-meeting in “Tribute to the Warsaw 
Ghetto Fighters.” He asked Du Bois to speak on the “significance of the 
ghetto fight for the Negro people in the United States today in relation to 
cooperation with their allies, the Jewish people and the common people of 
America.”24 In his speech, Du Bois spoke of recalling “the scream and 
shots of a race riot in Atlanta and the marching of the Ku Klux Klan” dur-
ing his visit to the ruins of the Warsaw ghetto in 1949. He acknowledged 
that he was able to gain a “more complete understanding of the Negro 
problem” through a “cleared understanding of the Jewish problem in the 
world.”25 The swift response by African Americans to the 1948 “Genocide 
Convention” is another landmark. We Charge Genocide, a petition deliv-
ered by African-American Communists to the United Nations in 1951, 
invoked global awareness of the Holocaust to make a link between the 
crimes of the Nazis and Jim Crow America. Their action met a negative 
response from Raphael Lemkin, the chief proponent of the genocide con-
cept and the UN Convention, who was fearful of losing American 
support.26
The dialogue of Blacks and Jews is also found in apartheid South Africa. 
For many prominent anti-apartheid activists, the diary of Anne Frank was 
a treasured text, with handwritten copies circulating even in the notorious 
Robben Island prison. In one of his public addresses as president of 
24 W. E. B. Du Bois, “Letter from Jewish Life to W. E. B. Du Bois, February 13, 1952,” 
W. E. B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312) Special Collections and University Archives, University 
of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, accessed March 8, 2020, http://credo.library.umass.
edu/view/full/mums312-b137-i103.
25 Du Bois, “The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto,” 471.
26 Ann Curthoys and John Docker, “Defining Genocide,” in The Historiography of 
Genocide, ed. Dan Stone (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 9–41 (here 16–21); 
David Helps, “‘We Charge Genocide’: Revisiting Black Radicals’ Appeals to the World 
Community,” Radical Americas 3, no. 1 (2018): 1–24 (here 9).
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post- apartheid democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela remembered 
that Anne’s diary had reinforced his confidence in the invincibility of the 
cause of freedom and justice. The anti-racist activists drew on the analogy 
with Nazism to characterize the apartheid system and to mobilize interna-
tional support for the anti-apartheid movement as the most critical moral 
battle in the postwar world. The three successive exhibitions of “Nazisme 
in Zuid-Afrika” held in Anne Frank House in Amsterdam in the early 
1970s, jointly organized by the Pluto (the Dutch-South African student 
group) and the Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement, provide us with an 
excellent example of the interaction of postcolonial and Holocaust mem-
ory. Visitors could see the banner declaring “Nazism=Apartheid” and a 
life-size papier- mâché doll of then-Prime Minister B.J. Vorster holding a 
swastika.27 Black British critic Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic and Between 
Camps are nothing other than the attempt to recover this history of dia-
logue between Blacks and Jews. The postcolonial matters in the transat-
lantic nexus of memories.28
nagasaki and auschwitz
“Stunned by the intense air of death” during his first visit to Auschwitz in 
1987, Nakatani Takeshi works as a tour guide at Poland’s national 
Auschwitz-Birkenau museum. After passing the examination for official 
guides, he started working there in 1997. He hopes the tour he leads can 
help Japanese visitors to understand “the suffering of victims and the 
importance and fragility of peace.” But for him the museum does not 
prompt reflection on the East Asian wartime experience.29 Hirano Yumie, 
who serves as a “keeper of memory” of the A-bomb experience in 
27 Shirli Gilbert, “Anne Frank in South Africa,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 26, no. 3 
(Winter 2012): 366–93 (here 366, 374).
28 There is not space here to explore the growing evidence for exchanges across the “Black 
Pacific,” but see Yuichiro Onishi, “The New Negro of the Pacific: How African Americans 
Forged Cross-Racial Solidarity with Japan, 1917–1922,” Journal of African American 
History 92, no. 2 (2007): 191–213; Bill Mullen, Afro-Orientalism (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2004); Yuichiro Onishi, Trans-Pacific Anti-racism: Afro-Asian Solidarity 
in twentieth-Century Black America, Japan, and Okinawa (New York and London: New York 
University Press, 2013); Etsuko Taketani, The Black Pacific Narrative: Geographic Imaginings 
of Race and Empire between the World Wars (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2014).
29 Toshihisha Onishi, “Auschwitz guide works to enlighten Japanese visitors,” Japan 




Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, has a different approach. The City of 
Hiroshima launched a program for ordinary citizens to communicate the 
stories of A-bomb survivors (hibakusha in Japanese) and their desire for 
peace in 2012. Since then, she has visited Peru, Mongolia, and Iceland to 
share hibakusha accounts. In an interview before her visit to Poland in 
2015, she said, “many Jews were killed because of racial discrimination, 
and innocent civilians were killed in Hiroshima. I want to convey how 
human rights are abused at a time of war.”30
Two Japanese memory agents hold different, almost opposite, views on 
the mnemonic connectivity and historical comparability of Auschwitz and 
Hiroshima. If the Auschwitz tour guide sticks to the incommensurability 
of the Holocaust, the Hiroshima memory keeper unreservedly compares 
Auschwitz and Hiroshima. This difference may come from the differences 
in the training they received: Nakatani’s training to be an Auschwitz guide 
combined the official memory of Poland and Israel, while Hirano’s prac-
tice as a voluntary memory keeper in Hiroshima epitomizes the dominant 
discourse of A-bomb victimhood in Japan. The divide between those 
Japanese memory agents indicates the complexity of the Auschwitz- 
Hiroshima connection.
Nevertheless, A-bomb victims in Japan were already invoking the 
Holocaust in “year zero”—1945. The first sign of entanglement appeared 
on November 23, 1945, in Nagasaki. At a memorial mass for Catholic 
hibakusha, Nagai Takashi delivered a funeral oration to about 600 survi-
vors holding 8000 small white crosses to represent the Catholic victims. 
The speech reportedly moved the whole congregation to tears.31 The 
original manuscript of Nagai’s funeral address reads: “The atomic bomb 
was originally destined for the prefectural offices at the center of Nagasaki. 
But because of weather conditions, the wind carried the plane north to 
Urakami, and the bomb exploded above the cathedral there … we want to 
believe that the Urakami church was chosen not as a victim but as a pure 
lamb, to be slaughtered and burned on the altar of sacrifice to expiate the 
sins committed by humanity in the Second World War.” The redemptive 
30 Sakiko Masuda, “‘Memory Keeper’ Yumie Hirano to visit Poland in May, Convey 
Survivors’ Experiences of Atomic Bombing,” The Chugoku Shinbun, April 18, 2018, http://
www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=59331.
31 For this and what follows: Konishi Tetsuro, “The Original Manuscript of Takashi Nagai’s 
Funeral Address at a Mass for the Victims of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb,” Journal of 
Nagasaki University of Foreign Studies, no. 18 (2014): 55–68.
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discourse apparent in the African diaspora’s invocation of the Jewish exo-
dus reappears again in postwar Nagasaki.
Nagai went on to say, “We want to believe that only the sacrificial vic-
tim of Urakami could bring the war to an end; by this sacrifice, billions 
who would otherwise have fallen victims to the ravages of war have been 
saved.” Then, Nagai picked out the word hansai (燔祭), the Japanese 
translation of the term “holocaust” from Chapter 22 of the Old Testament 
book of Genesis, to illustrate the sublime world-redemptive suffering of 
the A-bomb victims: “How noble, how splendid was that holocaust of 9 
August, when flames soared up from the cathedral, dispelling the darkness 
of war and bringing the light of peace!” Nagai’s speech is one of the earli-
est recorded public uses of “holocaust” in the postwar global memory 
space. Considering that the term was not popular even in Israel and the 
“West” until the late 1950s, his 1945 reference seems all the more 
remarkable.32
Nagai’s use of “holocaust” was not a direct reference to Auschwitz, but 
it invited a comparison in some aspects at least. With its biblical semiotics, 
hansai contributed to sacralizing meaningless death into holy sacrifice to 
atone for the sins of humankind and contribute to universal salvation. But 
the sublimation of victims (higaisha) into sacrifices (giseisha) also fed a 
nationalist project. Political religion comes into being by conferring a holy 
status on earthly entities like the nation, state, class, history, and race. It 
binds the individual to the sacralized secular body through a code of ethi-
cal and social commandments.33 The sacralization of the nation activates 
suppressed memories of suffering incurred in the national project under 
the aura of sacrifice.34 In this sense, Nagai’s thesis that placed Urakami 
32 For the earliest uses of Holocaust in the West, see Steve Friess, “When ‘Holocaust’ 
became ‘The Holocaust’,” The New Republic, May 18, 2015, https://newrepublic.com/
article/121807/when-holocaust-became-holocaust See also Sean Warsch, “A ‘holocaust’ 
Becomes ‘the Holocaust’,” The Jewish Magazine, http://www.jewishmag.com/107mag/
holocaustword/holocaustword.htm; Jon Petrie, “The secular word Holocaust: Scholarly 
myths, history, and 20th century meanings,” Journal of Genocide Research 2, no. 1 
(2000): 31–63.
33 Emilio Gentile, “The Sacralisation of Politics: Definitions, Interpretations and Reflections 
on the Question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism,” Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions 1 (2000): 18–55.
34 See Jie-Hyun Lim, “Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories-National 
Mourning and Global Accountability,” in Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and 




Cathedral at the center of a holocaust enriched the psychological texture 
of Japanese victimhood nationalism.
In postwar Japan, Auschwitz and Hiroshima were frequently cited as 
terrible twin symbols of man-made mass death and even singled out as two 
archetypical examples of White racism.35 The extensive Japanese press cov-
erage of the Eichmann trial promoted the association of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki with Holocaust. The poet and peace activist Kurihara Sadako 
drew a succinct analogy: “Of the world’s two great holocausts, Auschwitz 
was a major atrocity carried out by the enemies of the victorious Allies; 
Hiroshima/Nagasaki was a major atrocity carried out by Allies.” She even 
suggested that Hiroshima was worse than Auschwitz because hibakusha 
had to suffer from the after-effects of radiation exposure while Auschwitz 
had an end-point.36 Rarely tainted by sporadic anti-Semitism and 
Holocaust denial scandals,37 the analogy of Auschwitz and Hiroshima 
never disappeared from the Japanese mnemoscape.
Ran Zwigenberg has explored the intriguing case of the Hiroshima- 
Auschwitz Peace March. Four Japanese memory agents-cum-anti-nuclear 
peace activists left Hiroshima in March 1962 to participate in the com-
memoration of the liberation of Auschwitz on January 27, 1963. Satō 
Kyōtsu ̄, a Buddhist monk and a veteran of the Japanese imperial army, led 
the peace pilgrimage. He declared that its aim was “to deepen the connec-
tion between these two places of utmost suffering and tragedy in World 
War II.” On the route to Auschwitz, they visited World War II memorial 
sites in Vietnam, Singapore, Israel, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. This 
can probably be characterized as the first mnemonic pilgrimage on a global 
scale covering the Euro-Asian memory space, and Zwigenberg’s presenta-
tion of it as an early exemplar of cosmopolitan memory is relatively 
persuasive.38
35 Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: 
New York Review of Books, 2015), 92–9; John W. Dower, “An Aptitude for Being Unloved: 
War and Memory in Japan,” in Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century 
eds. Omer Bartov, Atina Grossmann and Mary Nolan (New York: The New Press, 2002), 226.
36 Sadako Kurihara, “The Literature of Auschwitz and Hiroshima,” Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies 7 (1993): 77–106 (here 86, 87). The Japanese original was published in 1984.
37 Rotem Kowner, “Tokyo Recognizes Auschwitz: The Rise and Fall of Holocaust Denial 
in Japan, 1989–1999,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, no. 2 (2001): 257–72 (here 257, 
259, and passim).
38 Ran Zwigenberg, “Never Again: Hiroshima, Auschwitz and the Politics of 
Commemoration,” Asia-Pacific Journal 13:3, no. 1 (2015): 1–22; See also Ran Zwigenberg, 
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In practice, though, the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Peace March was more 
like a mnemonic obstacle race. First, Cold War ideology delayed its depar-
ture. The Japanese authorities refused to issue passports for the Japanese 
activists, on the grounds that they were displaying political bias in com-
memorating the crimes of Germans at Auschwitz and not the massacre 
committed by Soviet soldiers at Katyn. In contrast, People’s Poland wel-
comed the Japanese peace activists, since from the perspective of the Polish 
communist party Hiroshima was a crime of American imperialism and the 
Peace March demonstrated its affinity with Nazism. Dziennik Polski, a 
Cracow newspaper, reported on the appearance of the Hiroshima peace 
delegates at the 1963 Auschwitz liberation commemorations. The report 
stressed Satō’s advocacy of the A-bomb free Central Europe agenda prop-
agated by the Polish government.39
But this involved an inverted memory of the Japanese empire that 
exposes the ambivalence of cosmopolitan memory. In this mnemoscape, 
Japan occupied a postcolonial rather than a postimperial position, as the 
“Pacific War” between Japan and the USA became just one episode in 
Japan’s century-long struggle and defeat against the colonialism of the 
Western Great Powers.40 Within this frame, Japan could remain an inno-
cent victim in the process of coming to terms with the wartime past. And 
the American crime against Japanese civilians represented by the A-bomb 
served to reinforce this, while the misery and suffering of Japan’s 
Taiwanese, Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese, Indonesian, Filipino, and other 
Asian neighbors were consigned to oblivion. The Peace March partici-
pants regarded themselves as the authentic victims and heroic pacifists 
until they were confronted with the accusations of the Japanese war atroci-
ties during the pilgrimage. And despite this challenge, the pilgrims 
carried on.
Moreover, ethnically non-Japanese victims remained marginalized in 
the cosmopolitan memory that associated Hiroshima with Auschwitz. 
Even Oe Kenzaburo, one of the writers and intellectuals most sensitive to 
the minority question, confessed that he had ignored the Korean A-bomb 
victims in his insightful reportage on anti-nuclear pacifism and memory in 
Hiroshima: the Origins of Global Memory Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014).
39 “Pierwszy dzień wolności…” Dziennik Polski, January 29, 1963.
40 Sebastian Conrad, “The Dialectics of Remembrance: Memories of Empire in Cold War 
Japan,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 56 (2014): 4–33 (here 13, 17–18).
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Hiroshima.41 The ethnocentric memory of their own victimization blocked 
the sensibility among many Japanese for the suffering of others under 
Japanese occupation. Remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki quickly 
became a way of forgetting Nanjing, Bataan, comfort women, and other 
Japanese atrocities.42 Rather, in interviews with hibakusha, reflections on 
the moral adequacy of the desire for revenge against Germans and 
Americans respectively, could evoke tirades against the vengefulness of the 
Koreans.43 As James Orr puts it, Hiroshima became “an icon of Japan’s 
past as an innocent war victim and a beacon for its future as a pacifist 
nation.”44 Yoneyama Lisa offers a more radical diagnosis, arguing that 
“the claim to posit a universal category of humanity as the subject of 
memorialization serves to obstruct condemnation of Japanese nationalism 
and ethnocentrism.”45
One cannot but be sceptical about the “cosmopolitan memory” con-
necting Hiroshima and Auschwitz in the 1960s. In the death diplomacy of 
exchanging the ashes of unidentified victims between the two sites, for 
example, it vulgarized the memento mori of the genocide. Moreover, it 
implied the nationalist appropriation of the Holocaust on the Japanese 
side as well as its ideological instrumentalization on the Polish side. In the 
Euro-Asian space it worked as a screen memory to cover the suffering of 
those subject to Japanese colonialism—a function similarly fulfilled by an 
obsessive interest in Anne Frank. Almost every Japanese has learned some-
thing about Anne Frank through the diary, manga comic book adapta-
tions, or anime films. And as French journalist Alain Lewkovitz explains, 
“the Anne Frank-Japan connection is based on a kinship of victims … [But 
t]hey don’t think of the countless Anne Franks their troops created in 
Korea and China…”46
41 See Kenzaburo Oe, “Preface to the English edition,” in Hiroshima Notes, trans. 
D. L. Swain and T. Yonezawa (New York: Marion Boyars, 1995), 9. The Japanese original 
was written in 1963.
42 John Dower, “The Bombed: Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japanese Memory,” Diplomatic 
History 19, no. 2 (1995): 275–95 (here 281).
43 Robert Jay Lifton, Death in Life. Survivors of Hiroshima (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1991), 322.
44 James J. Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar 
Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 52.
45 Lisa Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), 25.
46 Quoted in Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Why Are the Japanese So Fascinated With Anne 
Frank?” Haaretz, January 22, 2014, https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/anne-frank-the- 
japanese-anime-1.5314070.
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The Japanese career of Saint Maksymilian Kolbe is less well known than 
the Anne Frank syndrome, and it is much more complicated. Canonized 
in 1982 as a martyr for agreeing to be killed in Auschwitz in place of a 
fellow-inmate, Father Kolbe had spent time in Nagasaki as a missionary 
between 1930 and 1936. During those years, Nagai Takashi, the funeral 
orator of 1945 and himself known as the saint of Nagasaki, had visited 
Father Kolbe in the Hongochi monastery in Nagasaki and recorded his 
admiration for the priest. As the historical centre of Japanese Catholicism, 
Nagasaki was the focus of memory of the past persecution of Catholics in 
Japan. Kolbe’s career at key sites of national and Catholic martyrdom pro-
moted a very particular mnemonic nexus of Polish and Japanese (Catholic) 
victimhood. The moves for his beatification in 1971 and canonization in 
1982 involved efforts to strengthen that nexus.47
Endō Shu ̄saku, a famous Catholic liberal novelist, published the serial 
novel Onna no isshō in the popular progressive daily newspaper Asahi 
Shimbun in 1980–1982.48 The novel intertwines the love story between 
two young Christians in wartime Nagasaki with Father Kolbe’s martyr-
dom at Auschwitz. The resulting impression is that the deaths of both 
Nagasaki and Auschwitz victims were the work of Providence, a redemp-
tive self-sacrifice for the sake of the peaceful future of humankind. Endō 
Shūsaku’s short essay depicting Father Kolbe’s death in Auschwitz fea-
tured in high school literature textbooks and is and still widely read among 
Japanese teenagers. In his interpretation, the highest love is to sacrifice 
one’s own life to save that of another—an act of altruism that deserves the 
name miracle (kiseki).49
It is intriguing to note that Sono Ayako, one of Japanese Prime Minister 
Abe’s informal advisers, provoked an online storm by writing that South 
Africa’s apartheid policies had been good for Whites, Asians, and Africans. 
She has praised apartheid as a model of how Japan could expand 
47 See Jie-Hyun, Lim, “Kimyōna He ̄chi—Makisimiriano Korubeto Nagasaki Hibakushano 
Shinsēka (A Strange Juxtaposition-Maximilian Kolbe and the Sacralization of the Nagasaki 
A-Bomb Victims),” in Sengo Nihon Bunka Saikō, ed. Tsuboi Hideto (Tōkyō: Sanninsha, 
2019), 74–103.
48 English edition: Endō Shūsaku, Sachiko, trans. Van C. Gessell (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2020).




immigration.50 Sono’s ultra-nationalist and racist public remarks are well 
known, but the fact that she has been an admirer of Father Kolbe is not. 
Two years after his beatification, she published the novel Kiseki (miracles), 
which includes a documentary biography and a fictional narrative in which 
the protagonist travels in search of the sites and the truth of Kolbe’s mir-
acles. Sono’s interpretation of “miracle” shares with that of the liberal 
Endō Shu ̄saku its emphasis on the highest love to sacrifice one’s own life 
to save another, though she is more fascinated with the patriotic myth of 
Father Kolbe and his family.51
It is not particularly surprising that the story of a Polish Catholic martyr 
became entangled with the history of the suffering of Japanese Catholics 
in Nagasaki. Kolbe’s missionary life really was entwined with the lives of 
the Catholic hibakusha there. But a key element of his story is missing 
from the Japanese reception. The agents of Japanese memory have main-
tained total silence on the question of Kolbe’s antisemitism, and this is 
true even among progressive Catholic intellectuals in Japan. When his 
beatification was announced in 1971, Jan Józef Lipski pointed out the 
antisemitic tendencies of Kolbe’s journal Mały Dziennik.52 And public dis-
cussion of Kolbe’s antisemitism was not confined to Poland; his canoniza-
tion in 1982 reignited the controversy, which the New York Times and 
Washington Post widely covered.53 The silence of Japanese Catholics on 
Kolbe’s antisemitism cannot be easily explained. Finding an explanation 
would help us to assess Japanese memory culture in the postwar period.
50 Elaine Lies and Takashi Umekawa, “Japan PM ex-adviser praises apartheid in embarrass-
ment for Abe,” Reuters, February 13, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/japan-apart-
h e i d / j a p a n - p m - e x - a d v i s e r - p r a i s e s - a p a r t h e i d - i n - e m b a r r a s s m e n t - f o r - 
abe-idUSL4N0VN1PV20150213.
51 Sono Ayako, Miracles: A Novel, trans. Kevin Doak (Portland, ME: Merwin Asia, 2016), 
15, 63, 68, 101–2. See also Phillip Gabriel, Spirit Matters: The Transcendent in Modern 
Japanese Literature (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).
52 Jan Józef Lipski, “Ojciec Kolbe i Mały Dziennik,” Tygodnik Powszechny, Nr. 38 (1182), 
19. IX. 1971.
53 Richard Cohen, “Sainthood,” Washington Post, December 14, 1982; Binder, “Franciszek 
Gajowniczek Dead; Priest Died for Him at Auschwitz,” New York Times, March 15, 1995; 
John Gross, “Life Saving,” The New York Review of Books, February 17, 1983; Daniel Schlafly, 
Warren Green and John Gross, “Kolbe and Anti-Semitism,” The New York Review of Books, 
April 14, 1983.
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comfort women, american-armenians, 
and PerformatiVe nationalism
A monument to the Korean comfort women was unveiled in front of the 
Bergen County courthouse in New Jersey on March 8, International 
Women’s Day, in 2013. Alongside monuments commemorating American 
slavery, the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, and the Irish potato fam-
ine, a new memorial stone to Korean comfort women took its place in the 
county’s “ring of honor,” part of a memory island outside the courthouse. 
The event exemplified the transpacific migration of the memory of the 
Korean comfort women. The institutional collaboration between the 
Korean American Civic Empowerment (KACE) organization and the 
Kupferberg Holocaust Center accelerated that transpacific memory cam-
paign. The two jointly organized a meeting of Korean comfort women 
and Jewish American Holocaust survivors in the auditorium of 
Queensborough Community College on December 13, 2011—a striking 
example of the global entanglement of migrated memories. The meeting 
received broad media coverage in Korea.54
The mnemonic confluence of the Holocaust and comfort women in 
New York City epitomizes the extraterritoriality of a global memory of 
World War II. However, Japanese deniers of the comfort women history 
and nationalist memory activists began to mobilize in the transpacific 
memory space too. They appealed to the White House, Congress, and 
local governments to remove the comfort women monuments by arguing 
that comfort women were volunteer prostitutes and complaining that 
Korean nationalists were lying in order to dishonor the Japanese nation. 
The USA thus became a battlefield as the East Asian memory wars over-
flowed into the transpacific memory space. The damage done to the 
regional anti-communist alliance by the memory competition around 
forced labor and the comfort women is indicated by 2019’s accelerating 
crisis in relations among the parties to the GSOMIA (General Security of 
54 No Ch’anghyon, “mi chŏngbu 1ho wianbugirimbi nyujŏjisŏ chemakshik,” Newsis, 
March 9, 2013, https://newsis.com/view/?id=NISX20130309_0011904596; Korean 
American Civic Empowerment, “Compilation of News Articles on Comfort Women 





Military Information Agreement)—South Korea, Japan, and the USA.55 
Following Bergen County, the City Council of Glendale, California, 
approved plans for a monument to the Korean comfort women by a vote 
of four to one on July 9, 2013. Despite the lobbying of Japanese national-
ists, Glendale City Council was determined on the comfort women issue. 
There are two Armenian names, Ara Najarian and Zareh Sinanyan, among 
those of council members who voted for the plan.56 Given that Armenian 
Americans make up about 40% of the city’s 200,000 inhabitants, making 
it the second biggest Armenian settlement in the world after Yerevan, the 
presence of two of them on the council is not surprising.57 What is intrigu-
ing is the address made by Armenian-American Council members at the 
unveiling of the comfort women statue.
Ara Najarian called the unveiling “a moment of pride for the City of 
Glendale” and expressed his hope that the monument could be “a part of 
the healing process” for the surviving comfort women. Zareh Sinanyan, 
the first Armenian-born politician to sit on the Glendale City Council and 
the grandson of an Armenian genocide survivor, also spoke, emphasising 
how his own memory of the Armenian genocide and its denial by the 
Turkish state had made him sensitive to the comfort women issue. 
Presumably, the political calculation of appealing to Glendale’s 20,000 
Korean-American residents also informed his speech.
Still more impressive for its display of cosmopolitan memory is the 
ReflectSpace Gallery in Glendale City Library. Designed to explore and 
reflect on major human atrocities, ReflectSpace provides a range of exhib-
its on memories.58 The inaugural exhibition, “Landscape of Memory: 
Witnesses and Remnants of Genocide,” in May–June 2017 reflected on 
the Armenian Genocide through the cross-disciplinary work of witnesses, 
survivors, and artists. The second exhibition, “Do the Right Thing,” 
which focused on the comfort women, was presented between July 20 and 
September 3, 2017. Armenian Americans Ara and Anahid Oshagan and 
55 Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Resists U.S. Pressure to Improve Ties With Japan,” New 
York Times, November 15, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/world/asia/
south-korea-japan-intelligence-sharing.html.
56 Rafu Staff, “Glendale Approves Comfort Women Memorial,” Rafu Shinpo, July 15, 
2013, http://www.rafu.com/2013/07/glendale-approves-comfort-women-memorial/.
57 Chris McCormick, “Armenian Exceptionalism,” The Atlantic, April 4, 2016, https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/glendale-armenians/475926/.
58 “ReflectSpace,” City of Glendale, accessed March 17, 2020, https://www.glendaleca.
gov/government/departments/library-arts-culture/reflectspace.
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Korean American Monica Hye Yeon Jun co-curated works by twelve inter-
national documentarians and artists. The exhibition’s key theme was the 
“tension between the inability to speak about personal trauma and the 
deep human urge to tell” characteristic of many survivor experiences.59 
Subsequent exhibitions “Wake: The Afterlife of Slavery,” “i am: Narratives 
of the Holocaust,” “in/visible—Negotiating the US-Mexico Border,” 
and “Nonlinear Histories—Transnational Memory of Trauma” show 
explicitly how dedicated the gallery is to mapping the global memory space.
It is heartening to note that in stark contrast to the position taken by 
Japanese-American right-wing nationalists Rafu Shimpo, the Japanese- 
American community newspaper in Little Tokyo in Los Angeles, pub-
lished a very sympathetic report on the unveiling ceremony. The NCRR 
(Nikkei for Civil Rights & Redress) has also been supportive of commem-
orating comfort women in the USA. The NCRR was founded in 1980 to 
call for compensation and redress for 120,000 Japanese Americans 
interned during World War II. It helped many internees to speak out at 
the 1981 hearings of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians. At the same time, it actively supported memory 
activism around the comfort women as part of a wider commitment to 
emancipatory memory politics and fighting discrimination. After 
September 11, 2001, the NCRR established a 9/11 Committee to col-
laborate with the Muslim Public Affairs Council, the Council on American- 
Islamic Relations, and the American Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee.60
The unanticipated collaboration of the Armenian-American commu-
nity and Japanese Americans of the NCRR in commemorating Korean 
comfort women in Glendale is an example of vernacular cosmopolitan 
memory in which mnemonic solidarity almost seems to have been real-
ized. A closer look, however, reveals a more complex picture. Zareh 
Sinanyan had to apologize for posting racist, homophobic, and vulgar 
comments on YouTube, “many of which appeared centered around 
Armenia’s geopolitical enemies”61—actions in stark contrast with the 
59 Chuck Wike, “New Exhibition at Downtown Glendale Central Library: Do the Right 
Thing—(dis)comfort women,” City of Glendale, accessed March 17, 2020, https://www.
glendaleca.gov/Home/Components/News/News/5389/1097?arch=1&npage=12.
60 “About NCRR,” NCRR—Nikkei for Civil Rights and Redress, accessed March 8, 2020, 
http://www.ncrr-la.org/about.html.
61 Brittany Levine, “Glendale Councilman Zareh Sinanyan apologizes for racist postings,” 
Los Angeles Times, May 1, 2013.
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solidary sentiments of his Glendale speech. Moreover, in a private talk 
with Korean-American memory activists, Sinanyan disagreed with the 
comparison they made between the Armenian genocide and the Japanese 
military sexual slavery.62 His remarks implied that only the Holocaust is 
actually comparable to the “Armenocide,” which should not be placed on 
a par with the petty tragedy of the comfort women. Mnemonic solidarity 
remains subject to the agony of competition.
To be sure, the globalization of the comfort women issue would hardly 
have been possible without mnemonic solidarity. Until the early 1990s, 
comfort women were silenced and erased from the national and regional 
memory in East Asia.63 Even when the suppressed memory surfaced in 
Korea in 1991, it remained a matter of “nationalized sexuality”: When 
memory activists proposed building a monument at Independence Hall of 
Korea, they were turned down on the pretext that there was not enough 
space in the most spacious memorial site in Korea. Comfort women did 
not fit the Hall’s heroic narrative. Postcolonial Korea’s dominant patriar-
chal memory thus marginalized and suppressed a key dimension of the 
country’s wartime suffering.64
It was the heightened sensitivity to sexual violence provoked by the civil 
war in former Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide that moved the com-
fort women into the global mnemospace. A reflection on the sexual abuse 
in former Yugoslavia sharpened the awareness of women’s rights as an 
inalienable, integral, and indivisible part of human rights. The International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and 
ICTR) included rape as a crime against humanity, providing a language for 
the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military 
Sexual Slavery that convened in Tokyo in 2000.65 The composition of the 
Tokyo tribunal itself demonstrates the significance of the global memory 
space. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, the former president of the ICTY, and 
Patricia Viseur-Sellers, Legal Advisor on Gender Related Crimes to both 
the ICTY and ICTR, acted as judges and chief prosecutors. Eight regional 
62 General Secretary of KACE, in discussion with the author, KACE Office, New York City, 
July 4, 2014.
63 See Carol Gluck’s chapter in this volume.
64 Hyunah Yang, “Hankookin gunwuianburu ̆l giŏkhandanŭngeot (Remembering Korean 
comfort women),” in Wihŏmhan Yŏsŏng [Dangerous Women], eds. Elaine H.  Kim and 
Chungmoo Choi, trans. Eunmi Park, (Seoul: Samin, 2002), 157–76 (here 175).
65 Maki Kimura, Unfolding the “Comfort Women” Debates: Modernity, Violence, Women’s 
Voices (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 6–8.
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teams of prosecutors, including a joint team from South and North Korea, 
presented cases on behalf of the former comfort women.66
The judgment of the Tokyo Tribunal did not carry legally binding 
force. But its conviction of the Japanese state and the dead emperor 
Hirohito for “war crimes and crimes against humanity” had symbolic sig-
nificance. The final judgment reads: “The crimes committed against the 
survivors remain one of the great unremedied injustices of the Second 
World War. There are no museums, no graves for the unknown comfort 
woman, no education of future generations, and no judgment days, for 
the victims of Japan’s military sexual slavery. Many of the women who 
have come forward to fight for justice have died unsung heroes.”67 As 
Carol Gluck argues in this volume “Just as the Holocaust became a global 
example of genocide, so did the comfort women become a touchstone for 
new international law relating to the violence against women in war.”
If Korean nationalism initially operated to suppress the memory of the 
comfort women, this opening up of a global conversation about them has 
also drawn nationalist memory activists into the commemoration business. 
The aborted plan to install a comfort women statue in the German city of 
Freiburg offers another insight the multiple political uses of a memory 
icon and also into the ways in which mnemonic solidarity can be buffeted 
by the cross-currents of global-transnational and local memory politics. In 
September 2016 Tae-young Yeom, the mayor of the South Korean city of 
Suwon, proposed to send a comfort woman statue to Suwon’s partner city 
Freiburg. Initially, Freiburg’s mayor Dieter Salomon welcomed it as the 
kind of gift that is usual between sister cities. As a committed Green Party 
politician, Salomon was also memory-conscious, an advocate of critical 
engagement with Germany’s Nazi past. But he had to withdraw his deci-
sion, partly because of local voices arguing that it would be a scandal to 
build a comfort woman statue when there was not yet any memorial to the 
victims of German wartime sexual slavery and violence. The angry reac-
tion from citizens of Matsuyama, Freiburg’s partner city in Japan, also 
inclined Mayor Salomon to rethink his original move.68
66 Rumi Sakamoto, “The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military 
Sexual Slavery: A Legal and Feminist Approach to the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue,” New 
Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 3 (2001): 49–58 (here 49–50).
67 Judges of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual 
Slavery, “Transcript of Oral Judgment,” December 4, 2001, accessed March 8, 2020, 
http://iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/tokyo/summary.html.




The story does not end here. In November 2016, The Korean Council 
for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, a nationalist 
feminist NGO, made Mayor Yeom the first to win the Council’s special 
prize designed for local policymakers who promote and globalize the 
comfort women issue.69 On International Women’s Day in 2017, thanks 
to Mayor Yeom’s tireless efforts, a replica of the comfort woman statue 
that stands in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul was unveiled in the 
Nepal-Himalaya-Pavillon in Wiesent, a Bavarian village with a population 
of under 2500.70 Neither German nor Korean media reports explain why 
the Nepal-Himalaya-Pavillon in Wiesent was chosen for this gesture.
This event was performed entirely out of context, out of history, and 
out of memory. Perhaps it was not the German residents of Wiesent, but 
the Korean voters at home that the comfort women statue was designed 
to address. Around the same time, the provincial assembly of Gyunggi-do 
province, to which Suwon belongs, resolved to erect a comfort woman 
statue on Dokdo/Takeshima—a cluster of rocks in the Sea of Japan which 
is the subject of an angry territorial dispute between Korea and Japan. As 
the chairperson of Gyunggi-do provincial assembly stressed the principle 
of “human rights” in this resolution,71 he revealed the open secret of how 
mnemonic nationalism appropriates and vulgarizes cosmopolitan memory. 
The global memory space provided Korea’s Quixotic nationalists with a 
brand new playground, and local politicians were able to exploit Korean 
victimhood nationalism, which is deeply rooted at the local government 
level, to raise their national and even global profiles. Memory activism 
around the comfort women still threatens to reinforce a victimhood 
nationalism that has become more performative, visualized, intimate, and 
entrenched in the everyday life of postcolonial Korea.
69 Yi Minu, “yŏmt’aeyo ̆ng suwŏnshijang, chŏngdaehyŏp t’rt’ŭkpyŏlsangt’ susang,” 
Newspeak, November 21, 2016, http://www.newspeak.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno= 
116422.
70 Stefan Gruber, “‘Trostfrau’ mahnt zum Frieden,” Mittelbayeriscshe Zeitung, March 12, 
2017, https://www.mittelbayerische.de/region/regensburg-land/gemeinden/wiesent/
trostfrau-mahnt-zum-frieden-21411-art1496089.html. My thanks to Tanja Vaitulevich for 
the information of this bizarre event.
71 Hong Yong Duck, “kyŏnggidoŭihoe orhae ane toktoe p’yo ̆nghwaŭi sonyŏsang seu-
giro,” Hankyoreh, January 16, 2017, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/area/778 
893.html.
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critical relatiVization in Postcolonial PersPectiVe
The mnemonic confluence of the Holocaust, colonialist crimes, and 
Stalinist terror characterizes global memory formation in the post-Cold 
War era, an era in which “multidirectional memory” is not yet free from 
hegemonic memory politics.72 A reflection on the ways in which memories 
of Holocaust and Gulag, of Auschwitz and Nagasaki, of the Armenian 
genocide and the comfort women, of Mississippi, Robben Island and the 
Generalgouvernement, have been and might be globally connected reveals 
a tension inherent in the global memory formation itself. Whether at the 
official or the vernacular level, remembrance is permanently pulled 
between forces of de-territorialization and re-territorialization. The simple 
generic juxtaposition of three traumas (or victimhoods)—or any two of 
them—does not necessarily produce a rosy cosmopolitan memory. 
National memories have competed for the status of hegemon in global 
memory formation, and the result has been the hierarchization of victim-
hood. In post-communist Eastern Europe and the postcolonial tri- 
continent, what promised to be a cosmopolitan memory of Holocaust has 
been appropriated to serve mnemonic nationalism. In places where vic-
tims and victimizers cohabit, an indigenized Holocaust remembrance has 
worked as a screen memory to veil the dark history of the victims’ 
own crimes.
Cosmopolitan memory is thus not free from nationalist appropria-
tion. Indeed, against our expectations, it provides mnemonic national-
ism with persistent moral leverage, thus intensifying the struggle for 
mnemonic hegemony among conflicting national memories. Holocaust 
memory as it circulates globally is particularly vulnerable to nationalist 
appropriation, perhaps because it occupies a position of absolute morali-
ty.73 And the unique success of Holocaust survivors in claiming material 
restitution makes their moral claim, in all its absoluteness, an object of 
emulation for other traumatized groups. It is a paradox but no surprise 
72 See Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory.
73 The verdict of the European Court of Justice on December 17, 2017 that denying the 
Armenian genocide belongs to the domain of the freedom of speech, while the denial of the 
Holocaust is a crime transcending the freedom of speech, is a case in point. See Ofer Aderet 
and Reuters, “European Court: Denying Armenian ‘Genocide’ Is No Crime: Judges draw 





that the Holocaust as an object of cosmopolitan memory is frequently 
abused to justify nationalist remembrance in Eastern Europe and East Asia 
in the post-Cold War era. This is not because the Holocaust has “no real 
resonance” outside of Europe, Israel, and the USA.74 Israel, the USA, and 
Western Europe were never reluctant to politicize, instrumentalize, and 
abuse Holocaust memory. If anything, the presence of real survivors in the 
“Western” countries made it easier to authenticate, justify, and facilitate 
the politicization of the Holocaust memory. In short, the cosmpolitaniza-
tion of the Holocaust has intensified mnemonic nationalism as much as it 
has contributed to mnemonic solidarity in the global memory formation.
Zygmunt Bauman’s warning that the Holocaust is a logical outcome 
not of premodern barbarity, but of Western modernity gives us a clue to 
how to connect postcolonial criticism to global memory formation in the 
post-Cold War era. His postmodernist critique of the Holocaust disquiets 
“the moral comfort of self-exculpation” by the non-German West by shat-
tering the complacent binary of mad perpetrators and innocent victims. If 
it is a “legitimate outcome of the civilizing process” in modern society, the 
Holocaust becomes “our” problem beyond the German-Jewish encoun-
ter.75 In the same way, a postcolonial critique can alert us to the mnemonic 
nationalism inherent in triple victimhood claims. Attentiveness to the ways 
in which anti-colonial nationalism operates not as an alternative but as an 
accomplice to colonialism exposes the ambivalence of colonialist desire 
and frustration among the colonized. It can help us to rescue the memory 
of colonial victimhood in the tri-continent from mnemonic nationalism. 
And the critical gaze of postcolonialism can be extended to Eastern 
Europe, where the analogy between the Slavic East under the Nazi occu-
pation of the “Third Europe,” the socialist colonies under the Stalinist red 
empire, and the postcolonial states of the “Third World” was familiar. The 
postcolonial entanglement of triple victimhood is one of keys to under-
standing the global memory formation in the post-Cold War era.
By way of conclusion, I propose critical relativization and radical juxta-
position as antidotes to the nationalist appropriation of cosmopolitan 
memory. This is different from what came to be known as the relativiza-
tion of the Holocaust in the course of the German Historikerstreit of the 
74 Alon Confino, “The Holocaust as a Symbolic Manual: The French Revolution, the 
Holocaust, and Global Memories,” in Marking Evil: Holocaust Memory in the Global Age 
eds. Amos Goldberg and Haim Hazan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 56–70 (here 56).
75 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, xii, 28.
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late 1980s, when Ernst Nolte and other right-wing historians proposed to 
“explain”—and in effect justify—the crimes of National Socialism by pre-
senting Nazism as a response to Bolshevik terror.76 This episode developed 
into a debate about West German national identity which was substantially 
overtaken by the end of the Cold War. It briefly tarnished comparative 
approaches and challenges to the historical uniqueness of the Holocaust 
with the suspicion of apologetic nationalism. But comparison remains a 
critical methodology in historical studies, and in any case, as Charles Maier 
argued then, “comparability cannot really exculpate.”77
What matters is not generic relativization or comparability but the 
“political relativization of responsibility.”78 For example, the focus on the 
human actors and questions of responsibility allows us to interrogate 
assertions of the historical uniqueness or ineffability of the Holocaust, and 
more particularly those that subsume the complex Holocaust events into 
the mass murder of a single people, the Shoah. As Geoff Eley pointed out 
at the time of the Historikerstreit, the exclusive focus on Shoah “tends to 
free other, less universally abhorred aspects of Nazism (like the crimes 
against labor), let alone other parts of the killing program (like the murder 
of gypsies, Poles, Soviet P.O.W.s, homosexuals, and so on) from 
attention.”79 We need to see even the mass murder of the Jews in the con-
text of processes and practices that are open to both historical explanation 
and ethical and forensic judgment.
Arguably, the memory wars in post-communist Eastern Europe and 
postcolonial tri-continent represent a second, global wave of the 
Historikerstreit. Memories and narratives of the past are now more diverse, 
contradictory, localized, and multiple than they were when subject to ide-
ological division on the single axis of the Cold War. The cosmopolitaniza-
tion of Holocaust memory remains an undeniable phenomenon in the 
post-Cold War era. But the global memory formation involves more than 
the mere transposition of Holocaust memory onto colonial genocide and 
Stalinist terror. Neither, from the viewpoint of global memory formation, 
76 See Siobahn Kattago, Ambiguous Memory: The Nazi Past and German National Identity 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 56–62; Geoff Eley, “Nazism, Politics and the Image of the 
Past: Thoughts on the West German Historikerstreit 1986–1987,” Past & Present, no. 121 
(1988): 171–208 (here 173).
77 Charles S.  Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German National 
Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 1.
78 Ibid., xii.
79 Eley, “Nazism, Politics and the Image of the Past,” 174.
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are we required to make an either/or choice between uniqueness and rela-
tivization. What I call critical relativization should make it possible for us 
to consider other victims empathetically, and to resist the temptation of 
prioritizing our own victimhood. Similarly, the critical juxtaposition of dif-
ferent memories that avoids the compulsion to make systematic or causal 
connections can help us to perform non-hierarchical acts of comparison in 
the global memory space.80
80 On critical juxtaposition, see Susan Stanford Friedman, “Planetarity: Musing Modernist 
Studies,” Modernism/Modernity 17, no. 3 (2010): 471–99 (here 493–94).
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Abstract Rosenhaft explores some ways in which discourses of human 
rights, racism and antisemitism that emerged in the global North after 
1945 have been appropriated, complicated and disrupted in this century’s 
memory conflicts. She examines Black Holocaust fictions in the light of 
changes in the global Black diaspora, and reflects on the recent debates on 
antisemitism and Holocaust memory that place diasporic actors in conten-
tion as well as on the populist trope of a “white, Christian Europe”. 
Following Paul Gilroy’s use of the term “postcolonial melancholia” to 
characterize British nostalgia for empire, she identifies analogous forms of 
nostalgia driving the current memory wars, and deploys the notions of 
“post-Holocaust” and “post-imperial” melancholias as complementary 
responses to the challenges posed by the (re-)emergence of a multicul-
tural Europe.
Keywords Holocaust memory • Black diaspora • Antisemitism • Israel 
• Melancholia • Multidirectional memory
This chapter reflects on the ways in which, in the twenty-first century, 
generational change and shifting patterns of migration and diaspora have 
combined to complicate and challenge the discourses of human rights, 
racism and antisemitism that emerged in Europe and the United States in 
the wake of the Second World War and the Holocaust. These discourses 
underpinned a structure of what Michael Rothberg called “multidirec-
tional memory” which, fragile though it has always been, seemed for a 
time to promise a degree of solidarity among the victims of genocide, war 
and colonialism living in the global North or raised in its philosophical 
traditions, and reflected the hegemonic power of a vision of “human 
rights” allied to a politics of redress for historical wrongs.1 The twenty-first 
century has witnessed a falling-out among the parties to that solidarity 
and a renewal of memory contests, even in the liberal West. These are 
manifested equally in publicly debated anxieties about antisemitism that 
center for the first time on parties of the left, in the historical (including 
Holocaust) revisionism of populist and right-wing movements and 
governments, and in the renewal of claims of national sovereignty in 
opposition to human rights discourse.
1 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of 
Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
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In the European frame, an important source of antagonism is the fail-
ure of white Europe as a whole to come to terms with the legacies of 
colonialism—including the demographic consequences of two world wars. 
In the British case, Paul Gilroy has characterized the pathology of this 
failure in terms of “postcolonial melancholia”—a nostalgia for empire that 
refuses to accept its lived and living consequences in the here and now.2 I 
want to suggest that it is possible to identify analogous forms of nostalgia 
driving the current memory wars, as forms of metropolitan amnesia about 
the character of imperial polities that manifest as melancholia come up 
against new claims of physical presence (diaspora) that are still realizing the 
implications of empire in the metropolis. This is true not only of the his-
torical colonial metropoles of Western Europe, but also of the former con-
tinental empires of Eastern and Central Europe, and those parts of the 
global North that partake of the mnemospace created by the post-1945 
settlement and re-molded by its collapse at the end of the 1980s—the 
United States and Israel. I tentatively introduce the notions of “post- 
Holocaust” and “post-imperial” melancholia as complementary responses 
to the real challenges posed by the (re-)emergence of a multicultural 
Europe. The first result of this encounter between contending claims on 
the past has been rage; the question is whether it is possible to go beyond 
that to new forms of shared ownership of the past.
A feature of these recent developments is the mobilization of diasporic 
populations both in solidarity with human rights struggles abroad and in 
defense of “homeland” states against human rights claims. The fact of 
such mobilization is not new; the modern history of migration has seen 
many episodes in which conflicts in the homeland and the political disposi-
tions they generate have been transposed to the new lands of settlement. 
And they are a reminder, among other things, of the ambivalence of the 
dynamic relationship between vernacular and official memory discussed in 
the introduction to this volume. The modes of mobilization and their 
consequences shift over time as the who, why and where of migration 
flows change along with the self-perceptions of homelands.3 The recon-
figuration of diasporas leads to new kinds of conversations within and 
between them, all of which have a mnemonic dimension. Memory, after 
all, does not exist without rememberers, and memory communities are 
2 Paul Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
3 Cf Latha Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad. Diasporas in International Relations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) and the literature cited there.
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subject to generational and demographic change. This unpicking of the 
materiality of cultural memory is key to understanding the prospects for 
mnemonic solidarity.
Black Holocaust Fictions and conversations 
in tHe diaspora
I start by considering how the dynamics of internal contention within an 
evolving global diaspora are at work on the familiar territory of “multidi-
rectional memory,” namely in the imaginative engagement of contempo-
rary Black cultural producers with the Holocaust. In his chapter in this 
volume, Jie-Hyun Lim sketches out a still-remembered history of shared 
human rights struggles between Jewish radicals and Black activists in 
Europe, America and Europe’s settler colonies. To some extent what I call 
Black Holocaust fiction continues in dialogue with that history. That dia-
logue has taken on new dimensions in the twenty-first century, and those 
are the focus of the second section of this chapter. What I explore here is 
the consequences of the way in which the Afro-diasporic memory space is 
being reconfigured through the growth of an African and Afro-Caribbean 
immigrant population in the United States and the emergence of new 
“Afropean” voices.4 Those voices challenge the primacy of the transatlan-
tic slavery narrative and its heirs in the United States.
Novels and films produced since 1999 and more particularly since the 
mid-2000s partake of a moment of intensification of representation of a 
Black Holocaust experience. This began with the increased circulation of 
knowledge and information about the experiences of Black people in Nazi 
Germany and occupied Europe, and it is notable that the three novels that 
interest me here, Clifford’s Blues (1999) by John A. Williams, Half-Blood 
Blues (2011) by Esi Edugyan, and The Book of Harlan (2016) by Bernice 
McFadden, all include bibliographies.5 The bibliographies claim historical 
authenticity for their stories; they also indicate that the writers are drawing 
on knowledge of the persecution that was certainly intimated in the 1940s 
but was then largely forgotten for fifty years. In the English-speaking 
4 For a recent work that engages this term critically but affirmatively, see Johny Pitts, 
Afropean. Notes from Black Europe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2019).
5 John A. Williams, Clifford’s Blues (Minneapolis: Coffee House Press, 1999); Esi Edugyan, 
Half-Blood Blues (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2011); Bernice L. McFadden, The Book of Harlan 
(New York: Akashic Books, 2016).
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world, television and the internet contributed to the dissemination and 
popularization of information about Black Holocaust experiences. John 
Williams was inspired by seeing a photograph of a Black inmate on a visit 
to Dachau, but Esi Edugyan was one of a younger generation who found 
the images that piqued their curiosity in books and on the internet.6 The 
first English-language television documentary on the subject, Hitler’s 
Forgotten Victims, was made for the British broadcaster Channel 4 in 1997 
(written by Cameroonian Moise Shewa and directed by Briton David 
Okuefuna). The year 2002 saw the publication of Clarence Lusane’s 
Hitler’s Black Victims, the first serious attempt to bring together the pub-
lished evidence on the subject, and Tina Campt’s Other Germans, a 
groundbreaking and theoretically sophisticated work on race and gender 
in the lives of Afro-Germans persecuted by the Nazis, came out in 2004. 
In 2006, Raffael Scheck published his study of the German army massa-
cres of French colonial troops in 1940—numerically the largest group of 
Hitler’s Black victims.7
New fictions were thus a natural response to the rhythms of public 
knowledge and interest, as more became knowable about the situation of 
Black people under Nazism. But they can also be read as reflections the 
contemporary Black experience. Each of the novelists chooses an African- 
American man as protagonist, and each of the protagonists either finds 
himself in a concentration camp or narrowly escapes it after having arrived 
in Europe as a jazz performer. In a 2011 reflection on the memory con-
tests triggered by the conflict in Palestine, Michael Rothberg implicitly 
distinguishes between memories as such and the “unavoidable building 
6 Gilbert H.  Muller, Michael Blaine and Raymond C.  Bowen, “Clifford’s Blues: A 
Conversation with John A. Williams,” in Conversations with John A. Williams, ed. Jeffrey 
A. Tucker (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2018), 217–26; Maaza Mengiste, 
“The Place in Between: An Interview with Esi Edugyan,” Callaloo 36, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 
46–51; Esi Edugyan, Dreaming of Elsewhere. Observations on Home (Edmonton: University 
of Alberta Press, 2014); Cath Clarke, “A secret romance: the director who is confronting 
Nazis, race and bigotry” (Interview with Amma Asante), The Guardian, May 3, 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2019/may/03/secret-romance-amma- 
asante-director-nazis-race-bigotry.
7 Clarence Lusane, Hitler’s Black Victims. The Historical Experiences of Afro-Germans, 
European Blacks, Africans, and African Americans in the Nazi Era (New York: Routledge, 
2003); Tina Campt, Other Germans: Black Germans and the Politics of Race, Gender, and 
Memory in the Third Reich (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2004); Raffael Scheck, 
Hitler’s African Victims. The German Massacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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blocks or morphemes of memory,” adding that the fact that those mor-
phemes are combined in multidirectional ways does not have any particu-
lar political valence.8 When the authors of Black Holocaust fictions place 
African-American jazzmen in Nazi concentration camps, what they are 
doing is to mobilize highly recognizable “morphemes” from intersecting 
memory traditions. The relationship between the narratives thus gener-
ated and what is known about the reality of Hitler’s Black victims, how-
ever, is highly attenuated. Even in proportion to the relatively small Black 
presence in Germany, there were few Black people in concentration camps. 
Most victims were settled colonial immigrants or German-born Blacks and 
they suffered mainly from loss of access to education, training and work, 
denial of citizenship, forced labor and the threat and reality of compulsory 
sterilization. While each of the novels acknowledges in some degree the 
historical reality of Afro-German and other non-American Black victims, 
the African-American perspective remains central. In The Book of Harlan, 
the depiction of life in Buchenwald is distinguished by its deployment of 
an extremely sensationalized version of the concentration camp mor-
pheme. But the concentration camp story is simply an episode, though in 
some senses the climax, in what is essentially a twentieth-century family 
saga based on the author’s own family history.
I want to propose that the timing and shape of these fictions has some-
thing to do with the shifting balance between optimism and pessimism in 
Black memory communities. This seems to me to be particularly true of 
Williams and McFadden, both African Americans (Edugyan was born in 
Canada to Nigerian parents). For their protagonists, Europe’s jazz 
metropolises Berlin and Paris, which historically figured in the African- 
American imagination as spaces of liberty and escape, become places of 
incarceration and death. In fact Clifford’s Blues is modeled on a slave nar-
rative and portrays its protagonist’s survival for twelve years in Dachau as 
a return to slavery, in his case forced domestic service to an SS officer.9 An 
earlier working of the motif of return, Octavia E. Butler’s 1979 Kindred, 
although not itself a Holocaust fiction, anticipates this. In Kindred, a 
twentieth-century African-American woman who finds herself repeatedly 
transported back to a slave plantation to ensure the survival of her white 
8 Michael Rothberg, “From Gaza to Warsaw: Mapping Multidirectional Memory,” 
Criticism 53, no. 4 (2011): 523–48.
9 Heidi Elisabeth Bollinger, “Crimes of Racial and Generic Mixing in John A. Williams’s 
Clifford’s Blues,” Journal of Narrative Theory 44, no. 2 (2014): 267–303.
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great-grandfather has recourse to reading about Nazi concentration camps 
in her effort to understand the psychological regime of the plantation.10
The world of these novels is a world of imperiled Black bodies; their 
vision is a pessimistic one. The publications of the past twenty years reflect 
not only the availability of new materials for envisioning the Holocaust 
past but the present of “post-postracial America,” of Black Lives Matter, 
of unsanctioned police killings and, most recently, the tolerated assertive-
ness of organized white racism in the public sphere.11 And these grounds 
for pessimism are not restricted to the United States. The move to the 
right signaled by Donald Trump’s election in the United States was echoed 
by the outcome of the Brexit referendum in Britain and all that has fol-
lowed, and indeed by the resurgence of the populist right across Europe. 
Literary Afro-pessimism and the Black Lives Matter movement have also 
become part of the German political and cultural scene.12
In Britain, Paul Gilroy’s 2005 diagnosis of “postcolonial melancholia” 
mourned the slipping away of “the ludic, cosmopolitan energies and dem-
ocratic possibilities so evident in the postcolonial metropolis” that he had 
identified in his earlier work. More than ludic possibilities have been lost 
in the succeeding decade and a half. In what has become known in the 
United Kingdom as the Windrush Scandal, between 2012 and 2019 a still 
unknown number of Black Britons were denied access to housing, jobs 
and healthcare and 88 were deported to countries in the Caribbean where 
they had been born but never lived; some died abroad, alone and in fear, 
while the deaths of others still in the United Kingdom were hastened by 
the stress of their situation. The victims of what the then Prime Minister 
celebrated as a “hostile environment” for illegal immigrants had arrived as 
children or been born in Britain between 1948 and 1973, while their par-
ents, as colonial subjects, still carried British passports under the old impe-
rial dispensation. Their status as British nationals was affirmed in law when 
immigration rules were tightened in the wake of decolonization in the 
10 Octavia E. Butler, Kindred (New York: Doubleday, 1979).
11 For a recent use of “post-postracial,” see Alison Landsberg, “Post-postracial America. 
On Westworld and the Smithsonian National Museum of African American History and 
Culture,” Cultural Politics 14, no. 2 (July 2018): 198–215.
12 Priscilla Layne, “The Darkening of Europe: Afrofuturist Ambitions and Afropessimist 
Fears in Damir Lukacevic’s Dystopian Film Transfer (2010),” Seminar 55, no. 1 (February 
2019): 54–75; Kevina King, “Black, People of Color and Migrant Lives Should Matter: 
Racial Profiling, Police Brutality and Whiteness in Germany,” in Rethinking Black German 
Studies, eds. Tiffany N. Florvil and Vanessa D. Plumly (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2018), 169–96.
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1970s. But that status was nowhere documented, so when they were chal-
lenged to prove that they were not in the country illegally they could 
not.13 In effect, the system—the archive and the people whose job it was 
to manage the archive and the polity itself—had forgotten that they 
existed.
It is not surprising, then, that Black writers and filmmakers outside the 
United States are also producing Holocaust fictions.14 Moreover, they are 
deploying some of the same morphemes. But they are using them in rather 
different ways to place Black Europeans in Holocaust history and to reflect 
on the issues of race and identity particular to them. Anglophone African 
migrants of the second generation are notable for the interest they have 
shown in the Black Holocaust. As noted above, the first television docu-
mentary was made by a Black Briton. In an early short film, The Greatest 
Escape, Black British filmmaker John Sealey places a Tirailleur Sénégalais—a 
French colonial soldier—in a German POW camp to develop a surrealist 
riff on the still resonant statement “There are no Black Germans.” The 
narrative moves from realistic scenes of capture and racial abuse to a comic 
conclusion in which the protagonist is able to leave the camp simply by 
putting on the commandant’s coat and rebuking the sentries on his way 
out—certified German by the uniform and accordingly no longer Black. 
Sealey describes the film as a reflection on his own experience of invisibil-
ity, reinforced by observing the non-presence of Black people in Hollywood 
movies.15 In Canadian Esi Edugyan’s Half-Blood Blues, although African- 
American Sid is the protagonist-narrator, the narrative centers on his fel-
low bandsman Hiero, a mixed-race German, who is sent to a concentration 
camp as a result of Sid’s actions. The year 2018 saw the release of Amma 
Asante’s feature film Where Hands Touch. The film tells the story of Leyna, 
the daughter of a French colonial soldier and a German mother, who falls 
13 Amelia Gentleman, The Windrush Betrayal: Exposing the Hostile Environment (London: 
Guardian Faber, 2019).
14 A non-European example with a strong European connection is the plan for a film based 
on the documented experiences of mixed couples in Nazi Germany under development by 
the Nigerian web entertainment company EbonyLife Films “AVA AND DUANTE,” 
EbonyLife Films, accessed April 25, 2020, https://ebonylifefilms.com/filmsindevelop-
ment/. EbonyLife’s founder and CEO is Mosunmola Abudu, born in London to Nigerian 
parents.
15 The Greatest Escape, dir. John Sealey (GB 2003); John Sealey, “Black and German: 
Filming Black History and Experience,” in Africa in Europe. Studies in Transnational 
Practice in the Long Twentieth Century, eds. Eve Rosenhaft and Robbie Aitken (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2013), 234–47.
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in love with the son of an SS-officer while evading sterilization in 1944 
Berlin. Asante, raised in London by Ghanaian parents, tells a complex 
story about her engagement with this history: Although she has made two 
films which focus on global Black British history and questions of racial 
allegiance—Belle (2014) and A United Kingdom (2016)—Where Hands 
Touch was in fact her first project for a historical drama. Even as a school-
girl she was fascinated by the Holocaust—caught up in that global circula-
tion of threshold knowledge referred to above. But her own experience of 
living with outspoken racism in South London led her to want to anato-
mize white racism at the same time as she reflected on her own Black 
British identity and the meanings of belonging.16
What these cultural producers make of the Holocaust story, and the 
ways in which their fictions have been received, relate to shifts and asyn-
chronies in the shape of the diaspora that is the source and audience for 
new historical fictions. The entry into the historical conversation of people 
of color who are not descendants of enslaved Africans is changing the 
nature of the conversation within the global Black community. If the rela-
tionship of Africans and Afropeans to the Holocaust is mediated by their 
own experiences of colonialism, postcolonial conflicts and migration, the 
same is equally true of their relationship to the historical traumas of African 
Americans. The American critic Michelle Wright has drawn attention to 
the significance of this. In her book The Physics of Blackness she insists on 
the limitations of what she calls the Middle Passage Epistemology, which 
prioritizes transatlantic slavery and its narratives in the articulation of 
Black diasporic identity. Against this “genealogical,” hierarchical and het-
eronormative understanding of Black identity she argues for one that 
acknowledges multiple origins and possible forms of affinity.17 African and 
Afropean writers, too, have been critical of claims, explicit and implicit, 
that the only historically relevant Black experience is (a particular version 
of) the African-American one.18
16 Clarke, “A secret romance”; Amma Asante’s home page: “AMMA ASANTE,” accessed 
May 5, 2020, www.ammaasante.com.
17 Michelle M.  Wright, The Physics of Blackness. Beyond the Middle Passage Epistemology 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).
18 For example, Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, “Rewriting the African Diaspora: Beyond The Black 
Atlantic,” African Affairs 104, no. 414 (January 2005): 35–68; Aretha Phiri, “Expanding 
black subjectivities in Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s 
Americanah,” Cultural Studies 31, no. 1 (2017): 121–42.
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Conversely, the first reactions to the trailers for Where Hands Touch and 
following its release in North America reflected a significant degree of 
non-recognition on the part of American viewers of the particularities of 
the Black European experience. Among the critical responses was a com-
bination of disgust and incredulity at the visible pairing of the Afro- 
German protagonist with a boy who is not only white but wearing a Nazi 
uniform. Some viewers were irritated by Asante’s inversion of the jazz 
morpheme: Here, it is the son of a white German fan of Billie Holiday 
who introduces Leyna to the forbidden music.19 It is important in this 
context that Sealey, Edugyan and Asante are all explicit about using stories 
which place their protagonists in conditions of extreme stress to explore 
questions of identity for Black people living in majority white communi-
ties (like Afropeans both before and since the Second World War), and 
that for Edugyan and Asante the character who articulates this problem is 
of mixed race: a German with an African father. It is striking, too, that all 
three end their narratives of radical imperilment on an optimistic note: I 
have noted the comic dénouement of The Greatest Escape; Half-Blood 
Blues ends with a reconciliation between Sid and Hiero, who has survived 
the camps, while Asante’s Leyna survives to give birth to a mixed race 
child of her own.
For all their optimism these texts—and their authors—offer warnings 
against racism, but this generation of Afro-diasporic cultural producers has 
its own questions to ask of history. It is positioning itself somewhere 
between the undifferentiated “humanity” of global-genocide discourse 
with its analogies between slavery, colonialism and Holocaust and the 
Black Europeans who were more than accidental victims of Nazi genocide. 
The more immediate sense that if this is not my history, it might have 
been, reflects not just the emergence of a global memory space but a con-
viction of global citizenship that goes beyond the diasporic—and which its 
subjects rightly see as being under threat from the rise of new forms of 
populism and exclusionism.
19 See Kate Erbland, “‘Where Hands Touch’ Filmmaker Amma Asante Responds to Claims 
Her WWII Drama ‘Romanticizes Nazism’—TIFF,” Indiewire, September 9, 2018, https://
www.indiewire.com/2018/09/where-hands-touch-amma-asante-responds-social-
media-1202001098/. Criticisms included observations about “taste” and the danger of 




antisemitism Wars: cHallenging tHe autHority 
oF Holocaust memory
These new questions of mutual recognition within the Black diaspora are 
coinciding with a renewed crisis of mutual recognition between diasporic 
Blacks and Jews. In America, the strain of pessimism in thinking about 
“race” that was briefly interrupted by the “post-racial” moment with its 
ludic possibilities reaches back over a generation, to the disillusion that 
followed the murders of Martin Luther King and Malcom X, the criminal-
ization and bloody suppression of radical Black activism and the progres-
sive de-coupling of civil rights from social and economic justice programs 
in public policy. In the framing narrative of Clifford’s Blues, the publisher 
who receives the protagonist’s manuscript camp diary reflects that it is 
unlikely to be published because of a “severe generic problem in this busi-
ness”—the problem of seeing Blacks and Holocaust in the same frame. 
The conjuncture of new knowledge about the Holocaust with the rise of 
an Afro-pessimist vision can explain the publication of Clifford’s Blues in 
1999, but in fact it was written in the 1980s, and has a clear affinity with 
Williams’ dystopian works.20 The protagonist of The Book of Harlan, hav-
ing survived Buchenwald, lives through the downward spiral of urban 
Black communities in the 1970s and when he takes his revenge by mur-
dering a former camp guard at the end of the novel, the redemption is a 
bitter one.
The moment of disappointment of the civil rights movement was also 
the moment of the unraveling in America of that historic alliance between 
Blacks and Jews, initially intensified by the Holocaust experience, that is 
invoked in Paul Gilroy’s work of the 1990s and in Rothberg’s 
Multidirectional Memory.21 Rothberg and Gilroy were optimistic about 
the possibility that those solidarities could be realized again, once the 
material histories of common struggles were recalled. But by that time the 
prospects were already poor. Williams, whose wife was Jewish, signals soli-
darity by introducing Clifford’s Blues with lines by Aimé Césaire that 
20 Bollinger, “Crimes”; Anthony C. Cooke, “Black Community, Media and Intellectual 
Paranoia-as-Politics,” Journal of Black Studies 42, no. 4 (2011): 609–26.
21 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness (London: Verso, 
1993); Paul Gilroy, Between Camps. Nations, Cultures and the Allure of Race (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 2000); Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory. See Eric J.  Sundquist, 
Strangers in the Land. Blacks, Jews, Post-Holocaust America (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
2005) for an analysis of the literary manifestations of the unraveling alliance.
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invoke the two histories of slavery and oppression in the figure of the riv-
ers of Babylon. But in a later interview he expressed impatience with forms 
of Jewish Holocaust piety that minimized the significance of the suffering 
of other victims.22
Claims for the primacy of Jewish victimhood gained new currency as 
the first decade of the twenty-first century waned. They are implicit in the 
ways in which Holocaust remembrance has become tied to celebration of 
the state of Israel in key public institutions. This nexus has been con-
structed over decades, but at a time when Israel was on the defensive 
against challenges to its moral and political legitimacy as a result of its 
occupation policies and domestic ethno-nationalism, its outcome was a 
new version of the hierarchical victim discourse that articulates moral 
authority in terms of Jews’ privileged claim to victim status. For a period, 
at least, support for Israel as a principle became a precondition for moral 
and political legitimacy in public discourse, opening both specific criticism 
of Israel and talk of other victims (historical and contemporary) to charges 
of antisemitism.
These charges were actively deployed in political contests as the center 
fell away in the mid-2010s. In 2016, the British Labour Party under a new 
left-wing leadership became the main target of accusations of antisemi-
tism. Challenged to resolve the problem by adopting the definition of 
antisemitism propagated by the International Holocaust Remembrance 
Alliance, the party was divided over the aspects of that definition which 
identify certain propositions about the state of Israel as examples of anti-
semitic speech. These include “denying the Jewish people their right to 
self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel 
is a racist endeavor; applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior 
not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation; [and] drawing 
comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis” as well as 
“accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged 
priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations [or] 
holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.”23 
Members of the party who, like party leader Jeremy Corbyn himself, were 
sympathetic to the situation of the Palestinians and critical to different 
degrees and in varying terms of Israeli policy perceived the terms of the 
22 Muller, Blaine and Bowen, “Clifford’s Blues,” 221.




IHRA definition as inhibiting legitimate critical discussion of the past and 
present of the Middle East. The angry exchanges that ensued within the 
party and between the party and its critics, and which effectively set the 
leadership in opposition to the organized Jewish community in Britain as 
well as to many Jews within its own ranks, encompassed much more than 
the question of Israel, but the issue of mnemonic loyalty raised by the 
IHRA definition remained at its center.24
A particularly problematic aspect of the IHRA definition is the ban on 
comparisons in combination with the anticipated charge of “double stan-
dards.” Implicitly reasserting the uniqueness of the Holocaust-as-Shoah, 
these provisions ignore the ways in which comparison between the crimes 
of the Nazis and other abuses, historical and contemporary, has become 
the currency of political rhetoric and also the object of scholarship. They 
also (paradoxically) limit the generalizability of the lessons of the 
Holocaust, which is part of the IHRA’s mission. In the United States, 
these implications played themselves out during the summer of 2019 
when Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez characterized the 
migrant detention camps on the US-Mexico border as concentration 
camps.25 Amid the subsequent media storm, the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum (USHMM) felt obliged to issue a statement condemn-
ing all efforts to draw historical analogies with the Holocaust. 
Unsurprisingly, this provoked immediate protest from several hundred 
scholars and memory activists.26
The implications of this moment for mnemonic solidarity across racial 
divides was made clear by President Trump’s attacks on Ocasio-Cortez 
and other Democratic congresswomen of color, attacks which linked their 
status as racialized immigrants, their socialist politics, their championing 
of immigrant rights and the imputation of antisemitism into a single 
charge of anti-Americanism. The charge of antisemitism, which did not 
24 The chronicle of these debates has yet to be written. The internal inquiry which was 
designed to resolve the question became an object of contention itself: Shami Chakrabarti, 
“The Shami Chakrabarti Inquiry,” accessed May 5, 2020, https://labour.org.uk/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/10/Chakrabarti-Inquiry-Report-30June16.pdf.
25 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Ocasio-Cortez calls migrant detention centers ‘concentration 
camps,’ eliciting backlash,” The New  York Times, June 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/06/18/us/politics/ocasio-cortez-cheney-detention-centers.html.
26 Omer Bartov et al., “An Open Letter to the Director of the US Holocaust Memorial 
Museum.” New York Review of Books, July 11, 2019, https://www.nybooks.com/
daily/2019/07/01/an-open-letter-to-the-director-of-the-holocaust-memorial-museum.
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originate with Trump but has been repeatedly deployed against them and 
other figures on the political and academic left, arises principally from their 
critique of Israeli policy, and in particular from their support for the cam-
paign for Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel. In 
December 2019, Trump issued an executive order which effectively rede-
fined Judaism as a race or nationality. This made anti-Zionism (in the form 
of BDS) prosecutable under civil rights legislation, while at the same time 
declaring American Jews dual nationals with implicitly divided allegiance—
diasporics in spite of themselves.27 A particularly resonant example of the 
racial dimensions of the divide over BDS came when a civil rights organi-
zation in Alabama withdrew its offer of an award to the distinguished 
African-American philosopher and activist Angela Davis on the grounds of 
her support for BDS, apparently at the urging of a local Holocaust educa-
tion group.28
Germany, too, was drawn into these “antisemitism wars” at the end of 
2018. An anonymous communication to the German government, appar-
ently of Israeli origin, accused a very large group of publicly financed 
NGOs of anti-Israeli bias in their support for Palestinian communities, 
their provision of platforms for speakers critical of Israel or their promo-
tion of exhibitions that engage with historical and contemporary dimen-
sions of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel.29 In the wake of a Bundestag 
resolution of May 2019 affirming that the BDS movement is antisemitic, 
the director of the Jewish Museum in Berlin was forced to resign for 
expressing sympathy with BDS.30 And in May 2020 several hundred writ-
ers, artists and scholars protested against the evidence that local authori-
ties were pressuring event organizers and prize committees to withhold or 
withdraw awards to critics of Israeli policy. Precipitated by the anticipated 
“disinvitation” of Cameroonian writer Achille Mbembe by the 
27 Peter Baker and Maggie Haberman, “Trump targets anti-semitism and Israeli boycotts 
on college campuses,” The New  York Times, December 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/12/10/us/politics/trump-antisemitism-executive-order.html.
28 The withdrawal was subsequently reversed: Niraj Chokshi, “Angela Davis won an award. 
It was revoked. Now it’s been reinstated,” The New York Times, January 25, 2019, https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/us/angela-davis-israel.html.
29 Jannis Hagmann, “Schwere Vorwürfe aus Israel,” Die Tageszeitung, December 5, 2018, 
https://taz.de/Schreiben-liegt-der-taz-exklusiv-vor/!5553564/.
30 Melissa Eddy, “Director of Berlin’s Jewish Museum Quits After Spat Over B.D.S.,” The 




Ruhrtriennale, their statement cited mainly artists and scholars of color as 
victims of this pressure.31
The storms of 2016–2020 were manifestly precipitated by a particular 
geopolitical conjuncture: Under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, 
the Israeli state, which has always been active in promoting political sym-
pathy in the diaspora, had intensified its counter-offensive against the 
negative public opinion generated by its policies. This was coupled in 
domestic policy with the creation of “facts on the ground” through the 
intensification of pressure on the populations of the occupied territories, 
the consolidation of the permanent status of settlements in defiance of 
international law, and constitutional changes aimed at redefining Israel as 
an ethno-national state. Netanyahu’s ethno-nationalism in turn made him 
an ally of other national populist governments, including that of Donald 
Trump (an affinity potentiated by the unanticipated alliance of right-wing 
Zionism and the Christian evangelicalism). Similarly, Germany’s Christian 
Democrat government was on the defensive as a result of pressure from a 
new ethno-nationalist right whose rhetorical target was now “Islam,” 
although it remained a source of antisemitic violence in practice.
Accordingly, these events may prove to have been a hiccup in the prog-
ress of global knowledge and understanding of the Holocaust and its les-
sons. Even Kenneth Stern, the author of the IHRA’s working definition of 
antisemitism, acknowledged the specificity of the moment in December 
2019: “I drafted the definition of antisemitism. Right-wing Jews are wea-
ponizing it.”32 In spite of the contretemps over historical analogies, the 
USHMM, like all other institutions of Holocaust commemoration and 
education and the global community of Holocaust scholars, continues to 
acknowledge the full range of victim groups under the Nazis (all concen-
tration camp inmates and victims of genocidal bio-politics) as subjects of 
Holocaust. And the question of comparability continues to be explored 
through the critical juxtaposing of the Holocaust with other genocides, 
even if its epochal character remains axiomatic in the very fact and acts of 
commemoration.
31 “Pledge opposing ideological or political interference and litmus tests in Germany,” 
accessed May 15, 2020, https://nopoliticallitmustests.wordpress.com/pledge-opposing- 
ideological-or-political-interference-and-litmus-tests-in-germany/.
32 Kenneth Stern, “I drafted the definition of antisemitism. Right-wing Jews are weapon-
izing it,” The Guardian, December 30, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2019/dec/13/antisemitism-executive-order-trump-chilling-effect?CMP.
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Conversely, antisemitism is no chimera. The increase in publicly 
expressed hostility and violence against Jews in America and Europe is a 
real feature of the global rise of right-wing populism since the turn of the 
century. And in Britain, the harsh light shone on the Labour Party revealed 
that tropes and styles of thought and argument that are objectively antise-
mitic retain their currency and may be more easily tolerated than other 
forms of racism even among some who consider themselves progressive 
and anti-racist.33
Considered from the perspective of memory studies, though, this has 
something to tell us about the mutability of the meanings we attach to 
apperceptions of the past. Beyond opportunistic weaponizing, raising the 
specter of antisemitism works partly because of a real generational change 
in the shape of memory in the global North: Any claim to the uniqueness 
of the Holocaust and its message now contends with the voices of people 
for whom the Holocaust is not any kind of memory. In the British case, it 
has been argued that inattention to or trivialization of the reality and per-
sistence of antisemitism was a consequence of the “drowning out” of post-
war Holocaust consciousness after the 1960s, as racial justice was 
increasingly framed in terms of the claims of former colonial subjects.34 
And there is force in the argument of scholars close to the Labour Party 
debates that routinized anti-racism can neither recognize nor counter 
antisemitism as long as it uncritically positions Jews as “white.”35 In expe-
riential terms, for Americans and Europeans with family histories of colo-
nial oppression and violence, the sufferings of displaced and besieged 
Palestinians are more immediate than the historical trauma of Europe’s 
Jews. And many of today’s economic migrants and refugees are escaping 
situations in which the regional reverberations of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the great power contentions that underly it are a source of present 
distress. One result of this can be a lack of sensitivity to and even a new 
license for antisemitic language, imagery and actions in anti-imperialist 
and anti-capitalist discourse. Another result is that the charge of antisemi-
tism is experienced as a silencing mechanism. In August 2018, 84 British 
Black and minority ethnic organizations published an open letter in which, 
33 Chakrabarti, Inquiry; Ben Gidley, Brian McGeever and David Feldman, “Labour and 
Antisemitism: a Crisis Misunderstood,” The Political Quarterly, accessed May 15, 2020, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12854.
34 Andy Pearce, Holocaust Consciousness in Contemporary Britain (Oxford and New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 15 (citing John Solomos).
35 Gidney, McGeever and Feldman, “Labour and Antisemitism.”
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invoking common histories of colonialism and racism, they insisted that 
freedom to choose the terms in which they comment on Israel was indivis-
ible from the freedom to express their own needs and call for justice as 
minority communities in Britain.36
In the Jewish diaspora too, and among those non-Jews for whom 
Holocaust memory is foundational to political identity, the passage of 
time has wrought changes that make for irritable responses to the claims 
of new diasporic actors and may block impulses to solidarity. A form of 
political argumentation (from either side of the debate) that declares real 
world solidarity with Palestinians to be incompatible with mnemonic soli-
darity with the victims of the Holocaust tugs at a nexus of liberal sympa-
thies that emerged in Germany, Britain and the United States after the 
Second World War, though with different timing and in different forms. 
In Germany, whose own Jewish Holocaust survivor population is negligi-
ble, the accusation that the German government was funding antisemitic 
activities touched a nerve because of the West German state’s long- standing 
commitment to both material and moral support of Israel as part of its 
acknowledged responsibility to the victims of the Holocaust. At the level 
of civil society, the accusation was directed at cultural organizations whose 
agenda is the promotion of intercultural dialogue and also at charities 
whose engagement in projects in Africa and the Middle East can be seen 
as part of the legacy of German colonialism. While projects of this kind 
remain open to the charge of neo-colonialism, they have increasingly 
drawn their energy from critical reflection on that history, and even before 
that they were part of the formation of humanitarian globalism that, along 
with post-Holocaust philo-Semitism, underpinned West Germany’s liberal 
consensus.37
The counter-charge, which (even when it falls short of direct analogies 
between Israel and Nazi Germany) positions supporters of Israel as com-
plicit in practices of colonialism, racism and apartheid, exposes the 
36 “As BAME communities, we stand united against attempts to suppress our voices,” The 
Independent, August 17, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/letters/letters-
ihra-definition-palestine-israel-bame-sexism-labour-denmark-a8496251.html.
37 Carole Fink, West Germany and Israel. Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics and the Cold 
War 1965–74 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Britta Schilling, Postcolonial 
Germany. Memories of Empire in a Decolonized Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 90–132; Claudia Olejniczak, Die Dritte-Welt-Bewegung in Deutschland (Wiesbaden: 
DUV, 1998), 75–6; Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge. Antisemitism and 
Philosemitism in Postwar Germany (Oxford: Pergamon, 1992).
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instability of multidirectional memory. But it also challenges mnemonic 
investment in an imagined historical moment in which global acknowl-
edgment of the Holocaust as a Jewish catastrophe was accompanied by a 
consensus in the West that the historical mission of the survivors was prop-
erly embodied in the new nation-state. It is well known that that “moment” 
was an extended one. Even in Israel it was not until the beginning of the 
1960s that there crystallized a politically potent vision of the Holocaust 
legacy as one that called for honoring the victims as part of the process of 
Jewish identity construction.38 In her chapter in this volume Carol Gluck 
reminds us of the importance of the 1961 Eichmann trial, which simulta-
neously brought the details of the Shoah to international attention and 
introduced Israel to the world as the champion of the survivors and other 
Jews in the diaspora, as well as of subsequent trials which extrapolated 
generic categories of crimes against humanity and commemorative justice 
from the Holocaust events. The adoption of the Holocaust as an identifi-
catory point of reference for American Jews, and its entrance into the 
American cultural mainstream as “part of the language” (Peter Novick) 
was similarly the outcome of an extended chain of circumstances.39 And 
Britain has had its own path to “Holocaust consciousness,” the identity of 
British Jews informed by a high degree of assimilation in spite of endemic 
antisemitism and a relationship with empire complicated by British policy 
in Palestine since the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The fact that British 
Jews paid a price for the ambivalence of that policy in the riots in British 
cities that followed incidents of Jewish terrorism Palestine in 1947 is part 
of a community experience that underpins their tendency to identify more 
strongly with Israel than other European Jewish communities.40
As different as these national contexts were, they fed into a shared 
imaginative nexus that tied Israel’s legitimacy to its status as the guardian 
38 Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust, trans. Heim Watzman 
(New York: Holt, 2000).
39 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999); 
Henry L. Feingold, Bearing Witness: How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995).
40 Pearce, Holocaust Consciousness; Todd Endelman, The Jews of Britain 1656–2000 
(Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2002); Tony Kushner, 
“Anti-Semitism and austerity: the August 1947 riots in Britain,” in Racial Violence in Britain 
1840–1950, ed. Panikos Panayi (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), 149–68.
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of the moral legacy of the Holocaust victims.41 That vision of Israel and a 
narrative of origin that underlies it was also embedded in now-canonical 
media representations which reached global audiences. The film Exodus, 
released in 1960, which depicts the struggle for the creation of a Jewish 
state in postwar Palestine, went beyond the novel from which it was 
adapted in placing Holocaust survivors in key roles as well as in its focus 
on the theme of their rescue. It also introduced material not present in the 
novel which envisioned post-liberation Israel as a nation in which Jews and 
Arabs could live in harmony. And its liberal credentials—sanctioned at the 
time by the Israeli authorities that promoted it—were sealed by the 
involvement of blacklisted Communists, including screenwriter Dalton 
Trumbo, in its production.42 The 1978 television series Holocaust, which 
opened a new phase in popular awareness of the Holocaust especially in 
West Germany, ends with the arrival in Palestine of the young German 
Jewish survivor Rudi.43 The closing scenes of Schindler’s List (1993) make 
a similar mnemonic connection by taking the surviving Schindler Jews to 
Schindler’s grave in Israel, and has clear resonances with the end of 
Exodus.44
As Exodus’ conciliationist conclusion testifies, this vision was not at its 
origin the work of the political right, just as there were strong socialist and 
secularist elements in the Israeli nation-building project. And from this 
point of view it is significant that it was not only Jews on the political right 
whose voices were raised in alarm and accusation during the antisemitism 
debates of 2016–2020. In Britain, those who would not associate them-
selves with the politics of the right (including Jews inside the Labour 
41 Dan Diner, “Cumulative Contingency: Historicizing Legitimacy in Israeli Discourse,” 
History and Memory 7, no. 1 (1995): 147–70.
42 M.M. Silver, Our Exodus. Leon Uris and the Americanization of Israel’s Founding Story 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2010); Giora Goodman, “‘Operation Exodus’: 
Israeli government involvement in the production of Otto Preminger’s Film Exodus (1960),” 
The Journal of Israeli History 33, no. 2 (2014): 209–29. See also Alan Mintz, Popular 
Culture and the Shaping of Holocaust Memory in America (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2001), 3–35.
43 Holocaust (NBC, Producers Robert Berger and Herbert Brodkin, 1978). The impact of 
the series in West Germany was explored in a special issue of Historical Social Research/
Historische Sozialforschung 30, no. 4 (2005).
44 Cf Shai Ginsburg, “An American Reflection: Steven Spielberg, The Jewish Holocaust 
and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Miguk’ang 34, no. 1 (2011): 45–76. Ginsburg pro-
poses that these scenes in fact reflect Spielberg’s skepticism about the failure of post-1967 
Israel to fulfill the Exodus vision.
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Party) were among the most sensitive to intimations of antisemitism asso-
ciated with criticism of Israel and most militant in challenging them. This 
is in spite of the fact that while antisemitic speech and action by the non- 
establishment right were certainly increasing there, there was no evidence 
(by comparison with the United States) of its being endorsed by govern-
ment, and surveys earlier in the decade showed that British Jews suffered 
less from antisemitic violence and were less afraid of it than Jews elsewhere 
in Europe.45 Adapting Gilroy’s language, I would suggest that among 
some diasporic Jews anxieties about antisemitism are fuelled by a post- 
Holocaust melancholia that draws on nostalgia for that moment which 
they remember as endowing Israel with the moral authority to act as a 
beacon for postwar moral reconstruction.
populations in motion and tHe unraveling 
oF tHe postWar settlement: deFending “WHite 
cHristian europe”
Paul Gilroy is not the only critic to have anatomized the aporias of mem-
ory in Europe. Writing about France’s memory culture, Ann Laura Stoler 
used the term “aphasia” to characterize the crippling incapacity of the 
postcolonial metropole to speak its past to itself.46 In the Western cultural 
and medical tradition, melancholia and aphasia are pathologies. But in 
invoking these terms here is not my intention to pathologize the remem-
berers. The point, rather, is to pose the question (implicit in the term 
“aphasia”) of what has remained unremembered, misremembered or 
actively suppressed in the mnemonic construction of an identificatory 
moment. This should make us attentive (with Gilroy) to the losses that 
have been incurred in this process—what we have to mourn and who is 
doing the mourning. Here it helps to take into account the ways in which 
remembered moments decay and are reconstructed as memory 
45 EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism 
Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU (Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2018). Cf L. D. Staetsky and Jonathan Boyd, 
The Exceptional Case? Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in the United 
Kingdom (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2014).
46 Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Aphasia. Race and Disabled Histories in France,” Public 
Culture 23, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 121–56.
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communities are reshaped through the intervention of new remember-
ers—and also in resistance to those interventions.
In the case of the “antisemitism wars” the key driver at the level of 
mnemonic discourse is the global articulation of memories of the Nakba 
in forms that powerfully challenge the foundational myths of the state of 
Israel, which now include the Holocaust. That the challenge to Israel’s 
current practices is often posed in the moral and rhetorical terms set in 
motion by the Holocaust and its aftermath appears paradoxical but is a 
logical consequence of that form of legitimation. But the historical 
moment in which the Arab-Israeli conflict emerged was the moment of a 
global postwar settlement, other aspects of whose legacy and memory are 
also now objects of contention. In 1947, India and Pakistan gained their 
independence. The year 1948 witnessed the United Nations Genocide 
Convention, which signaled the codification of a globally binding dis-
course of human rights in a self-conscious drawing of the lessons of the 
Holocaust.47 It was also the year of (among other things) the Berlin con-
flict which initiated the division of Germany and with it the consolidation 
of the Cold War in Europe and of Communist hegemony in Eastern 
Europe, and (with the launch of the National Health Service) the begin-
ning of Britain’s experiment in social democracy. The ambivalences of that 
historical moment are many, but it resulted in a relatively stable discursive 
framework in which states and civil society groups deployed a shared lan-
guage of internationalism, rights and justice. The rise of ethno- nationalism 
in Europe, America and Asia has been accompanied by an explicit rejec-
tion of that language along with the institutions that the postwar world 
community built to realize its promise.
In this volume, Jie-Hyun Lim points to the way in which official mem-
ory cultures were also stabilized, or frozen, in that postwar consensus, 
when he describes how new national victimhood narratives were “released” 
by the ending of the Cold War around 1990. He also alludes to the fact 
that in Europe—as in the Indian sub-continent and in Palestine—that 
postwar settlement rested on policies of partition and the forced displace-
ment of populations (indeed, of re-settlement). The case of the expulsion 
of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to which Lim refers is exemplary 
in the way the vernacular memory of the events was alternately 
47 Samuel Moyn points out that the common view that “human rights” was a product of 
the postwar, post-Holocaust moment is itself a retrospective construct: The Last Utopia. 
Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2010).
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instrumentalized and suppressed as the West German state negotiated its 
own relationship to the wartime and Holocaust past, to emerge after uni-
fication as part of a new narrative of German victimhood. But attention to 
this local example can distract from the ways in which traumas of this kind 
were experienced at the same time in many parts of Europe and its former 
colonies. We are reminded of this not least by the latest re-emergence of 
sources of conflict which partition and resettlement were intended to sup-
press, provoked and exploited by nationalist politicians who rely on selec-
tive memory and the mobilization of diasporic allegiance to legitimate 
their politics, whether in the Middle East or in the India of Narendra 
Modi.48 (The case of Britain’s welfare state is a reminder that postwar 
reconstruction also depended on large-scale labor migration, much of it 
from the colonies, which, like the “Windrush generation,” is itself the 
object of complex practices of memory and forgetting.)
It is this aspect of the way the mnemonic nexus between colonialism, 
imperialism and the legacies of war and Holocaust is playing out in con-
temporary political contests that I want to address briefly here. I focus on 
Eastern European reactions to the twenty-first-century “refugee crisis” 
and the arrival in Europe of a new generation of displaced people. What is 
being remembered, what forgotten? Jie-Hyun Lim’s account of Polish 
debates suggests that in the latest round of memory contests the Holocaust 
may be being displaced by colonialism as the hegemonic point of reference 
for victimhood claims: Poles not only disavow their own historical implica-
tion in colonialist practices when they declare dark-skinned refugees to be 
inherently alien to the Polish body politic, but they also claim moral 
authority as victims of great power colonialism.
Something else that has been officially forgotten in Eastern and Central 
Europe is the region’s long history of ethnic and religious pluralism. The 
cohabitation of Muslims, Christians and Jews, Slavs, Italians, Magyars, 
Germans and Roma, in different combinations and often in the same com-
munities, was a feature of this part of Europe before the First World War. 
Politically, it was institutionalized in the constitution of the Habsburg 
Empire, and the cosmopolitanism fostered, celebrated and constantly 
48 On the construction and mobilization of the “global Indian,” see Varadarajan, The 
Domestic Abroad, 107–41. On the impacts of mobilization on South Asian communities and 





re- negotiated by the institutions of empire survived in the successor states 
after its breakup. As Lim suggests, there were always hierarchical relation-
ships and embedded practices of othering among ethnic and national 
groups, whether in partitioned Poland or the Habsburg Empire. And the 
record of irridentism, antisemitism and complicity with genocide in the 
states created by the 1919 peace treaties is nothing to celebrate.49 In a very 
real sense, though, it was the Holocaust and the postwar settlement that 
produced ethnic homogeneity in the region.
There is thus a very particular mnemonic maneuver at work when 
nationalists in Poland, Hungary and Czechia invoke homogeneity as their 
natural heritage to legitimate their resistance to accepting refugees. In the 
rhetoric of Hungary’s Fidesz government under Viktor Orbán, that resis-
tance takes more militant form, as the closure of Hungary’s borders to 
refugees is articulated as the front-line defense of a “white Christian 
Europe” against the invasion of an alien (i.e. Muslim) civilization. This 
structure of argument does have an authentic history, though it obfuscates 
the fact that Hungary was Europe’s northernmost zone of contact with 
Islam and a conduit for Islamic culture until the late seventeenth century. 
Paired with the rhetoric of domestic defense against Jewish power, resur-
rected in Fidesz campaigns against George Soros and Western liberalism, 
it is part of the tradition of the Hungarian right, including the interwar 
antisemites whose legacy is being rehabilitated.
But in Hungary, returning to this interwar rhetoric means reaching 
back over genuinely formative (and traumatic) experiences of war, 
Holocaust and socialist reconstruction. And it is not accidental, but 
belongs to an extremely aggressive memory politics which is in some 
senses a study in paradoxes.50 A central paradox is the elevation of the 
Treaty of Trianon to the status of foundational trauma, given that, follow-
ing the principle of national self-determination, the treaty both established 
49 Johannes Feichtinger and Gary B. Cohen, eds., Understanding Multiculturalism: The 
Habsburg Central European Experience (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2015); Omer 
Bartov and Eric D.  Weitz, eds., Shatterzone of Empires. Coexistence and Violence in the 
German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2013).
50 Éva Kovács, “Overcoming History through Trauma: The Hungarian Historikerstreit,” 
European Review 24, no. 4 (October 2016): 523–34. This website presents Trianon as a 
“grass-roots” movement with multiple local monuments: “Nekünk még legalább két-három 
Trianon kéne, de hamar!” Szily László, accessed May 7, 2020, https://cink.hu/
nekunk-meg-legalabb-ket-harom-trianon-kene-de-hamar-1478546158.
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Hungary as a nation state and made it more nearly ethnically homoge-
neous. What is mourned, of course, is the loss of territory which created 
Hungarian minorities in other successor states, and which went along with 
the loss of the dominion over other nationalities that Hungarians enjoyed 
as part of the dual monarchy. From this point of view, we might character-
ize the Eastern European rejection of cohabitation with refugees as an 
expression of (late) post-imperial melancholia: It reflects a selective mem-
ory of the historical past which is re-constituting the subjects of that his-
tory as an exclusive (memory) community and thereby blocking the 
possibility of solidarity—or even dialogue—among its heirs.
conclusion: memory matters
Memory matters. Talking about the past is an eminently political act, and 
talking and writing critically about how people talk about the past engages 
our political instincts as well as the sinews of scholarship. This incurs haz-
ards. The present volume would have included a fifth substantive chapter, 
had its author not been put in danger by police action against a memory 
activist whose work the chapter gestured at. The challenge at the level of 
scholarship is that the sense of the moment that makes particular memo-
ries matter, and the equally intuitive sense of how particular articulations 
of memory are working in the moment, may outrun the tools of scholar-
ship: the sources, rhythms of critical reflection and structures of explana-
tion that normally define our disciplines. To insist on the multidisciplinarity 
of memory studies is to acknowledge some of the tensions between the 
different ways in which we address “memory,” between randomness and 
system, allusion and analysis, topography and explanation. As a historian, 
I feel some discomfort when I find myself making large statements in a 
small space and in discursive registers that may appear incommensurate, as 
I have here. It incurs an obligation to explain myself and to reflect on how 
to take critical analysis and praxis further.
The view that scholars are called on to respond to a general crisis of 
democratic values and practices as the second decade of the twenty-first 
century begins is widespread in memory studies as in the humanities more 
generally. My own sense of the moment and its implications for historical 
memory in Europe was galvanized by my experiences in the summer of 
2018, during the first engagements of what I refer here to as the 
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antisemitism wars. I felt its force in the course of my own memory work in 
Liverpool, a proudly multicultural city with strong and fiercely politicized 
memory cultures, when I was party to two accusations of antisemitism. 
The first was directed at me. I had curated an exhibition on the persecu-
tion of German Sinti and Roma, and wanted to follow it up with an event 
about the rather different experience of Romanian Roma which would 
provide an opportunity for dialogue between Jewish survivors and their 
children and immigrant Roma. The use of the term “Holocaust” to char-
acterize the genocide of Roma and Sinti in the publicity for the event led 
to protest from a member of the host organization. The protest asserted 
the historical and moral uniqueness of the Shoah; the social media context 
in which it was raised situated it in the militant campaign against 
antisemitism.
In the second case I was made aware of an accusation of antisemitism 
leveled against an exhibition co-curated by a colleague. The exhibition’s 
central theme was the historical relationship between transatlantic slavery, 
colonialism and luxury consumption—issues central to Liverpool’s civic 
memory politics which have also engaged my scholarly attention. All of 
the works on display were by British artists the Singh Twins. The image 
that attracted the charge of antisemitism was one displayed to complement 
the main exhibition. Entitled Partition Politics—Business as Usual, it offers 
a conspectus of partitions carried out by colonial powers, exploited by 
international capital, and contested by non-state actors. Images of the 
occupied West Bank are at the center of a design that also refers to the 
Scramble for Africa, the partition of India and the Western intervention in 
Suez, foregrounding the international arms trade as driver and beneficiary 
of regional conflicts. After taking advice, the gallery managers rejected the 
claim of antisemitism. However, while the picture remained, the gallery 
felt obliged to post a disclaimer at the exhibition entrance.51
In that moment the unanticipated resonances of my public engage-
ment with the Holocaust’s “other victims” encroached on my more 
scholarly project of the moment: puzzling out the meanings of Black 
Holocaust fictions. I was positioned in spite of myself in a memory war. 
I originally entitled this chapter “Mnemonic Knots,” a pessimistic riff on 
51 The image is reproduced in Eve Rosenhaft, “Europe’s Melancholias and the Crisis of 
Multidirectional Memory,” global-e 12, no. 8 (2019), accessed May 15, 2020, https://
www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/february-2019/europe-s-melancholias-and-crisis- 
multidirectional-memory.
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the notion of “entangled memories.” Here, I have focused largely on the 
skeptical dimension of the mnemonic solidarity project, mapping a form 
of internal “re-territorialization” of memory. This process has manifestly 
been promoted and energized by the rise of the political right across the 
globe. But the affective power of these interventions and the discourses 
they have released invites us to ask how the identities of the contending 
groups are invested in the ways in which the past is remembered. Here, 
I suggest that attention to the nexus of Holocaust and postwar recon-
struction as an object of both remembering and forgetting can be pro-
ductive, given that it is the discourses of human rights and internationalism 
that emerged out of that moment that are under attack in this century. 
The double-edged character of the mnemonic moment is apparent in the 
deployment of accusations of antisemitism that draw their authority 
from Holocaust memory by the very politicians who are challenging the 
postwar settlement and promoting active racism and antisemitism at 
home. And the anxieties precipitated by these destabilizing contradic-
tions are real, particularly, I argue, for those who were shaped in one way 
or another by the postwar moment (among whom I count myself). This 
is where the different subject positions (and histories) represented by 
dwellers in the global North become relevant, and I suggest that the 
effects of both migration and generational change are at work in the 
fracturing and reconfiguring of memory communities, both national and 
global-diasporic. These remain intuitions and hypotheses that invite fur-
ther exploration.
Such exploration would also need to take account the epochal shifts in 
the political economy of the global North that have taken place since 1945 
(and that have also impacted the global South). The postwar social settle-
ment was unraveling in the West well before the collapse of socialism in 
the East, to be replaced by neo-liberal regimes of varying reach and inten-
sity. From this point of view, the celebration of Britain’s National Health 
Service—in the costumes and imagery of 1948—that formed the center-
piece of the opening of the 2012 Olympic Games in London is no less 
surprising in its timing than Orbán’s mourning of Trianon. It is perfectly 
clear that in both the East and the West of the global North, populism and 
xenophobia reflect the hurts incurred by neo-liberal economic policies. 
Less clear is how the ways in which people refer to the past in interpreting 
those hurts have been shaped by the dynamics of the economic system. 
One result of the collapse of socialism and the triumph of neo-liberalism 
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was the de-legitimizing of the labor movement and its memories, and this 
may have contributed to the framing of Holocaust in terms that valorize 
victimhood. Reflecting on the dialectics of race and diaspora, critics of the 
paradigm of multiculturalism have pointed to the roots in consumerist 
individualism—the neo-liberal personality—which it shares with certain 
kinds of identity politics that are in permanent tension with a progressive 
politics of memory and practical solidarity.52 This essay has focused on 
imagined pasts. A further thinking through of the present mnemonic 
moment would need to take into account the impact of profound changes 
at the level of political economy, not only on structures of sentiment and 
expectation but also on the communicability of material pasts—experi-
ences and aspirations.
There is, of course, a note of pessimism in my use of the term “melan-
cholia” to denote some ways in which the selective memory of a complex 
history impinges on perceptions and action in the present. With Paul 
Gilroy, I apply it to histories that have made the global North what it is: 
colonialism, continental imperialism and the Holocaust foundations of 
both human rights discourse and the statehood of Israel. I use it not in an 
accusatory spirit, but to signal the tenderness of memory that makes it 
susceptible to shock and pain when other people’s experiences of the 
shared past insist on being heard.
This is where the optimistic dimension of the mnemonic solidarity proj-
ect comes in. The encounter between Jewish and Roma survivors that I 
was organizing in the summer of 2018 went ahead (with re-worded pub-
licity) and led to a powerful exchange, new kinds of mutual recognition 
and continuing collaborations. In the context of my exhibition work, too, 
I have learned the importance of face-to-face encounters. Conversations 
with and between Jewish and Roma Holocaust survivors—too often con-
tenders in a hierarchy of victimhood—confirm the potential of vernacular 
memory for generosity. But my exhibition experience has also taught me 
how important it is that those conversations are informed by a shared 
store of knowledge about each others’ history, a level plane of understand-
ing that enables recognition and the negotiation of difference.53 Providing 
52 See, for example, Rey Chow, The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 102–18. I am grateful to Ian Gwinn for provoking 
me to these reflections.
53 Kyu Dong Lee and Eve Rosenhaft, “Roma/Holocaust/Representation. Exhibition 
Experiences on Two Continents,” Critical Romani Studies, forthcoming 2021.
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that information and ensuring that it is received is one of the jobs of schol-
ars. Scholarship and activism together will do best to link such grass roots 
conversations to critiques of the discourses of national and community 
ressentiment that constrain empathy and the social and geopolitical prac-
tices of power that persistently force us into adversarial positions—
“partition politics” in the widest sense.
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Abstract The women who served in Japan’s military brothels across Asia 
during the Second World War are a focus of the politics of memory in East 
Asia as well as a touchstone for international human rights and sexual vio-
lence against women. By the 1990s, the “comfort women” had become a 
“traveling trope,” which like the Holocaust, both recognized and tran-
scended its original time and place. Gluck traces their “coming into mem-
ory” through changes in five areas of the evolving postwar “global memory 
culture”: law, testimony, rights, politics, and notions of responsibility. She 
shows how the ideas and practices of public memory changed over time, 
in the course of which the comfort women became “global victims” in a 
transnational memoryscape.
Keywords World War II • Comfort women • Public memory 
• Testimony • Global memory culture • Japan; Korea
In 2015, during the year of the seventieth anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War, the politics of memory in East Asia bristled with ten-
sion. The strong rhetoric and diplomatic sparring arose in the context of 
surging nationalisms in an ecology of public memory that since the 1990s 
had once again employed history as a political instrument to arouse patrio-
tism, promote national unity, and strengthen support for the regime in 
power. This global phenomenon included such political leaders as Abe 
Shinzō in Japan, Vladimir Putin in Russia, Xi Jinping in China, Narendra 
Modi in India, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, 
and a number of others who played the national history card for domestic 
purposes and then deployed it in international relations.
For East Asia, Russia, and Eastern Europe, World War II remained a 
magnetic site of memory in the polarized landscape of instrumental 
nationalism. No surprise then that the seventieth anniversary of the end of 
the war, like the fiftieth and sixtieth before it, generated a geopolitical bliz-
zard of angry interchanges among East Asian leaders, with others, includ-
ing Americans and Germans, adding their voices in an effort to calm the 
latest historical storms in the region. What might have been surprising, 
however, was the way in which the “comfort women,” who served the 
Japanese military in brothels throughout wartime East and Southeast Asia, 
occupied so central a place in the geopolitics of memory in 2015. Ten 
years earlier in 2005, the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the war, the 
comfort women had figured in diplomatic tensions with South Korea, and 
 C. GLUCK
75
China together with protests against Japanese history textbooks and poli-
ticians’ visit to Yasukuni, the national shrine of the war dead. In that year 
conservative Prime Minister Koizumi repeated the general apology for 
Japan’s having “caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of 
many countries” that had been offered for the first time by socialist Prime 
Minister Murayama on the fiftieth anniversary in 1995. In 1995, the com-
fort women had indeed been a prominent government issue. Following a 
direct apology to former comfort women by a cabinet official in 1993 (the 
Kōno Statement), Prime Minister Murayama established the quasi-official 
Asian Women’s Fund to compensate survivors, inaugurating a controver-
sial “Atonement Project,” which began in 1995 and ended in 2007.1
Outside official circles in the public terrain of war memory, the former 
comfort women remained a vexed and visible presence for the remainder 
of the 1990s, as Chinese and South Korean leaders chastised Japan for not 
having confronted what they called its “history problem.” Yet in most 
Asian countries the continued and expanded efforts to recognize and 
compensate the surviving comfort women took place in civil society, 
largely apart from the state. How then did the comfort women come to 
the fore in 2015 as a target of renewed government denial in Japan; a 
sharpened diplomatic weapon in South Korea, even overshadowing for a 
moment the ever sore point of Japanese colonial rule; an issue evoked in 
China together with the Nanjing Massacre and other wartime atrocities; a 
talking point for both South Korea and China in the controversies with 
Japan over the disputed islands in East Asian waters? One answer lay in the 
rising tide of nationalism in Japan, China, and South Korea, which threat-
ened to sweep away earlier signs of transnational reconciliation and recre-
ate the hostilities of decades past. Yet, when it came to the comfort women, 
no amount of nationalistic flag-waving and geopolitical name-calling was 
likely to alter the views of wartime violence against women that had spread 
1 “Statement by Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
August 15, 2005, accessed May 3, 2020, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/
announce/2005/8/0815.html; “Statement by Prime Minister Murayama ‘On the occasion 
of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end’(August 15 1995),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, August 15, 1995, accessed May 16, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/
press/pm/murayama/9508.html; “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yōhei Kōno 
on the result of the study on the issue of “comfort women”,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, August 4, 1993, accessed May 3, 2020, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/
state9308.html; “Closing of the Asian Women’s fund,” Asian Women’s Fund, accessed May 
3, 2020, www.awf.or.jp/e3/dissolution.html.
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so widely during the preceding two decades. Nor would renewed Japanese 
denials of coercion be likely to dissuade international opinion from focus-
ing on the injustice of the comfort women system.
The reasons for these predictions, I argue, are to be found in the 
changes that occurred in the ideas and practices of public memory in the 
second half of the twentieth century, often as a result of the conflicted 
processes of remembering the Second World War. Identifying five areas in 
what I call the global memory culture that evolved, largely since 1945, I 
suggest the ways in which the comfort women figured in each of them. 
The areas are law, changes in the legal processes treating past injustice; 
testimony, changes in the ways we know the past; rights, changes in notions 
of the obligations states and societies owe their citizens in relation to his-
tory; politics, changes in national and international political practice in 
regard to historical wrongs; and responsibility, changes in ideas of moral 
accountability for past and present actions. Entangled with one another in 
social practice and crossing national borders in influence and impact, these 
trends amounted to a sea change in the ideas of how the past is—or ought 
to be—collectively and publicly remembered.
Law: Changes in JudiCiaL ProCess
Legal changes linked to the war occurred in both criminal and civil law. In 
criminal trials, the main trends over time included the change from a focus 
on perpetrators to a focus on victims; from conventional war crimes to 
crimes against humanity; and from legal locality to universal jurisdiction. 
This began of course with the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes 
Tribunals held in Germany and Japan immediately after the war. Following 
conventional judicial procedure, the Allied trials assigned individual 
responsibility for the newly defined crimes against peace and crimes against 
humanity. The trial of wartime leaders had another, overtly pedagogical, 
goal of offering history lessons for “civilization,” which according to 
Justice Robert Jackson was “the real complaining party” at the bar in 
Nuremberg.2 Thus the trials were in part performative justice: in this case, 
performing the consequences of the deeds of Nazi and Japanese officials 
in waging barbaric and aggressive war. The trial of the Class A war 
2 “Opening Statement before the International Military Tribunal,” Robert H.  Jackson 




criminals in Tokyo had the memory effect of seeming to hold twenty-eight 
leaders responsible for the war while everyone else—emperor and people 
included—could imagine themselves as their victims.
The comfort women—or “comfort girls,” as American wartime reports 
referred to them—were not included in the Allied charges. They were not 
purposely excluded, like the biological war crimes of the Japanese army’s 
research Unit 731, but in part because of what might be called “familiarity 
blindness.” At that time, and afterward too, brothels were familiar, con-
sidered normal or necessary by a number of militaries to protect troops 
against venereal disease and local populations against rape. Thus although 
Dutch, French, and Chinese investigators presented evidence of Japanese 
sexual violence, it seems plausible that the comfort women system itself 
was not “seen” as an ethical or criminal violation: that prosecutors were as 
if morally “blind” to it. An exception occurred later in the so-called B-C 
Trials for conventional war crimes conducted by nine Allies in seven Asian 
countries with more than six-thousand defendants, large numbers of them 
charged with mistreating Allied POWs. In one such Dutch trial in Batavia 
in the Indies, Japanese officers were tried and convicted for “forced pros-
titution” of thirty-five Dutch women, a charge that derived as much from 
the violation of racial as of gender boundaries. In terms of public memory, 
the many tens of thousands of Asian comfort women remained invisible, 
or at least unseen, in the charges made at the postwar tribunals.3
However flawed the legal bases of the “victors’ justice” meted out at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, the tribunals set the course for developing criteria 
and procedures for adjudicating violations of evolving international law. 
By the 1990s, in the International Criminal Courts for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, crimes against humanity had become central; and 
international legal tribunals—if still, as ever, beset with legal difficulties—
had become an established means of post-conflict practice. This change 
occurred, not only through international law proper but through substan-
tial changes in national courts, primarily in trials related to the Holocaust. 
These national trials were also performative and pedagogical in intent, but 
3 The numbers given vary from more than 200,000, the figure commonly used by interna-
tional scholars and activists, to between 20,000 and 40,000, a number associated with histo-
rian Hata Ikuhiko and echoed by conservative Japanese “denialists.” See Hata Ikuhiko, 
Ianfu to senjō no sei (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1999). Chances are that some 100,000 women 
were involved, although in my view the exact number, while ultimately unknown, matters 
less than the brute fact of the extent of the “comfort women system.”
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their practice—and memory effect—changed over time, until victims 
became almost as central as perpetrators.
Many identify a turning point in the 1961 Eichmann Trial in Jerusalem, 
which brought victims’ stories directly into the Israeli courtroom in testi-
monies of survivors, including the pseudonymous Kazetnik “of the planet 
of Auschwitz.”4 The testimonies continued in the 1963–65 trials of the 
Auschwitz guards in West German courts, which while conducted under 
German criminal law helped to spread knowledge of the Holocaust more 
widely, shifting the weight of wartime criminality toward an emphasis on 
crimes against humanity. In France, after the 1970s, the national obsession 
with the Vichy past intersected over time with the increasing prominence 
of Holocaust memory. By the late 1990s, in the trial of Maurice Papon for 
his role in the wartime deportation of Jews, the testimonies of family 
members and the photographs of victims projected on the courtroom 
walls made the trial into a form of what some have called commemorative 
justice.5 Before the long tail of Holocaust justice reached its end as the last 
perpetrators died, the trials in national courts had helped over the years to 
alter the script of war crimes adjudication. Other official, quasi-judicial 
procedures developed that paid similar attention to the importance of vic-
tims’ stories, in particular, modes of transitional justice like Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions, which performed the past for the sake of 
recognition of grievous wrongs in Latin America, South Africa, and else-
where. Often cloaked as much in moral as in legal authority, these com-
missions attempted to provide a kind of restorative justice, whose aim was 
to heal society, not leave it forever divided into victims on one side and 
perpetrators on the other.
These altered national scripts of memory politics had significant effects 
on international law, including, for example, the assertion of universal 
jurisdiction in the form of the end of legal impunity for heads of state, as 
represented by the case of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in 
1998–2000. Transnational discourses on human rights led to the inclu-
sion of rape as a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute of the 
4 His real name was Yehiel Dinur, though he later became famous as Kazetnik, “inmate of 
a concentration camp.” For part of his testimony (Sessions 68, 69), see The Nizkor Project, 
accessed May 4, 2020, http://www.nizkor.com/ftp.cgi/people/e/eichmann.adolf/tran-
scripts/Sessions.
5 Nancy Wood, “The Papon Trial in an ‘Era of Testimony’,” in The Papon Affair: Memory and 
Justice on Trial, ed. Richard L. Golsan (London: Routledge, 2000), 96–114 (here 96–97).
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International Criminal Court in 1998. In each phase of the numerous 
legal justifications for this landmark statute, the arguments referred to the 
“Asian comfort women,” who had raised their voices in public at around 
the same time in the early 1990s that Bosnian “rape camps” and women’s 
rights—or as it was then expressed, the human rights of women—drew 
the international spotlight. Just as the Holocaust became a global example 
of genocide, so did the comfort women become a touchstone for new 
international law relating to the violence against women in war. And so 
rape, a violation as old as warfare itself, became a crime against humanity 
in international law. The first conviction for employing rape as a weapon 
of war occurred in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in The Hague in 2001.6
The second area of legal change relating to World War II appeared in 
the increasingly important civil trials, which adjudicated claims filed by 
individuals or by groups in class-action suits, for redress, restitution, and 
compensation for grievances suffered during the war. The demands con-
cerned compensation for individuals, as distinguished from reparations 
exacted between states. Moreover, these individuals or groups were not 
only suing their own governments, they were also making direct legal 
claims against foreign states and foreign corporations. And they frequently 
did so without the assistance of their national governments, or even in the 
face of state opposition. Amid the surge of civil suits during the 1990s, 
many related to the Holocaust, the comfort women, too, went to court. 
Indeed, the 1991 class-action lawsuit filed by three Korean former com-
fort women and others against the Japanese government accelerated the 
process of the comfort women coming into memory in the broader public 
landscape of views of the wartime past.
Their existence, after all, had never been a secret in Japan. The comfort 
women appeared in newspapers, novels, films, nonfiction accounts, and in 
parliamentary discussion about the relief law for former Japanese comfort 
women.7 Nonetheless, somewhat like the impact of the Holocaust survi-
vor testimonies at the Eichmann trial, the initial civil suit and public 
6 For this and other cases of rape in international courts, see Mark Ellis, “Breaking the 
Silence: Rape as an International Crime,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
38, no. 2 (2006–7): 225–47.
7 For the Diet questioning about relief for former Japanese comfort women, Ikeya Kōji, 
“‘Ianfu’engo jitsurei ni kansuru kokkai shingi,” Sensō sekinin kenkyū 33 (Autumn 
2001): 76–81.
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statements by the Korean women in 1991 made the comfort women vis-
ible to a wider public. In this and subsequent suits Japanese courts rou-
tinely denied the plaintiffs’claims, basing their denial on earlier state-to-state 
treaties, such as the one concluded between Japan and South Korea in 
1965; the lack of provision in international law for claims by individuals; 
or the statute of limitations, which for civil suits in Japan was twenty years. 
Yet, as Japanese courts continued to rule against the plaintiffs for damages, 
the introductory narratives and appendices of the negative judgments 
began to acknowledge violations of international law, coercion, suffering 
and even the responsibility (but not the obligation) of the government to 
recognize them. In suits filed by Korean, Filipino, Chinese, Taiwanese, 
and Dutch women, the courts rejected compensation, but a number of 
judges recognized the truthfulness, the “irrefutable historical evidence,” 
of the plaintiffs’ accounts of abduction, brutality, and violence.8 The com-
pensatory, or reparative, justice denied in these failed lawsuits nonetheless 
reflected and affected the changing public memory of the comfort women 
in Japan and around the world.
Yet it is clear that criminal and civil trials are imperfect vehicles for dis-
pensing justice on matters like war responsibility and wartime sexual vio-
lence, not least because the law is not designed to put history on trial. 
Rules of evidence, burdens of precedent, and the generally conservative 
character of legal systems limit what national and international courts can 
do, even when they are so minded. Still, it is true that the body of interna-
tional law accumulated since the end of World War II contributed to what 
one scholar termed “trans-temporal justice,” and others refer to as 
“memory- justice.”9 In their performative, commemorative, restorative, and 
compensatory roles, the criminal and civil trials helped to change the law 
and also the way in which the darkest parts of the past were regarded. 
They had, in short, a powerful memory effect.
8 Tsubokawa Hiroko and Ōmori Noriko, Shihō ga nintei shita Nihongun “ianfu”: higai-
kagai jijitsu wa kesenai! (Kyoto: Kamogawa shuppan, 2011).
9 Kohki Abe. “International Law as Memorial Sites: The Comfort Women Lawsuits 
Revisited,” Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, no. 2 (2013): 166–87 
(here 181–82); Christopher J. Piranio and Edward Kanterian, “Memory, Justice and the 
Court: On the Dimensions of Memory-Justice under the Rome Statute,” Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs 24, no. 3 (2011): 425–47.
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TesTimony: Changes in The way we Know The PasT
The second area of change is epistemological, a result of the expanded role 
of testimony as a window on history. We live, one French historian said, in 
“the era of the witness,” epitomized by the 1990s, when individual testi-
monies of personal wartime experience overflowed the courtroom, the 
memoir, and social memory circles to become one of the main currencies 
of public memory and an increasingly recognized source of knowledge 
about the past.10 In many instances the signal importance of witnessing 
had to do with the nature of the crimes and injustices at issue. They were 
often not documented, not recorded, not written down, and indeed in 
many cases, they were actively covered up, the evidence of their existence 
destroyed or expunged. This was as true of state crimes against the 
Disappeared in Latin America in the 1970s as of the civil violence of the 
Rwandan genocide in the 1990s. The deportation of the Jews of Western 
Europe and the extermination camps to which they were sent were indeed 
documented, sometimes in horrifying detail. But the so-called Holocaust 
by bullets in Eastern Europe, in which millions of Jews were killed in mass 
shootings, left mostly traces of mass graves and ghostly villages as evidence 
of its murderous horror.11 How often it happened during the massacres of 
civilians, which occurred in so many regions during World War II, that 
there was “just one witness,” frequently someone who had climbed out 
from under a pile of corpses as the sole survivor of the mass murder that 
took place on that spot.12 The question then became: Was just one witness 
sufficient to know the truth of what happened there? Or, to use the lan-
guage of a common challenge to the value of oral testimony, whether 
made near to the events or at a great distance of time: No documents, no 
historical truth. This modern conceit, so long established and so deeply 
believed—that history must be derived from written sources—came in fact 
to be regarded differently in the era of the witness than it was in earlier 
years. The voices of the victims had been heard. Testimonies of Holocaust 
10 Annette Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
11 See Patrick Desbois, The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth 
Behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Timothy 
Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
12 Carlo Ginzburg, “Just One Witness,” in Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism 
and the “Final Solution”, ed. Saul Friedländer  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1992), 82–96. Ginzburg’s context is different but the Roman formulation of “one witness, 
no witness” presents the same legal problem here.
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survivors now numbered in the tens of thousands, joined by those of oth-
ers who suffered in, or suffered through, the war.13 Ordinary people, most 
of them, their voices were supplemented at times by those of equally ordi-
nary perpetrators, not concentration camp commandants but Polish vil-
lagers, not military leaders in Tokyo but soldiers who used the comfort 
stations in Asia. These testimonies raised the epistemological challenge of 
how to know the past in order to do justice to it.
There is no doubt that the testimonies of former comfort women 
proved crucial in the process of their coming into public memory.14 After 
1991, when Kim Hak-sun, the first Korean comfort woman to tell her 
story publicly, appeared in South Korean and Japanese media, the gather-
ing of witnesses, oral histories, interviews, and testimonies across Asia 
gradually amassed a powerful archive of overlapping accounts of comfort 
women who served the imperial Japanese military throughout its areas of 
wartime occupation. These by then elderly women told of brutality and 
horror about which many had long remained silent—out of trauma, 
shame, or survival instinct. They were now old enough to tell their stories 
and to want their stories heard. And in a late twentieth-century social 
context altered by feminism, women’s rights, concerns about sexual vio-
lence, and local, regional, and global challenges to the deficits in Japan’s 
war memory, there were people willing to listen to them and to help them 
seek justice so long deferred. “I want to shake the whole world,” said one 
former Korean comfort woman, and together with others who recounted 
their experiences, shake the world they did.15 The public power of private 
stories proved enormous. In the Women’s International War Crimes 
Tribunal, held in Tokyo in 2000 as a “people’s tribunal” on Japanese 
13 For example, the 55,000 video testimonies in the Visual History Archive of the USC 
Shoah Foundation, which began as a Holocaust archive but expanded to other genocides, in 
which it includes the Nanjing Massacre, https://sfi.usc.edu/.
14 Although for the sake of simplicity I refer to the former comfort women, it is important 
to stress that they were aided, supported, and funded by a transnational network of activists 
and civil organizations throughout their efforts to obtain redress. Stephanie Wolfe notes this 
difference from Japanese-American and Jewish redress movements: The Politics of Reparations 
and Apologies (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2013), 245.
15 “Shake the whole world”: Hwang Koom Ja in the documentary film by Dai Sil Kim-
Gibson, Silence Broken: Korean Comfort Women (see her book with the same title 
(Parkersburg, IA: Mid-Prairie Books, 1999). The documentary includes testimonies of sol-
diers as well as comfort women. See also the documentary Shusenjo: The Main Battleground 




military sex slavery with international prosecutors and judges, nearly sev-
enty former comfort women attended, twenty of whom told their stories 
as witnesses before the mock tribunal.16 Coming from nine countries, 
including East Timor and North Korea, most of them did not know one 
another, and many had never spoken publicly (or even privately) of what 
they had suffered. Two former Japanese soldiers testified, too, but it was 
the women whose stories made the tribunal a testament to a still largely 
unrecorded history.
The reasons for this are well known. Rape and sexual violence are 
among the most difficult experiences to trace, or even talk about, espe-
cially for their female victims, whether in peacetime or in war. In addition, 
it appears that there was no extensive documentation of the comfort 
women system, and much of what might have existed was either destroyed 
or did not survive the end of the war. That the imperial Japanese army 
established or encouraged military brothels was clear from documentary 
evidence unearthed by the historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki in 1992, after the 
three Korean former comfort women came forward with their stories.17 
Japanese military brothels—the “comfort women system”—were part of a 
sprawling, far-flung, and diverse operation that ranged from the Philippines 
in the Pacific to the Nicobar Islands in the Indian Ocean, but it was one 
that did not leave much of a paper trail. What it did leave was human evi-
dence in the testimonies of the former comfort women, which provided 
accounts of systematic violations of human rights.
Abe Shinzō, Diet member and twice prime minister, held a different 
view Elected to the Diet in 1993, he campaigned with conservative allies 
16 Some testified on video, some in person. For the 2001 judgment, which found the 
Japanese government guilty of crimes against humanity in “state-sanctioned rape and 
enslavemen,” see “The Prosecutors and the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region v. Hirohito 
Emperor Showa et  al.,” International Crimes Database, accessed May 16, 2020, http://
www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/981/The-Prosecutors-and-the-Peoples-of-
the-Asia%E2%80%93Pacific-Region/. For testimonies of former Chinese comfort women, 
See Peipei Qiu, Su Zhuliang and Chen Lifei, Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from 
Imperial Japan’s Sex Slaves (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013).
17 Yoshimi Yoshiaki became a central scholar and activist in the movement for redress for 
the comfort women and recognition of state responsibility for the wartime system of sex 
slavery. Jūgun ianfu shiryōshū (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1992); Jūgun ianfu (Tokyo: Iwanami 
shoten, 1995). In English: Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese 
Military During World War II, trans. Suzanne O’Brien (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000); Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Kaishun suru teikoku: Nihongun ianfu mondai no kitei 
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2019).
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against what they called “masochistic history” in the late 1990s.18 As 
prime minister in 2006–07, Abe denied that the comfort women had suf-
fered “coercion in any narrow sense”—something that his own party had 
admitted in the 1993 Kōno statement—since nothing “in the documents” 
confirmed such a view.19 Then, more aggressively in his second term as 
prime minister beginning in late 2012, Abe made the comfort women a 
focus in the run-up to the seventieth anniversary of the end of the war in 
2015. He commissioned a report intended to discredit the Kōno state-
ment and continued to deny what he called the “baseless, slanderous 
claims” of sexual slavery and the forcible taking (kyōsei renkō, forced labor) 
of women.20 Instead, the comfort women were prostitutes who voluntarily 
signed up, young women duped by Korean or Chinese civilian recruiters, 
or daughters either sold by their parents or driven by poverty to sell them-
selves. While women of these backgrounds could be found in the brothels, 
so, too, were young girls forcibly taken and forcibly prevented from escap-
ing the brutal physical treatment to which many were later subjected. To 
make the argument against coercion—and the national dishonor associ-
ated with trafficking and sex slavery—the government and its nationalistic 
supporters denigrated the testimonies of the former comfort women as—
in their words—subjective, inconsistent, nebulous, unreliable, and as just 
18 Masochistic (jigyakuteki) history was associated with the revisionist jiyūshugi shikan (lib-
eral view of history) founded by Fujioka Nobukatsu in 1995 and with the Atarashii rekishi 
kyōkasho o tsukuru kai [Society for History Textbook Reform], formed in 1996. Abe was 
the secretary of the Young Diet Members Group for Japan’s Future and History Education, 
established in 1997, supporting the revisionist textbooks and countering the recent public 
accounts of the comfort women. For a summary of the range of right-wing revisionism, see 
Sven Saaler, “Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal-
Japan Focus 14, issue 20, no. 7 (October 2016): 1–17, https://apjjf.org/2016/20/
Saaler.html.
19 Abe made these comments on March 5, 2007 to the Budget Committee of the Upper 
House, and repeated them on more than one occasion. For Abe and the revisionists, see 
Hayashi Hirofumi, “Disputes in Japan over the Japanese Military ‘Comfort Women’ System 
and Its Perception in History,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Sciences 617 (May 2008): 123–32; Hayashi Hirofumi, Tawara Yoshifumi and Watanabe Mina 
“Muryama-Kōno danwa” minaoshi no sakugo: rekishi ninshiki to ‘ianfu’ mondai o megutte 
(Kyoto: Kamogawa shuppan, 2013).
20 “Details of Exchanges Between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) regarding the 
Comfort Women Issue – From the Drafting of the Kōno Statement to the Asian Women’s 




“confused memories.”21 In 2016 UNESCO was considering a joint nomi-
nation by civic organizations in nine countries to include documents col-
lectively entitled “Voices of the Comfort Women” in the International 
Memory of the World Register. Pressure from the Abe government 
resulted in a postponement of the matter in 2017, again with its allies 
claiming that the testimonies offered no persuasive proof of coercion.22 
But postponement or no, the ideologically driven government position 
did little to diminish the value of the women’s testimonies in a world by 
now grown accustomed to relying on individual voices as a source of first-
hand knowledge about the past.
Experts in several fields recognize the limits to the epistemological 
value of personal testimony, not least for accounts rendered more than a 
half-century later. Experience and neuroscience have both shown that 
human memory is malleable, that it changes over time, and that it is 
affected both by subsequent events and also by the stories that are socially 
available and acceptable at any given moment. Oral histories are influ-
enced by interviewers and the questions they ask while testimonies of 
people with similar experiences, such as Holocaust survivors or comfort 
women, are also influenced by one another, as suggested by the so-called 
model comfort woman story that emerged in the early 1990s.23 Many 
accounts followed a similar narrative arc, beginning with when the women 
were taken, by deception or force, at a young age, then recounting the 
hellish treatment in the brothels, ending with the physical and psychic 
aftermath of pain and shame after the war was over. While the details dif-
fered, the narrative template could sometimes flatten, omit, or embellish 
21 For a scholarly but typical example, Hata Ikuhiko, Ianfu to senjo no sei (Tokyo: 
Shinchōsha, 1999); expanded English version, Hata Ikuhiko Comfort Women and Sex in the 
Battle Zone (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books, 2018).
22 For example, a letter from Japanese scholars supporting the government’s position: 
“Over 100 Scholars Oppose UNESCO Registration of ‘Comfort Women’ Documents,” 
Japan Forward, accessed May 4, 2020, https://japan-forward.com/89-japanese-scholars- 
oppose-unesco-registration-of-comfort-women-documents/.
23 Ueno Chizuko and Jordan Sand, “The Politics of Memory: Nation, Individual and 
Self,” History and Memory 11, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 1999): 129–52 (here 143–44); Ueno 
Chizuko, Araragi Shinzö and Hirai Kazuko, eds., Sensō to senbōryoku no hikakushi ni mukete 
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2018). For “the paradigmatic story,” see C.  Sarah Soh, The 
Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 2008), 46–51.
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things, just as time, temperament, and trauma affected individual memo-
ries of their personal pasts. Even so, there could never be a single comfort 
women story. For whether read separately or taken as a whole, the diver-
sity of experience among the comfort women came through well and true. 
To be sure, scholars continued to argue about the relative evidentiary 
weight of testimony and written sources, exemplified by the contrasting 
views of Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Ueno Chizuko, both standing in opposition 
to the nationalistic revisionists.24 Despite the alleged difference between 
Yoshimi’s insistence on the historian’s normal practices of verification of 
the facts, whether in documents or testimonies, and Ueno’s poststructur-
alist accommodation of multiple truths and subjective agency in the stories 
told by the comfort women, in the end the two scholars and activists 
shared rather similar views. In fact, it was not the historian Yoshimi but the 
right-wing nationalists who were document-obsessed, on the one hand—
denying the military brothel system because of the lack of written proof—
and dismissive of the comfort women’s testimonies as “fabrications” 
because of inconsistencies and factual errors, on the other.25
And yet, it seems clear to almost everyone—except Japanese conserva-
tive nationalists—that the comfort women were telling stories they did not 
invent and relating experiences that were common enough to appear in 
testimonies across a broad swath of Asia and among radically diverse 
groups of women. It is also clear that the soldiers who used the comfort 
stations told of their experiences, too, both before and after the comfort 
women came forth to tell of theirs. It follows that insistence on the utter 
unreliability of testimony is untenable, precisely because the assemblage of 
witnesses produced what even Japanese courts called irrefutable knowl-
edge of past injustice. This epistemological change—a change in accepted 
modern ways of historical knowing based not on new but on renewed 
respect for the evidence of testimony, came about largely through remem-
bering the atrocities of the Second World War.
24 Ueno Chizuko, “Kioku no seijigaku: kokumin, kojin, watashi,” Inpakushon 103 
(1997), 154–74.
25 For example, one of the many tendentious articles distributed by the right-wing Society 
for the Dissemination of Historical Fact: Nishioka Tsutomu, “Behind the Comfort Women 




righTs: Changes in The reaLm of righTs
After law and testimony, the third marked change in memory practices 
occurred in the realm of rights, where public memory came to be linked 
to social justice of a civic sort. In many cases, this link appeared early in 
claims for the rights of the unincluded. Because dominant national narra-
tives of the war began as simple black-and-white stories with a putatively 
unified nation as the subject of the story, they naturally excluded the war-
time experiences of many people. Over the postwar years, those who were 
not included in the main national narratives of the war worked to have 
their stories recognized in the commons of public memory. These mem-
ory activists, as I have long called them, were countless in number, reflect-
ing wartime experience of every conceivable kind, including all points 
across the political spectrum. Their associations and their activism brought 
pressure “from below”—from outside the state—on behalf of their rights 
of memory, thus providing one of the main levers of change in the all-too- 
simple narratives of the war so long dominant in official and popular 
memory.26
What then are the rights of memory? Those excluded from the national 
story of the past, and often disadvantaged in the national society of the 
present—frequently but not always victims—typically sought a combina-
tion of four demands: recognition, which included both knowledge and 
acknowledgment of their experience; compensation, as a measure of 
redress for injury done to them; education, in order to transmit that 
knowledge to future generations; and public apology, as open expression 
of remorse for the injustices of the past. Monetary compensation was 
important but generally secondary—for how could money redeem such 
incalculable loss?—while knowledge and acknowledgment appeared as the 
main demand. And the source of that acknowledgment had to be public, 
official, with the authority of history behind it, which nearly always meant 
the state. It had also to be visible, in the form of public memorials, com-
memorative anniversaries, parliamentary resolutions, and the like. 
Recognition had to include an educational component, which so many 
memorials came to do, whether of the Holocaust or African-American 
slavery. The proliferation of “memorial museums” in the late twentieth 
26 Carol Gluck, “Operations of Memory: ‘Comfort Women’ and the World,” in Ruptured 
Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia, eds. Sheila Miyoshi Jaeger and Rana 
Mitter (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 47–77.
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century reflected this injunction, which was a combination of “never for-
get” and “never again.” Similar patterns appeared in nearly every society, 
not only in regard to war memory but to many forms of past grievances, 
from state violence in Latin America to racial apartheid in South Africa. 
And these rights of memory were understood and demanded, not in judi-
cial or emotional terms, but as civil rights or social rights—claims made by 
citizens on the state and society on the basis of human rights.
Such were the claims made in the testimonies of the former comfort 
women. They spoke of justice: “I want to see justice done before I die,” 
was a common plaint.27 By justice they meant recognition of the truth of 
their experience, which in turn was linked to apology and compensation, 
both from the Japanese government. This demand was one reason why 
some former comfort women rejected the so-called atonement payments 
from the Asian Women’s Fund established in Japan in 1995 at the time of 
the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war, under a government that had 
accepted the Kōno statement of two years earlier.28 Those who did not 
accept the payments rejected them because the compensation came from 
a non-governmental organization, not from the state. Twenty years later 
in December 2015 an agreement between Japan and South Korea created 
another fund for compensation, this time from the Japanese government, 
but without consulting the dwindling number of surviving former com-
fort women and without a direct apology from Prime Minister Abe. One 
survivor, age eighty-eight, repeated a point she had made before: “We are 
not craving for money … what we demand is that Japan make official repa-
rations for the crime it has committed.”29
The demand for education both centered on and in a number of 
instances also transcended gendered memory. The comfort women repre-
sented systematic sexual violence against women, which included not only 
27 For example, the memoir of the first Filipina Lola (as the former comfort women are 
called in the Philippines) to tell her story in public: Rosa Marie Henson, Comfort Women: 
Slave of Destiny (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1996), 152.
28 See http://www.awf.or.jp/ for the official Japanese view of the fund; for a critique, 
Nishino Rumiko, Kim Puja and Onozawa Akane, eds. ‘Ianfu’ basshingu o koete; ‘Kōno danwa’ 
to Nihon no sekinin (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 2013), in English, The Japanese State’s Assault on 
Historical Truth (London: Routledge, 2018); for a defense, Ōnuma Yasuaki, Shimomura 
Mitsuko, Wada Haruki, ‘Ianfu’ mondai to Ajia josei kikin (Tokyo: Tōshindō, 1998).
29 Lee Yong-soo, quoted in Choe Sang-Hun, “Japan and South Korea Settle Dispute Over 




military brothels but rape, mutilation, and murder of the sort that occurred 
during massacres in Nanjing and elsewhere as well as the wider range of 
such ongoing practices as sexual trafficking. At the same time many 
demands for redress avoided the conventional (male) language of the vio-
lation of female dignity, honor, or in South Korea, even “chastity.” Instead, 
the grievances were presented as a violation of human rights—not wom-
en’s rights, but the human rights of women.30 In this way the activists and 
the survivors sought to move the comfort women from shame to rights, 
from injury to redress, from invisibility to citizenship. And they did so via 
the rights of memory.
A related idea appeared in the “Right to the Truth” articulated by the 
United Nations in 2006, an idea that had a long postwar history, sharp-
ened by the demand of relatives to know the truth about the disappear-
ances of their family members in Latin America in the 1970s, and 
heightened since the 1990s by war, genocide, and other violations of 
human rights. The UN described the right to the “full and complete 
truth” about gross human rights violations as “an inalienable and autono-
mous right, linked to the duty and obligation of the State to protect and 
guarantee human rights.”31 Moreover, since the 1990s it had become 
common to insist on “the universality, indivisibility, interdependence, and 
interrelatedness of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.”32 
According to this strong, if aspirational, assertion, the right to the truth 
was now a right that tied doing justice to the past to civic and human 
rights in the present: in short, the rights of memory.
30 This formulation became the rallying cry at the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna in 1993, informed the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action at the Beijing 
Conference on Women in 1995, and has remained on the UN agenda ever since. See 
“Women’s Rights are Human Right,” The Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, accessed May 16, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/WHRD/
WomenRightsAreHR.pdf.
31 “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Study on the Right to the Truth - Report 
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,” Commission 
on Human Rights, accessed May 16, 2020, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/G06/106/56/PDF/G0610656.pdf?OpenElement.
32 For example, “Right to the Truth 10 October 2012,” UN Human Rights Council 
Resolution, accessed May 16, 2020, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Truth/
Documents/A_HRC_21_7.pdf. The phrase dates at least from the World Conference on 
Human Rights, Vienna, 1993.
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PoLiTiCs: Change in PraCTiCes of PubLiC memory
Law, testimony, rights, and now politics—the politics of memory, too, 
changed over the course of the decades after 1945. In domestic terms, the 
war was of course fought by nations in the name of nations so that war 
memory everywhere enshrined national ideologies of identity, pride, and 
sacrifice. War memory was political from the first, and subsequent shifts in 
domestic politics affected public memory, especially that of the institu-
tional or official sort.
China, for example, did not much engage in large-scale national com-
memoration of the Second World War during the Maoist era, especially in 
comparison with the anniversaries of the 1949 Revolution.33 The govern-
ment view of the war focused on Chinese Communist heroism in the Anti- 
Japanese War of Resistance, as World War II is known in China, and took 
the stance that it was not the Japanese people but their militarist leaders 
who had been responsible for the war. Then, in the 1980s, in the context 
of consolidating political power after the death of Mao, shifting from class 
struggle to economic growth, and making overtures to Taiwan, “a new 
remembering” of the war began to take hold in official discourse.34 The 
government turned to patriotic education, which presented the war with 
an emphasis on Japanese atrocities and Chinese victimhood. 1985, the 
fortieth anniversary of the end of the war, saw a national ramp-up in com-
memoration, including the opening of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial 
Hall, and in a nod to Taiwan, a growing recognition of the Nationalists’ 
contributions to the “All-nation War of Resistance.” After the democracy 
protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, for reasons of strengthening state 
power, the government intensified patriotic education, again featuring 
Japanese atrocities and Chinese suffering. The intensification continued 
under Xi Jinping, notably around the seventieth anniversary of the end of 
the war in 2015. Two of three new national holidays established in 2014 
commemorated the war, one on December 13 for the Nanjing Massacre, 
the other on September 3, for the signing of Japan’s surrender. The gov-
ernment designated nearly 200 national memorial sites related to the war; 
and on September 3, 2015, Xi Jinping presided over the largest military 
33 For official war memory before 1982 and the gap between it and popular views, see 
Chan Yang, World War Two Legacies in East Asia: China Remembers the War I (London: 
Routledge, 2017).
34 For this phrase, see Arthur Waldron, “China’s New Remembering of World War II: The 
Case of Zhang Zizhong,” Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (1996): 945–78.
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parade ever held in Beijing. “History Cannot Be Distorted,” stated the 
title of one of Xi’s anniversary speeches, but it could clearly be instrumen-
talized for the sake of strengthening a political regime.
Vladimir Putin followed a similar pattern in Russia. He expanded the 
patriotic commemorations of Victory Day (May 9), especially on the sixti-
eth and seventieth anniversaries in 2005 and 2015. With the annexation of 
Crimea in 2014, when opposing sides were hurling epithets of “Nazis” 
and “fascists” at one another, Putin signed a new law making it a criminal 
offense to “spread intentionally false information about the Soviet Union’s 
activities during World War II” and “to publicly desecrate symbols of 
Russia’s military glory.”35 The Great Patriotic War, as it is known, had 
long been the centerpiece of Soviet and Russian national memory, and 
Putin, like nationalist leaders elsewhere, was deploying the politics of the 
past in the name of power in the present.
In Japan, the politics of war memory played out in official terrain largely 
through the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), whose members over the 
years took positions that angered South Koreans, Chinese, and others, 
including many Japanese. Such incidents included prime ministers visiting 
Yasukuni, the shrine of the war dead; cabinet members denying the reali-
ties of the Nanjing Massacre; the Abe government refusing to recognize 
coercion of the comfort women; and the like. The memory politics of the 
LDP was partly a product of nationalist true believers, partly a position 
addressed to its right-wing supporters, and partly a refusal to acknowledge 
the way the winds of transnational memory were blowing. Notably, when 
the LDP fell in 1993 after nearly four decades in power, the first non-LDP 
prime ministers followed a different line, even traveling on what were 
nicknamed “apology tours” to Asian countries. When the LDP lost power 
again in 2009, the new prime minister immediately decided not to visit 
Yasukuni, suggesting that not every Japanese politician would work from 
the same playbook. Indeed, not every LDP leader did either. Miyazawa 
Kiichi, the prime minister when the Korean former comfort women filed 
their suit against the Japanese government in December 1991, expressed 
his “sincerest apology” in Seoul as early as January 1992. And Kōno Yōhei, 
who acknowledged military involvement in the comfort stations and the 
presence of coercion in his 1993 statement, was at the time the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary of an LDP government. But it was a different politician 
35 Ivan Kurilla, “The Implications of Russia’s Law against the ‘Rehabilitation of Nazism’,” 
PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, no. 331 (August 2014): 1–5.
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and a different political context when the LDP returned to power in a 
coalition government in December 2012. Combining his own nationalis-
tic beliefs with an electoral appeal to the conservative base of the party, 
Abe Shinzō made the comfort women a campaign issue, even pledging if 
elected to revise the Kōno Statement, twenty years after it was issued. Such 
were the domestic politics of war memory.
Yet the more decisive memory effect occurred in the arena of geopoli-
tics. For if war memory was always national, memory of a world war was 
also always international. The dominant national narratives of the war 
originated in a geopolitical context that helped to determine the shape 
they took. For Japan that context was the Allied (American) occupation, 
which oversaw the renaming of the conflict as the Pacific War, reducing it 
chronologically to 1941–45, Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, that is, the war 
between Japan and the United States. As a consequence the China War—
total war from 1937 to 1945—faded out of the main story, and with it the 
wartime experiences of the peoples of East and Southeast Asia. Many in 
Japan accepted this congenial version of the past, which was reinforced by 
postwar domestic peace and prosperity, and frozen into place by the 
US-Japanese alliance during the Cold War. Then in the 1980s, and dra-
matically after the end of the Cold War in 1989, Japan confronted a dif-
ferent world, one in which the rise of Asia was transforming the geopolitical 
context, and with it, the memory of the Second World War.
In this respect, East Asia had much in common with Eastern Europe, 
in that both regions experienced a surge of war memory in the 1990s, as 
the long-dominant narratives—the Japanese story of the Pacific War under 
the American Cold War imperium; the Eastern European memories sub-
sumed in a story of anti-fascism under the aegis of the Soviet Union—
broke apart in contentious national and international debate about the 
publicly unremembered parts of the wartime past. And so it was said that 
the geopolitical postwar era in East Asia and Eastern Europe truly began 
only after 1989. The contrast with Western Europe was stark, precisely 
because countries like France and Germany had been working at postwar 
reintegration and reconciliation since the late 1940s. For this reason the 
geopolitics of war memory during the seventieth-anniversary year of 2015 
was particularly vexed between, for example, Poland or the Baltics and 
Russia just as it was between Japan and South Korea, while the commemo-




For Japan, confronting its wartime past after the end of the Cold War 
meant dealing with the China War, thirty-five years of colonial rule in 
Korea, and the range of Japanese wartime actions and atrocities across 
East and Southeast Asia and in the Pacific. During the 1990s Koreans, 
Chinese and others increased the pressure on Japan to acknowledge these 
officially unacknowledged pasts. In this geopolitical context, in January 
1992, the former Korean comfort women and their supporters began 
their weekly Wednesday demonstrations in front of the Japanese embassy 
in Seoul. On the day of the thousandth demonstration in 2011, the now 
famous bronze statue of a seated comfort woman was erected on that site. 
The demonstrations continued for decades afterward, even as the number 
of survivors shrank and their age rose to an average close to ninety. By the 
late 1990s, Chinese and Korean leaders had raised Japan’s “history prob-
lem” to a regional political issue.
The regional issue was internationalized further as Chinese- and 
Korean-American and Canadian activists expanded their efforts to com-
municate Japanese wartime actions to wider audiences and to press for 
official demands on Japan to remember the Nanjing Massacre, POWs, the 
comfort women, and so on. There followed in the mid-2000s a series of 
parliamentary and congressional resolutions in Canada, the Netherlands, 
the EU, the US and other places, calling on Japan to confront the dark 
sides of its wartime past. In January 2014, the US Congress even passed a 
law, however ineffectual, demanding that Japan do so. Statues and memo-
rials to the comfort women were erected in Korean-American communi-
ties in New Jersey, California, and soon other places as well, supported not 
only by Asian-Americans but by students, feminists, and others.36 Of 
course, like most memory activists, these groups had their own agendas, 
whether of ethnic identity, gender, or local politics. But the collective 
 outcome of their respective concerns was to take the comfort women issue 
across national and regional borders, adding the diverse voices of transna-
tional civil society to those of international organizations like the United 
Nations. By 2017, there were statues and memorials in Germany, China, 
Taiwan, Australia, with proposals for more. The strenuous efforts of the 
Japanese government to protest the statues had the opposite of their 
intended effect. Indeed, it seemed as if every time Japanese diplomats 
opposed a memorialization of the comfort women in one place, a new 
36 Thomas J. Ward and William D. Lay, Park Statue Politics: World War II Comfort Women 
Memorials in the United States (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2019).
4 WHAT THE WORLD OWES THE COMFORT WOMEN 
94
statue was erected somewhere else. In fact, the comfort women had 
become universalized as what one scholar terms “global victims” whose 
“symbolic power” was by then out of Japanese or even Asian hands.37
Meanwhile in the regional context, in 2011 the South Korean 
Constitutional Court ruled that the failure of the Korean government to 
seek compensation for the comfort women was a constitutional violation 
of the basic human rights of the victims. This unexpected judicial ruling 
brought law into diplomatic politics, requiring the government to engage 
with the issue in a new way in its relations with Japan.38 After the ruling, 
Korean officials pursued the issue before the UN Human Rights Council 
in Geneva and in New York. The United Nations, whose censure of the 
comfort women system dated back to the 1996 Coomaraswamy report on 
“military sex slavery in wartime,” continued through the 2010s to call for 
Japan to confront the comfort women issue and settle its dispute with 
South Korea.39 The Japanese government, for its part, continued to 
 protest the UN reports and censure.40 Like Japanese courts, the govern-
ment argued on the basis of its long-held premise that part of the 1965 
normalization of relations between the two countries included a settle-
ment which had, in the words of the agreement, “completely and finally” 
37 The argument is based on Holocaust survivors and others, but the comfort women also 
fit the description. Carolyn J. Dean, The Moral Witness: Trials and Testimony after Genocide 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 21–25.
38 The South Korean ruling contravened the doctrine of avoiding “political questions,” a 
doctrine upheld in 2012 by the Philippines Supreme Court in a similar case brought by 
Filipino comfort women. Monica E. Eppinger, Karen Knop and Annelise Riles, “Diplomacy 
and Its Others: The Case of Comfort Women,” Scholarship Commons, Saint Louis University 
School of Law (2014): 23–45. For some reasons that might account for the South Korean 
court’s ruling, Hideki Okuzono, “South Korean Judiciary Shakes Japan-South Korea 
Relations,” International Circumstances in the Asia-Pacific Series, Japan Digital Library 
(March 2016): 1–12 (here 4–5).
39 “Compilation of Recommendations by the UN Human Rights Bodies on the ‘Comfort 
Women’ Issue,” Japan/Alternative Report on the Issue of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery 
May 2014, accessed May 16, 2020, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/
Shared%20Documents/JPN/INT_CCPR_CSS_JPN_17435_E.pdf.
For a representative official Japanese response, see e.g., Okamura Yoshifumi, “Letter from 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotenitary for Human Rights Okamura to Chair Janina 
of the Committee on Enforced Disappearance,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
accessed May 16, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/page22e_000883.html.
40 For a summary of Japanese official rebuttals, see “Japan’s Efforts on the Issue of the 
Comfort Women,” Diplomatic Bluebook 2019, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed 
May 16, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/page22e_000883.html.
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resolved all claims made by South Korea on Japan. Koreans who thought 
otherwise were bolstered in their views by the 2011 ruling of the 
Constitutional Court demanding that the government take action on 
behalf of the surviving former comfort women.
Calls for compensation and “victim-centered” resolution of the dispute 
were accompanied by an unrelenting emphasis on the need for a govern-
ment apology. Indeed, the politics of apology that developed in the 
decades since World War II paralleled the influence of domestic political 
concerns and changing geopolitics on East Asian war memory. By the end 
of the twentieth century it had become common to expect states to apolo-
gize to their citizens for injustices like slavery and mistreatment of indig-
enous peoples on the one hand, and to apologize to other states for 
wrongs committed during wartime and colonial rule on the other. Hence, 
the demands by Poland and the Baltic states for apologies from Russia for 
the depredations of World War II, and hence the calls on Japan for apolo-
gies to the former comfort women. The phenomenon of state apologies, 
which did not exist in this form seventy-five years ago, was now wide-
spread. We live, asserted one scholar in “a guilted age.”41 Whatever one 
thinks of such official expressions of remorse—sincere or not—the politics 
of apology had become accepted, expected international practice.
When it comes to war memory, international practice matters, and not 
only for strictly political reasons. I have argued that change in national 
narratives of war is often impelled from below—from memory activists in 
civil society—but such change also comes from outside, from international 
pressure. The pressure can be geopolitical, as in the case of the reintegra-
tion of West Germany into Cold-War Europe and the demands now placed 
on Japan from the “neighboring countries” in post-Cold-War East Asia. 
International opinion plays a similar, often independent role in challeng-
ing national memories, as it did in responding to the Nazi genocide of the 
Jews in the years following the war and as it does currently in viewing the 
comfort women system as a violation of the human rights of women. Just 
as Holocaust memory no longer belongs to Germany alone, so, too, do 
the comfort women now occupy a place in transnational memory. 
International forces, both geopolitical and ethical, are thus not likely to 
cease calling on the Japanese government to follow current political prac-
tices in acknowledging past injustices.
41 Ashraf H.A.  Rushdy, A Guilted Age: Apologies for the Past (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2015).
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When the Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers signed the 
December 2015 agreement that set up the Reconciliation and Healing 
Foundation to compensate the surviving comfort women, they declared 
the resolution to be “final and irreversible.” But the politics of memory 
knows no such historical finality, and it often proves reversible, too. In this 
case, it took no time at all to demonstrate the futility of such diplomatic 
wishful thinking. Indeed, it had been sabotaged at the moment of the 
agreement by the Japanese demand that the comfort woman statue be 
removed from its place in front of their embassy in Seoul, a demand met 
with vehement public opposition in South Korea. In a typical poll, three- 
quarters of the Korean respondents were against moving the statue, and 
an even larger number (84%) thought that Japanese government had not 
apologized to the former comfort women.42 No matter how often Japanese 
officials pointed to the number of public apologies Japan had offered since 
the first one made by Prime Minister Miyazawa in 1992, critics in Korea, 
China, Europe, the US, and elsewhere continued to deem them insuffi-
cient. The new South Korean president, Moon Jae-in (elected in 2017) 
rejected the 2015 bilateral agreement, declaring that the issue would be 
solved “only when the world, including ourselves and Japan, deeply 
reflects on sexual violence against all women.”43 He made this speech on 
the first commemoration in 2018 of a newly established national day in 
memory of the comfort women on August 14, the date Korea was liber-
ated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Thus, he appealed to world 
opinion on women’s rights on an occasion clearly linked in the public 
mind to an emotional evocation of Japan’s oppressive colonial and war-
time rule.
This mixed appeal to transnational values and national emotions aptly 
mirrored the memory politics characteristic of the “age of apologies,” 
which itself was an outcome of a “normative cascade” that occurred over 
the decades since World War II. Redress and apology to the victims of past 
injustice became an international norm that spread together with human 
rights discourse and made coming to terms with the past “a tool of inter-
national politics.”44 But it was always a tool wielded in the service of 
national politics as well. National pride polarized domestic opinion in 
42 Jiji tsu ̄shin nyuusu, September 2, 2016.
43 Nikkei Asian Review, August 15, 2018.




South Korea and Japan, suggesting that the “apology drama” between the 
two countries would continue, at least as long as conservative LDP gov-
ernments remained in power in Japan.45 Yet the changes in the global 
practice of memory politics also suggested that at some point, for the sake 
of regional and international relations, the Japanese government—how-
ever afflicted with so-called apology fatigue—would again apologize to 
and for the comfort women. For such are the political norms in the age of 
apologies.
resPonsibiLiTy: Changes in aCCounTabiLiTy 
for The PasT
The fifth change in the global memory culture since 1945 related to con-
ceptions of responsibility. In the simplest terms, responsibility for World 
War II was initially assigned to demonic or militaristic leaders, then broad-
ened to those implicated by their positions in “organizational guilt,” later 
widened still further to “ordinary men” who were involved in the atroci-
ties of war, until finally it came to include society at large, bystanders as 
well as collaborators. Immediately after the war, both in national narra-
tives and the international war crimes tribunals, Hitler, Mussolini, Tōjō, 
and their fellow leaders were considered responsible for waging aggressive 
war, a war that led to crushing defeat for the three Axis powers. Frequently 
described as a “handful” of evil or misguided leaders who misled their 
people, such a small number of leaders could scarcely have by themselves 
waged a total war that engaged all parts of state and society. In postwar 
reckonings with the Holocaust, the circle of official responsibility was 
enlarged to include organizational functionaries, so-called desk perpetra-
tors, bureaucratic figures like Eichmann who claimed of his role in geno-
cide that he was just “following orders.”46 By the 1990s, the sweep of 
responsibility had broadened further to include “ordinary men,” who 
committed acts of horror, whether police battalions in the Holocaust by 
bullets in Eastern Europe or conscript soldiers during the Nanjing 
45 For “apology drama,” Hiro Saito, “The Cultural Pragmatics of Political Apology,” 
Cultural Sociology 10, no. 4 (2016): 448–65.
46 Eichmann at his 1961 trial: David Cesarani, Eichmann: His Life and Crimes (London: 
Heinemann, 2004), 237–323.
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Massacre.47 Whatever coercion of command they may have experienced, 
they and many others, including civilians, could still be held accountable 
for their actions during the war.
By the end of the twentieth century the probing social histories of fas-
cism, militarism, imperialism, and wartime occupation cast the political 
and moral net more widely still, implicating even more ordinary citizens, 
often called bystanders, whose accountability rested in their non-action, or 
acquiescence in the face of events they might have silently opposed, 
whether out of self-interest or reasonable fear of the consequences of 
speaking out. In short, total war now seemed to suggest total complicity. 
Such complicity was not the same as collective guilt, an earlier idea roundly 
rejected after the Second World War, but rather the responsibility of indi-
viduals in their respective civic contexts. This broadening of the range of 
responsibility usually derived less from the act of war itself than from moral 
atrocities committed in its name. The expansion of the concept of respon-
sibility partly explained why wartime occupation and collaboration 
received increasing attention again after the turn of the century. In Vichy 
France, colonial Korea, Japanese-occupied East Indies, and many other 
places, the question became what made civilians behave as they did, and in 
what way were they to be held responsible for actions that at the time 
seemed sensible, useful, and even necessary.
While the idea of individual, rather than collective, responsibility gained 
ever greater prominence, a related question arose as to the extent of trans-
generational responsibility. Across how many generations—to take the 
most common example—were young Germans expected to “inherit” the 
responsibility for the actions of their Nazi forebears. In 2004, when for 
the first time a German chancellor appeared with the French president at 
the commemoration of the Normandy landings, Chancellor Schröder sug-
gested that “With regard to future generations, we should speak less about 
culpability and much more about responsibility.”48 The responsibility of 
citizens to recognize such unsavory parts of their nation’s past as slavery 
and wartime atrocities is clearly different from guilt for having participated 
in them. Responsibility carries over to subsequent generations but guilt 
does not. The notion of “postwar responsibility” (sengo sekinin) used by 
47 The phrase made famous by Christopher R. Browning in his Ordinary Men: Reserve 
Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1992).
48 Le Monde, June 5, 2004.
 C. GLUCK
99
some in Japan expressed a similar thought, if not so directly.49 
Transgenerational responsibility also relates to transgenerational justice of 
the sort claimed as a right to the truth for the grandchildren of the 
Disappeared in Latin America and in the current claims for compensation 
by families and descendants for injustices done to past generations during 
the war. One might claim that some of the young activists across the globe 
who took up the cause of the comfort women were themselves bearing 
transgenerational responsibility for violations of the human rights of 
women long before they or even their parents were born.
Public opinion polls on war memory conducted since the 1990s sug-
gested that the Japanese public understood their transgenerational rela-
tion to the past. In 2009, 49% thought Japan should apologize to the 
comfort women, 58% of those in their thirties and forties. In 2013, 75% 
disapproved of Osaka Mayor Hashimoto’s remark that the comfort women 
were necessary to “offer rest” for the soldiers. In 2014, a poll found that 
64% of university students surveyed thought the Japanese government 
should apologize to and compensate the victims. In a July 2015 poll, in 
which only 6% of respondents had experienced the war, 49% considered 
the war a “war of aggression” and 67% thought that Prime Minister Abe 
should apologize for colonial rule and aggression before and after the war 
in his seventieth-anniversary speech in August.50 Important here were 
“communities of memory” that expressed a social consensus of the sort 
that came to exist about slavery in most places, and would perhaps one day 
come to exist about sex slavery, too.51 And should that happen, it would 
be due in part to the former comfort women and their advocates around 
the world.
The stress on individual civic responsibility and the responsibility of 
states to their citizens and indeed to other states and their citizens found 
an echo in the thinking that underlay the United Nations commitment to 
R2P: Responsibility to Protect. Endorsed by the member states in 2005, 
the doctrine was described as a new international security and human 
rights norm to address the international community’s failure to prevent 
and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
49 For example, Ōnuma Yasuaki, Tōkyō saiban, sensō sekinin, sengo sekinin (Tokyo: Toshindō, 
2007); Takahashi Tetsuya, Sengo sekininron (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1999).
50 Chosun ilbo, October 20, 2009; Asahi shinbun, May 20, 2013; Kyōdō tsūshin, September 
27, 2014; Kyodo News July 21, 2015.
51 W.  James Booth, Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006).
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humanity. A response in part to Rwanda and Srebrenica, it enjoined the 
world to “never forget the victims of atrocities and crimes.” To exercise 
“collective responsibility” was to commit to work together to prevent 
them.52 However unreachable an ideal, it was born of the changes in ideas 
of historical responsibility that had occurred over the course of the twen-
tieth century.
gLobaL memory CuLTure in an age 
of rising naTionaLisms
The changes in law, testimony, rights, politics, and responsibility together 
constitute what I have been calling a global memory culture. Although 
based in part on precedents, its current form gradually emerged in the 
decades after 1945, to a considerable extent through debates and develop-
ments in the changing public memories of World War II. By the turn of 
the twenty-first century the global memory culture possessed its own 
norms and expectations, processes, and practices. States and societies were 
now expected to practice a politics of memory that included knowledge 
and acknowledgment of past actions; apologies and compensation to vic-
tims of injustice; education and memorialization to transmit their memory 
to future generations; and a general, collective, public, and official con-
frontation with the dark as well as the bright parts of a nation’s past. The 
Holocaust figured in many of the changes outlined here, from trials to 
notions of responsibility, transforming the Holocaust into a traveling 
trope: a transnational and global referent for genocide. In the years after 
1991, the comfort women, too, became a traveling trope: a transnational 
and global referent for the violation of the human rights of women. If, as 
Ueno Chizuko said of the comfort women in 1995, it had taken fifty years 
to change “the shame of women” into “the crime of men,” it was also true 
that by the end of the 1990s people in Japan, Asia, and around the world 
came to know about the comfort women and what they represented.53
52 “United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,” 
accessed May 16, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibil-
ity-to-protect.shtml; “Never forget the victims of Atrocities, Urges Secretary-General as He 
Opens Special General Assembly Session on Implementing Responsibility to Protect,” 
accessed May 16, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/ga10845.doc.htm.
53 Ueno Chizuko, “Kioku no seijigaku: kokumin, kojin, watashi,” 154.
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Their experience was written into international law in the 1998 statute 
of the International Criminal Court, which made wartime rape a crime 
against humanity, and references to the comfort women frequently 
appeared in the ongoing UN campaigns for the elimination of gender- 
based violence and the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 
UN reports from the mid-1990s used the term sex slavery for the comfort 
women system, a term vociferously opposed by the Japanese government 
and other conservatives but one that became established as part of a wider 
international discourse on trafficking, sexual violence, and rape. When it 
came to apology and compensation, speakers in UN deliberations often 
expressed the position held by South Korean officials and transnational 
civil society activists alike that human rights violations would not be set-
tled “until the victims received satisfaction.”54 This victim-centered under-
standing of past (and present) injustices was itself a product of the global 
memory culture. In this instance it meant that the demands of the surviv-
ing former comfort women had to be satisfied; the issue could not be 
settled by the state without their participation—a criticism leveled at the 
“final and irreversible” 2015 agreement between Japan and South Korea. 
In sum, at the same time that the comfort women remained a flammable 
topic in the national and regional politics of memory in East Asia, they had 
also become a global referent in the international campaign for human 
rights. And having become part of transnational memory, transnational 
norms now placed pressure on the same Japanese official memory whose 
recalcitrance accelerated the international movement to recognize the 
comfort women in the first place.
Nationalism was surely the main obstacle to official Japanese recogni-
tion of the comfort women system and other malign parts of the wartime 
past. The resurgent nationalisms that afflicted so much of the post-Cold 
War world each wielded history as an instrument of national pride and 
patriotism at home and a geopolitical cudgel in regional relations abroad. 
In this regard, China, South Korea, and Japan exemplified a globally wide-
spread revisiting—and revising—of national history to serve present politi-
cal power. Nationalism suffused South Korean views on the comfort 
women to the point that it could seem that only a single narrative would 
54 For a typical example of UN claims and Japanese responses: “Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Examines Reports of Japan,” The Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed May 16, 2020, https://www.ohchr.
org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17052&LangID=E.
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be permitted, not only in the court of public opinion, but in law courts as 
well. The South Korean scholar who described voluntary as well as coerced 
sexual service and wrote about the role of Korean recruiters of young girls 
in her study of the comfort women lost a 2015 lawsuit against her for 
defaming the honor of the victims and causing them mental stress. Her 
narrative of willing Korean participation in the comfort women system 
violated Korea’s preferred national story of coercion and forced labor by 
Japan as the oppressive colonial and wartime power.55 The Japanese gov-
ernment’s response was just as predictably nationalistic, praising the book 
for affirming its stance that the comfort women were either prostitutes or 
sold by their families and were therefore not coerced. At issue were less the 
facts than the two national narratives, with each side trying to prevent the 
other from besmirching the nation’s honor, in the process drawing Korea 
and Japan further away from the “reconciliation” that the author claimed 
was her goal in writing the book.56
The patterns of nationalistic memory politics differed from place to 
place, but in East Asia the most serious consequence of the recent con-
tention might well turn out to be the attitudes of young people in each 
country. Although polls showed that they often knew little of the factual 
history of the war, new generations of so-called angry youth in China 
learned to hate the Japanese for wartime atrocities and national humilia-
tion, and younger South Koreans responded to the escalation of the “his-
tory problem,” which banked the fires of postcolonial hostility. Numbers 
of young Japanese responded with anger at the constant harping on 
Japan’s shortcomings. The Internet harbored a vast swamp of regional 
hate speech, expressed in one’s own language and directed to like-minded 
fellow Chinese, Korean, or Japanese youth. Far from being age- or even 
decades-old, this “hate nationalism,” as I call it, surged after the turn of 
the century. And unlike the Abe regime, whose political power was finite, 
hostility learned in one’s youth could last a lifetime.
The comfort women and other historical issues certainly affected atti-
tudes toward relations between Japan and South Korea. Hate nationalism 
55 Pak Yu-ha, Teikoku no ianfu: shokuminchi shihai to kioku no tatakai (Tokyo: Asahi shin-
bun shuppan, 2014), the Japanese version by the author of the original, Cheguk ŭi wianbu, 
first published in Korean in 2013, reprinted in 2018, the versions differing somewhat one 
from the other. After appeals and support from in and outside South Korea, she lost the civil 
suit against her in the Seoul High Court in 2017.
56 Pak’s previous book was Wakai no tame ni: kyōkasho, ianfu, Yasukuni, Tokutō [Toward 
reconciliation: textbooks, comfort women, Yasukuni, Dokdo] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2006).
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notwithstanding, polls in 2019 showed that young people had more favor-
able impressions of the other country than the general population, 
although larger percentages of Japanese youth had a “bad impression” of 
Korea than vice versa. Half the Japanese with a negative impression of 
Korea gave the “continued criticism of history issues” as the reason for 
their opinion. The top reason for Koreans’ negative impression of Japan, 
given by three quarters of those polled, was that Japan had not “properly 
reflected on its history of invading South Korea.” And both sides gave 
“resolving historical disputes (comfort women/forced labor)” as the most 
important issue necessary to improve bilateral relations.57 Prospects for 
resolution seemed less than rosy in another 2019 poll, in which 87% of 
South Koreans wanted further apologies from Japan, while 80% of Japanese 
believed that additional apologies were unnecessary.58 These figures 
reversed in the past and they could well reverse again, but they clearly 
demonstrated the volatility that nationalistic uses of the past could arouse 
within nations and between them.
But because the comfort women, like the Holocaust, transcended local 
and regional borders to become part of transnational memory, the issue 
was no longer confined to contention between Japan and other Asian 
countries. And because the norms of the global memory culture required 
official acknowledgment, apology, and compensation, it was unlikely that 
future Japanese governments would forever choose to evade living up to 
those norms. Yet the point of greater significance might well be the role 
played by the comfort women and their supporters in helping to bring the 
violation of the human rights of women to sufficient global visibility that 
people and institutions sought to do something to prevent such violations 
from continuing. One critical factor was the civil courage of the former 
comfort women—including the poor and powerless, some illiterate, all 
elderly, from different countries across Asia—in coming forth to tell their 
stories and bring their experiences, terrible as they were, to the attention 
of the world. A second critical factor was the global memory culture 
brought about by the changes in legal, social, political, and moral under-
standing of the rights of women, sexual violence, and of civic 
57 “The 7th Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll, Analysis Report on Comparative 
Data 2019,” The Genron NPO, accessed May 16, 2020, http://www.genron-npo.net/en/
opinion_polls/archives/5489.html.
58 “Poll: Japan, ROK see ties worsening,” The Japan News, June 11, 2019, http://the-
japan-news.com/news/article/0005803183.
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responsibilities in times of war and peace. The norms and practices of the 
global memory culture combined with the spirit of these women to pro-
duce what might have seemed an unlikely scenario—maltreated women 
against a maltreating world—not only possible but successful in effect-
ing change.
What the world owes the comfort women then is a debt both to the 
past, in the form of a more responsible public memory, and to the future, 
in the effort to prevent similar injustice in our own time.
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CHAPTER 5
Eddies and Entanglements: Africa 
and the Global Mnemoscape
Lauren van Der Rede and Aidan Erasmus
Fig. 5.1 The Ethiopian 
Red Terror Martyrs 
Memorial Museum in 
Addis Ababa, showing a 
replica of the blood-
filled bottle used by 
Mengistu to signal the 
start of the Red Terror, 
the faces of 755 
individuals on the Derg 
“wanted list” and (1977) 
(reflected in the vitrine) 
the faces of the 
disappeared who are still 
missing (Lauren van 
der Rede)
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Abstract Van Der Rede and Erasmus provocatively characterize Africa as 
a “disobedient object” of memory studies, posing a series of radical chal-
lenges to the terms and methods of the field. In empirical terms, they 
point out how two specific cases, the Red Terror in Ethiopia and States of 
Emergency during Apartheid in South Africa, inflect our Europe-centered 
models of trauma and memory. Beyond this, positing Africa “not as a car-
tographic and geological location but as a concept and methodology,” 
van Der Rede and Erasmus challenge the liberal universalism implicit in 
the problematics of memory studies (and indeed in the notion of mne-
monic solidarity) with an insistence on hearing/listening rather than 
speaking that draws on postcolonial theory and the new methods of sound 
studies.
Keywords Africa and the global mnemoscape • Ethiopian Red Terror 
 • South Africa’s states of emergency • Genocide • Ethiopia • South 
African apartheid
Resisting the Knot: MeMoRies and theiR allegiances
The grains of Ethiopia and South Africa’s histories grate differently, 
though the irony with which they are held within the context of the 
study of the past is uncanny—be it memory or historical studies. The 
first of these spaces was never formally colonized, was itself an empire 
and remains synonymous with a politics of resistance, but is also a site of 
atrocities which the international community calls terror and local law 
recognizes as genocide. The second, in the infancy of its democracy, 
remains swaddled by the legacy of colonialism. It is a site of the extreme 
violence that accompanied institutionalized and legislated racism which 
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saw multiple states of emergency and yet is revered for its constitutional 
progressiveness. What drops out between the Ethiopian Red Terror and 
apartheid South Africa’s states of emergency is precisely that around 
which they are congealed, become knotted together and in place, as 
“then and there” from the “here and now.” Said differently, it is the 
refusal to think seriously not only of the violence of colonialism but of 
colonialism as violence that produces a knot from which African exam-
ples of genocide and war cannot come undone. Consequently, it remains 
that judgments pertaining to the veracity and value of violence lived and 
lives lost remain skewed. What the spaces of Ethiopia and South Africa 
offer us is a moment in and through which to respond to the call for a 
mnemonic solidarity: a call for the democratization of the global mne-
moscape. This call, which itself carries a charge that requires attention, 
asks not so much what the form or content of a global mnemoscape 
might look like but rather what its movement looks like, the churning of 
its subjects and the eddying of its temporalities. To read, hear, and 
respond to mnemonic solidarity as a call—in some sense, a summons—
has at the outset a grounding assumption: that one has the potential and 
capacity to both hear and listen of and to the persons whose subjecthood 
is textured by the discursive punctures of the global mnemoscape. We 
understand these punctures to be those ruptures that perforate the desire 
for a discourse of memory that might encompass the world through a 
different kind of solidarity of the present that can express the past with-
out fetishizing it. These punctures, we argue, must be attended to if we 
are to embark on the task of the democratization of the global mne-
moscape, let alone constitute a solidarity around its many parts.
Thus, in these terms, a call for mnemonic solidarity should be read as 
marking both a desire for and a movement toward dismantling the ter-
ritorializing effect of mnemonic discourses on colonialism, war, and 
genocide. The desire aforementioned is a response to the multitemporal 
and multispatial sear of colonialism, war and genocide as violence as 
politics, still unfolding histories, and divergent memories. Moreover, 
this desire is embedded in the call to think through these expressions of 
violence in a mode that democratizes, without flattening contextual 
specificity, the global mnemoscape. To set to work and realize a global 
mnemoscape would mean abiding by this beckoning, and allowing an 
entanglement of memory that would democratize rather than universal-
ize mnemonic discourses. If we are to address certain disciplinary and 
methodological inheritances, such an entanglement is critical, and 
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particularly useful insofar as it is a system of value that does not conform 
to an ordering of human suffering that must produce hierarchies as its 
structuring dynamic.
What follows will be an attempt to register how one might responsibly 
answer such a beckoning, from the vantage point of a non-geographically 
demarcated Africa, and its stakes in the wake of the formulation and deploy-
ment of the global mnemoscape and its own desire for solidarity. We will 
explore this position through an analysis of what we deem two mnemoni-
cally disobedient devices: Ethiopia’s Red Terror as genocide, and the ambi-
guity of time and war encapsulated in apartheid South Africa’s states of 
emergency. South Africa and Ethiopia are mnemonically disobedient objects 
insofar as they bear the marks of the knottiness of their relation to the past 
in the present. They disobey injunctions to be rendered as constellations of 
violent events, refuse historicism as a logic of the past, and evade a register 
that would reduce its subjects and objects to violence laid bare. As disobedi-
ent signifiers that operate as subjects within the mnemoscape, they demand 
coevalness, they resist, unsettle, and undermine the disciplinary functions of 
the discourses of genocide, war, and colonialism. For better or worse, they 
bear the marks of a difference that troubles—eddies—the regime of historic-
ity that would read colonialism as an event.
ethiopia: eddying genocide and teRRoR
Ethiopia is one space through which to respond to a call of mnemonic 
solidarity. Having ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (1948) in the year of its enactment, the country 
later also translated the definition of genocide into its Penal Code (1957), 
expanding thereon to provide protection for not only racial, ethnic, 
national, and religious groups, but also political groups. It is as a result of 
this elaboration that after the dismantlement of the Derg regime in 1991, 
the Special Prosecutor for the local courts was able to charge persons 
responsible for the Ethiopian Red Terror (officially c. 1976–78) with the 
crime of genocide. By contrast, in the chambers of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), perpetrators of the Red Terror could only be 
charged with War Crimes, as a recent case has shown.1
1 “Ethiopia: ‘Red Terror’ war crimes trial begins at The Hague,” BBC, October 30, 2017, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41802232.
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In the years prior to, but also through and beyond, the Revolution of 
1974, Ethiopia was a land of contradiction, stratified above all else by class 
divisions. The capital was home to well over a million Ethiopians, the vast 
majority of whom constituted the working middle and lower classes, who 
depended in many ways on the peasant class of Ethiopia for the agricul-
tural supplies of everyday life. However, as a result of the famine(s) which 
ravaged rural Ethiopia in the early 1970s this chain of supply and demand 
was broken, and the plight of the rural in many ways thus became the 
plight of the urban. It was this permeation of urban and rural/upper and 
lower classes, and the cruel irony of the “Hidden Famine” of 1973 coin-
ciding with the extravagance of Emperor Haile Selassie that ignited the 
Marxist-Socialist Revolution, led by parties of student movements and the 
intelligentsia, and consolidated by the military.
Following the deposition and later the murder of Emperor Haile 
Selassie in 1974 the Derg, a nominally Marxist faction which had splin-
tered away from the rest of the military, took power and ruled Ethiopia 
until 1991, not through democratic redress but through fear. The Red 
Terror is generally associated with the years 1977–78, but it is important 
to note that the military junta’s violence, indeed its brutality, did not 
spontaneously begin in 1977, or abruptly end in 1978; nor does it neces-
sarily operate along these lines as memory. Rather the violence which 
reached a peak during those years, and many thereafter, had been creep-
ing, slow to become visible but encroaching evermore on the peoples of 
Ethiopia. Some Ethiopians may have/still remember the brutality of the 
war with Italy, and its brief occupation in the 1930s, as well as the devas-
tating and drawn-out conflict with Eritrea over its independence. Thus, 
the acts committed by the Derg as well as those under its command and 
civilian allies were made practice well before the revolution. Rather, 
through the terror the Derg returned the brutality perpetrated against 
Ethiopians in the name of Italian colonization, and against Eritreans who 
struggled for independence from Ethiopia since 1961, on Ethiopia itself. 
In this way the Derg did, much as Aimé Césaire argues the Nazis did to 
Europe, return the barbarity of colonialism and empire to Ethiopia.2
The Derg began a campaign of repression banning any opposition par-
ties and inaugurating military rule, thus disavowing the desire for democ-
ratization. Moreover, it subjected its opponents to acts of cruelty which 
2 Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. J. Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 2000).
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are considered gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity, 
including: killing, torture, abduction, and disappearance. However, the 
Derg also banned any “anti-revolutionary” literature, which is to say texts 
which attempted to activate resistance against the military regime, includ-
ing “ABYOT,” “Struggle,”3 and others, going so far as to destroy the 
machinery of print. These acts of violence are not unique to the Derg and 
are familiar to presumably most persons in any part of the world today as 
expressions of particular kinds of logic. For example, killing, torture, dis-
appearance are included as constitutive acts in the definition of genocide 
provided in international law by the United Nations (UN) Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)4 and 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (1998).
Rather, as mentioned previously, what sets genocide aside from other 
forms of extreme and systemic violence is its mens rea: “… intent to 
destroy….” Terror’s mens rea, however, may be understood as the desire 
to coerce another group into subjugation by holding them hostage 
through fear. As Igor Primoratz explains, the logic of terror is such that it 
works to intimidate “innocent” people “into a course of action that they 
would otherwise not take” through “the deliberate use of violence, or the 
threat of its use.”5 In this sense, terror has two targets. The first is the 
direct target of an attack, subjected to those acts which constitute the 
manifest, blatant violence of terror. This target is the person who is pre-
sumed to be an immediate threat to the regime and is subjected to forced 
disappearance and kidnapping, torture, and killing, and so on. Through 
rumor and the displaying of the deceased in the streets of the capital and 
its surrounds the Derg made that direct violence spectacular at the same 
time as it was clandestine. And when bodies were dumped in the city 
streets, this spectacular violence also became a part of the quotidian, as 
communities were directly policed through the clustering of every approx-
imately five homes in a neighborhood (kebeles) administered by civil ser-
vants of the regime (kebele officers).
On the one hand, killing, abduction, disappearance, and torture served 
to illuminate the person identified as a threat to the regime. What is 
3 ABYOT was an independent, resistance pamphlet printed in both Amharic and English 
circulating as a mode of critiquing the Derg; while its English counterpart “Struggle” was a 
pamphlet published by the University Students’ Union of Addis Ababa.
4 Hereafter simply referred to as the Genocide Convention.
5 Igor Primoratz, “What is Terrorism?” in Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, ed. Igor 
Primoratz (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 15–27.
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significant to note here is that the identification of a person as an enemy of 
the Derg—and as such by extension the state—was not self-identification; 
the individual him/her/themselves did not necessarily identify as opposi-
tional to the state, unless he/she/they were in fact a member of politically 
oppositional groups such as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party 
(EPRP) and Meison. Rather, he/she/they needed only to be named, sus-
pected and as such marked as an opponent to the regime in order for said 
person to be considered “anti- revolutionary,” “terrorist,” “anti-Ethiopia,” 
and therefore necessary to eliminate. The condition for this elimination of 
an opponent, this first constellation of techniques of terror, is premised on 
conspiracy and suspicion, whereby the accused is presumed guilty until 
proven innocent.
The true brutality of the Derg’s rule is that it rendered spectacular vio-
lence quotidian, and in so doing assaulted its second, indirect target—the 
civilians who survive to bear witness, and whose witnessing in turn pro-
duced the fear through which the Derg held hostage the population and 
simultaneously subjugated the people. This is the primary object of terror: 
The direct victim who is subjected to killing, torture, and so on is con-
scripted as a mechanism through which to activate the fear that will take 
hostage and subjugate those who remain. It is the indirect victim, left to 
live with the constant threat of being made a direct victim, who is of pri-
mary importance. In this sense the violence directly enacted on a single 
person is displaced onto a group of people. The dumping of victims’ bod-
ies in the streets of Addis Ababa is one of the techniques through which 
this is achieved, registering as public display the culmination of the cruelty 
of the Derg. It is a warning that inspires foreboding that is affirmed when 
messages are left on the body that read “I am an enemy of the people. 
Mother, don’t weep for me, I deserved to die.”6 In some instances, these 
notes explaining murder as deserved punishment for (being suspected of) 
opposing the Derg are placed on the person before they are in fact exe-
cuted—as an artwork in the Red Terror Martyrs Memorial Museum 
(RTMMM) in Addis Ababa suggests. In this artwork a row of people is 
depicted against a red, unevenly shaded backdrop; the first from the left 
appears to be a priest, then a woman, four men, a woman in front of 
whom stands a boy child, a woman in hijab, and finally another man. Of 
this scale of individuals, all of whom have their hands out of view (thus 
6 Maaza Mengiste, Beneath the Lion’s Gaze: A Novel (New York: WW Norton & Company, 
2010), 240.
5 EDDIES AND ENTANGLEMENTS: AFRICA AND THE GLOBAL MNEMOSCAPE 
112
presumably bound), and all are met with shadowed silhouettes shaped 
quite like a Kalashnikov.
What is at stake in the difference produced by the labeling of some of 
the soon-to-be-shot is that not all of the victims of the Derg and particu-
larly the Red Terror were necessarily themselves members of political 
opposition or even identified as such. Some victims were subjected to this 
kind of violence purely on the grounds of being associated with someone 
who was presumed a threat to the regime. What this gestures toward is a 
feature of the figure of the terrorist which distinguishes it from the assassin 
or the revolutionary, for example. As Primoratz explains, this feature is the 
inability to distinguish between guilty and innocent, and in this context it 
is this inability that contributes along with the spectacular violence like 
that of the Derg, to the paranoia through which entire populations are 
held hostage through terror.
Techniques of terror are textured differently and include various mech-
anisms—activating gestures—that render it visible and audible to the pri-
mary target and in so doing produce witnesses and testimony, so as to 
activate fear. The public display of mutilated bodies, the refusal to return 
or reveal the location of the disappeared (living or not), and the letting live 
and release of victims of torture made knowable the extent of cruelty to 
which the Derg was willing to go. Terror through its mechanisms and 
techniques deploys fear’s interpellative potential to subjugate.7 Terror acts 
by rendering the spectacular quotidian. But the everydayness of the exces-
sive violence in response to the anxiety of a regime is not mundane; despite 
its routineness and its imposed cohabitation the spectacular violence of the 
Derg’s project of terror did not lose its charge. Rather it continued and 
continues in some ways to sear the lived experience of Ethiopians, as is 
clear from the growing exhibition in the Red Terror Martyrs Memorial 
Museum, in Addis Ababa.8
7 On interpellation, see L. Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes 
towards an Investigation),” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. B.  Brewster 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 11–44.
8 In addition to the sources listed in footnote 5, see Edward Kissi, “‘Remembering 
Ethiopia’s Red Terror: History of a Private Effort to Preserve a Public Memory,” in 
Documenting the Red Terror: Bearing Witness to Ethiopia’s Lost Generation, ed. Hirut Abebe-
Jirut (Ottawa, Ethiopian Red Terror Documentation and Research Centre (ERTDRC), 
2012), 9–24; Lauren van Der Rede, “Disappeared to Ethiopia’s Bermuda: Tales by a 
Puppet,” Kronos vol. 44 no. 1 (2018): 196–210, https://doi.org/10.17159/2309-9585/ 
2018/v44a12; Deirdre McQuillan, “Ethiopia Still Haunted by Memory of Derg Genocidal 
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In the wake of the dismantling of the military regime in 1991, the 
Ethiopian state was tasked with addressing the atrocities committed as 
part of the terror sowed by the Derg, in the absence of any legal protec-
tions against the offense of “terrorism” or “terror.” It is important to note 
that terrorism is a crime against international customary law, like geno-
cide, but unlike genocide does not have a central guiding and accepted 
definition from which other forms of legislation, including local legisla-
tion, can take its cue.9 Rather, terror is defined largely according to a 
state’s own definitions (and needs), as South Africa did in 1967 and 
Ethiopia would do only in 2009. Accordingly, the members of the Derg 
who were tried during the Red Terror Trials were charged with the crime 
of and offenses relating to genocide, and not in fact terror. The prosecu-
tion relied on the definition of genocide provided by its Penal Code of 
1957, which is an adaptation of the definition enshrined in the Genocide 
Convention (and later the Rome Statute). What enabled this is a distin-
guishing feature of the Ethiopian definition of genocide laid out in the 
Penal Code of 1957, namely that in addition to racial, ethnic, religious, or 
national groups, political groups are protected as well.
It was on these grounds that democratic Ethiopia took a retributive 
approach to justice and charged 27 members of the Derg, including 
“chairman” Mengistu Haile Mariam, with Crimes Against Humanity and 
Genocide, and not “Terrorism.” This is significant because it gestures 
toward a misfire in the praxis of naming violence and attending to that 
violence. The irony of naming the atrocities committed in Ethiopia by the 
Derg terror but the charging perpetrators with genocide points a veiling of 
the eponymous quality of Ethiopia’s Red Terror, which was named after 
the Red Terror perpetrated by the Bolsheviks in Russia approximately 
60 years before. What is lost if we do not mark this irony is a turning to 
Regime,” The Irish Times, May 6, 2011, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ethiopia-still- 
haunted-by-memory-of-derg-genocidal-regime-1.563626.
9 Terrorism, as a legal concept, has proved slippery in so far as defining it as a crime of 
international law is concerned. However, since the 1960’s there have been numerous sectoral 
counter-terrorism interventions. These include the Convention on Offenses and Certain 
Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (1963), the Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material (1979), the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings (1997), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism (2005). See Ben Saul, “The Legal Response of the League of Nations to 
Terrorism,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006): 78–102; and Ben Saul, 
“Speaking of Terror: Criminalizing Incitement to Violence,” The University of New South 
Wales Law Journal (UNSW Law Journal) 28 no. 3 (2005): 868–86.
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Europe that is colored not by a desire to become a Westernized subject, 
but rather a desire to learn barbarity. The definition of genocide provided 
in the Ethiopian Penal Code of 1957 is more elaborate than the definition 
provided in the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute. Under 
Article 281 of Title II of the Ethiopian Penal Code of 1957, Offenses 
against the Law of Nations, Chapter 1 (Fundamental Offenses) genocide 
is defined as follows:
Genocide; Crimes against Humanity.
Whosoever, with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial, religious, or political group, organizes, orders, or engages in, be it in 
time of war or in time of peace:
 (a) Killings, bodily harm or serious injury to the physical or mental health 
of members of the group, in any way whatsoever; or
 (b) Measures to prevent the propagation or continued survival of its mem-
bers or their progeny; or
 (c) The compulsory movement or dispersion of peoples or children, or 
their placing under living conditions calculated to result in their death 
or disappearance, is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from five 
years to life, or, in cases of exceptional gravity, with death.
The disjuncture between this articulation of the crime of genocide and 
that of the Genocide Convention begins with its framing, or title, in which 
genocide and crimes against humanity are named alongside each other, as 
equally offensive and as such, of equal importance. However, the legisla-
tion above sands away the grains of difference between genocide and 
crimes against humanity. Although the constitutive acts are shared by the 
two offenses, the mental element of these crimes which produces them as 
different is negated. According to the Rome Statute genocide is commit-
ted with “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a racial, ethnical, nation or 
religious group, as such” (Article 6); while crimes against humanity are 
violent acts committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack” 
(Article 7). There are a number of reasons why the way in which the 
Ethiopian legislation expresses the mens rea shared between genocide and 
crimes against humanity is significant.
First, it marks the perpetrator of these crimes as a subject: “whosoever,” 
while neither the Genocide Convention nor the Rome Statute marks an 
activating agent in its definition of genocide, and in the case of the Rome 
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Statute, crimes against humanity. This invocation of the subject—indeed 
of the human—is significant because it marks that there are people on 
both sides of atrocity. Second, this guilty subject is not only a person who 
commits one of these acts him/her/theirself but also someone who orders 
or engages in it, thus preemptively undoing the defense that many Nazis 
used at Nuremberg during the Military Tribunals (1945–46). In doing 
so—in opening what it means to actively participate in atrocity—it also 
explodes the question of complicity. Thus, the third point of significance: 
that the Ethiopian Penal Code of 1957 was a response to the Holocaust, 
in that it translated genocide and crimes against humanity (an offense 
adopted in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, or the 
Nuremberg Charter) into legislation as lessons from Nuremberg. Fourth, 
the legislation marks that both genocide and crimes against humanity can 
occur during times of war (between states) and peace.10 This is important 
because it marks that interstate war is not violence’s condition, but rather 
that there is the potential during times of peace for a different kind of war, 
in which the state reads as its enemy and takes as its target not another 
state and its agents, but its own people. This kind of war is what Raphael 
Lemkin in 1948 called genocide—what Ethiopians in the 1970s would 
call terror—and what South Africa for most of the second half of the twen-
tieth century knew as apartheid.
listening and heaRing: of Modes
To achieve what a call for mnemonic solidarity whispers as its desired 
object requires reckoning with an Africa that sits beyond its geographic 
designation as place. This means that what is necessary is to register Africa 
as a concept for thinking the global mnemoscape as a site that is not situ-
ated, and what may be useful in this is a leaning toward modes of aural-
ity—hearing and listening—as interpretive signposts to help us map the 
texture of the past in the present. The inclination to treat discourses on 
colonialism, war, and genocide as discrete is refused by such a gesture 
toward sound, and their differences are laid bare for analysis. Indeed, it is 
in the resonant movement of concepts such as genocide, war, and 
10 It is important to mark here that no Nazi was charged with the crime of genocide at 
Nuremberg, but that these persons were in fact charged with war crimes. Although the word 
genocide was used (once) during the Nuremberg proceedings, it only acquired the status of 
criminal offense in 1948.
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colonialism that we might hear the unsettling of their groundedness, in 
either Europe or its Other. In the most salient ways genocide, war, and 
colonialism are marked by their intent: to destroy, to resolve, and, finally, 
to civilize. These intentions are further emboldened by a desire to improve 
the ways in which their intent becomes method.
In order to undo history’s fetishism of the document, to underscore 
the present as the site in which memory unfolds, and to remind us of the 
precarity of time and temporality as concepts that belong to both, aurality 
might offer us a means through which to articulate that which we posit 
may be thought as the eddying entanglements of Africa and the global 
mnemoscape. This churning of the global mnemoscape can be read as an 
effect of an encounter with the discourses of war, colonialism, and geno-
cide when engaged not only from the vantage point of Africa, but through 
thinking Africa.
It should be said that aurality, or rather a discourse of sound, is not new 
to studies of the past, but it certainly complicates any universal relation to 
the past. In fact, it can be argued, and has been, that it is in studies of the 
past that sound has shown its propensity for excess as well as its inherent 
critique of a discourse of recovery.11 Elsewhere, sound and Africa both as 
place and idea are intertwined in a pursuit of the past. The relationship 
between aurality and colonialism is at the core of the birth and develop-
ment of another discipline—ethnomusicology—whose founder Erich 
Moritz von Hornbostel took it upon himself to record on a phonograph 
the infamous “Hottentot Venus” Sarah Baartman in order to not only 
articulate the differences between Western and non-Western physiog-
nomy, but to address what he called the need to “uncover the darkest and 
most distant past [and] to peel off the timeless and elemental from the 
fullness of the present.”12
11 Sound as it has been deployed in the discipline of history has been characterized by a 
historicist impulse, resulting in a teleology that merely seeks to augment narrative with new 
aural actors. What is important to note here is the idea that sound is not merely hearing, and 
that soundscape—a sonic deployment of technologies of mapping—is a critical concept. 
Daniel Bender, Duane J. Corpis and Daniel J. Walkowitz, “Editor’s Introduction: Sound 
Politics: Critically Listening to the Past,” Radical History Review 121 (2015): 1–7 (here 3).
12 The precursor to what becomes ethnomusicology is comparative musicology, and is a 
discipline not only concerned with music, but how music might grant us insight into the 
temporal dimensions of culture proper. Eric Ames, “The Sound of Evolution,” Modernism/
Modernity 10 no. 2 (2003): 297–325 (here 298).
 L. VAN DER REDE AND A. ERASMUS
117
Hearing is ironically in many ways the mode through which the law 
attempts to address and, in rare exceptions, redress offenses against it, 
which in our discussion here is violence as we call terror and apartheid. In 
response to these genres of violence Ethiopia and South Africa staged dif-
ferent iterations of “the hearing” in which the former held what is referred 
to as the Red Terror Trials and the latter held the famous Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Both the Ethiopian Red Terror Trials and the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa were imagined as 
“the mode” through which political transition occurs “peacefully,” requir-
ing listening and hearing from and to both victims and perpetrators.13 It is 
in this sense that these iterations of the legal hearing required a willingness 
to be activated—to allow the past into the present without fixing it there, 
so as to listen and to respond to what is being heard with justice in mind. 
Said differently, to listen here is to endow the law with the quality of activ-
ism. It is in this sense that the listening that the legal hearing enables is a 
potential for a coming to terms with mnemonic legacies of violence.
Hearing, however, also implies mishearing, which is why it must be 
paired with listening. The term solidarity has at its core an implicit kernel 
that hints at listening in its etymological trace of communion, and what is 
required if we are to achieve a mnemoscape entangled in solidarity is a 
thinking through and from Africa that would produce a democratization 
of memory discourses. Africa has been lodged as one of the spatial and 
conceptual others of the West through the discourses of the modern epis-
teme and its effects, not the least of which can be located in area studies 
and anthropology. Consider, for example, the contemporary trajectory of 
migrancy that posits the West (and those locales who are marked as its 
13 In law trials are usually distinguished from hearings, in the sense that the former is usu-
ally a drawn-out procedure in which a definitive and final decision is made after arguments 
are presented by both parties while the latter is faster in part because its object is to determine 
a temporary resolution to a matter. However, in the Ethiopian case, the decisions assumed 
final at Red Terror trials proved temporary in the sense that death penalties were converted to 
life sentences. Finally, in 2011, 23 members of the Derg serving these life sentences received 
official pardons by the state. See Yonas Abiye, “Ethiopia Pardons 23 Top Derg Officials,” 
Ezega News, June 1, 2011, https://www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails?NewsID=2919. 
Debate around the matter of amnesty and pardon had, however, been ongoing since the 
inception of the retributive mechanism of transitional justice in Ethiopia’s inception, see 
Kjetil Tronvoll, C. Schaefer and Girmachew Alemu Aneme, eds., The Ethiopian red terror 
trials: Transitional justice challenged (New York: Boydell & Brewer, 2009); Girmachew 
Alemu Aneme, ‘Apology and Trials: The Case of the Red Terror Trials in Ethiopia,’ African 
Human Rights Law Journal 6 (2006): 64–84.
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proxies) as always a destination: that to which is aspired spatially but also 
(as a consequence of the teachings of modernity) conceptually. The Rest 
(most of Africa, Asia, South America, etc.) are marked conversely as points 
of departure: that from which, according to the same epistemic logic, that 
same trajectory is to spatially and conceptually progress. This is how, 
through the schizogenic use of time, the discourse of anthropology denies 
the coevalness of ethnographic fieldwork and produces its object.14 It is in 
this sense and through the schizogenic use of time as method that various 
expressions of the mnemonic discourses of genocide, colonialism, and war 
have produced their object as knots of memory—both temporally bound 
and fixed. Said differently, the knot here acts as an anchor, holding in place 
what remains “there and then”—backwards, primitive, uncivilized—and 
separating it from the “here and now”—Western, modern/eurocentric, 
progressive. In “knotting” the Rest and Other of the West with catastro-
phe, the mnemonic discourses of genocide, war, and colonialism collapse 
time and space, to produce non-Western nations as perpetually “cold” 
societies, to borrow from Claude Lévi-Strauss, from whom Jan Assmann 
develops his theory of “cold” and “hot” memory. In Cultural Memory 
and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination, 
Assmann writes that “cold” and “hot” are two poles on the spectrum from 
primitive to civilized respectively, explaining also that “cold societies do 
not live by forgetting what hot societies remember—they simply live with 
a different kind of memory, and in order to do that, they must block out 
history.” From this he posits that cold memories are the nodes of history 
that mark time, freeze it in place in order for it to be measured. Conversely, 
hot memory “not only measures out the past, as an instrument of chrono-
logical orientation and control, but it also uses past references to create a 
self-image and to provide support for hopes and for intentions.”15 Hot 
memory, and indeed hot societies, in this sense use their cold counterparts 
for creating a self-image—or myth—of superiority and progression, of 
having developed from where their cold counterparts remain frozen. The 
deconstruction of this perception of Africa, an example of the democrati-
zation to which we referred earlier, requires an understanding of Africa as 
14 See Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other. How Anthropology Makes its Object (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983).
15 Jan Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and 
Political Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 52, 62; cf Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
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a concept and indeed articulating modes of thinking about the world that 
are non-Eurocentric. What the example of Ethiopia makes clear, further-
more, is that this requires grappling with Africa’s unsettling of globally 
accepted definitions of genocide and colonialism—and in markedly differ-
ent ways than elsewhere in the world.
Sound, more recently, has become a subject of the south, and is being 
called upon to do the work of solidarity. Unsurprisingly, it has followed 
the discursive contours laid out above, as a recent edited collection titled 
Remapping Sound Studies argues in its pursuit of a “Southern Sound 
Studies.” When “south” is defined in the volume, it is not so much a 
description as it is a genealogy of the term as a rather stable category, with 
subtle unreferenced nods to both a Marxist revisionist historiography in 
South Africa (colonialism of a “special type”) as well as terms such as 
“structural adjustment,” and institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund named. Where it begins with an account of 
the Enlightenment and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conflation of sound and 
south, and the multiple associations with writing, speech, and communi-
cation that the audiovisual litany marked as ideological, the volume unfor-
tunately returns to the territorialization it began with: the North’s other.16 
Once again, Africa is reduced to a site that history happens to—a context.
We are also reminded in rather plain terms, through the idea that the 
sonic event that is acousmatic is one that betrays its source, that the cer-
tainty of the relationship between the source of a sound, its cause, and its 
effect as sonic emission is not one that translates directly into the listener’s 
experience.17 In other words, we cannot merely hear if we are to hear 
properly. We must, and with a political and philosophical urgency, listen. 
Listening is about posture/-ing and perspective, a gesture that posits that 
it is about the movement of the articulated into the visual. It is about a 
gaze that is not the gaze. We constitute listening here as precisely this 
work: as activism, as engagement, attentiveness, and action in the moment 
of turning when we hear the call for a democratization of the global 
16 The audiovisual litany is a term coined by Jonathan Sterne and refers to the various dif-
ferences and dichotomies that surround the senses of sight and hearing. See Jonathan Sterne, 
The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction (Durham NC: Duke University 
Press, 2003), 15. Gavin Steingo and Jim Sykes. “Introduction: Remapping Sound Studies in 
the Global South,” in Remapping Sound Studies (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 
2019), 1–36.
17 Brian Kane, Sound Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 7.
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mnemoscape. It is in the act of hearing and listening for and to Africa in a 
non-reductive sense that we may be able to engage Africa as a productive 
site from which to think, a site of activation and activism. It is therefore in 
this sense that we approach Ethiopia and South Africa not as sites of mem-
ory, but as mnemonic structures in and of themselves. They do not consti-
tute an alternative to a global mnemoscape nor do they set the stage for a 
memory studies that would locate itself in Africa or in the global south. 
Rather, through their disobedience to historicism and to a memory stud-
ies that would favor shared remembering as a universal mode of mne-
monic discourse, they constitute sites of countercurrents and 
counterflows.
south afRica: total WaR and the tiMe of WaR
How might we remember a time of war that is not wartime? How might 
we listen to the sounds of war misrecognized? The idea of the state of 
emergency and what is called total war as it unfolds in the context of a set-
tler colonialism that would script the world demands that we consider the 
formulation colonialism as violence alongside the notion that imperialism 
is war.18 What is called the military industrial complex of the South African 
apartheid state produced the notion of “total war” in relation to the politi-
cal atmosphere of the Cold War, and this reveals an insecurity around the 
colonial state, imperial war, and the work of memory. Let us pause for a 
moment and consider the context of two particular terms that animated 
both the legal and administrative forces that characterized the various 
states of emergency in the 1980s in South Africa: total war and militariza-
tion. It is through the consideration of these terms as they oscillate in both 
the historiography and popular memory that we begin to see how tempo-
rality itself becomes a marker of insecurity. War, colonialism, and apartheid 
cease to be discrete objects, periods, or events if we attend to the ways in 
which these terms move.
By 1976, various events including the Soweto Uprising and the death 
of anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko in detention in 1977  in particular 
shifted the political landscape in South Africa and its two key actors, the 
state and resistance movements, leading to a United Nations arms embargo 
on South Africa. The discourses of the Cold War and the longstanding 
18 See, for example, the idea of global apartheid. See also Jacques Derrida and Peggy 
Kamuf, “Racism’s Last Word,” Critical Inquiry 12, no. 1 (October 1985): 290–99.
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conflation between communism and African nationalism (the red danger 
and the black danger) in the mind of the apartheid state drove a new 
administration under P.W. Botha to declare a new state policy in 1979: 
“total onslaught, total strategy.”19 In July of 1979, Botha would make the 
infamous “adapt or die” speech, in which he argued for significant reform 
of the apartheid system if the state in its current form were to survive the 
current domestic and international situation. Throughout this period, 
there was a debate both inside and outside the halls of power around 
whether South Africa was indeed at war. At times, the state would argue 
that it was facing a revolutionary onslaught that required the strategic 
intervention of the defense forces, and at other times it would state very 
plainly that the current situation of conflict in the country “involved so 
many different fronts, unknown to the South African experience, that it 
has gained the telling but horrifying name of total war.” This was captured 
perhaps in the most telling manner through two specific instances in 1988. 
The first, which occurred during a treason trial, was a moment where the 
South African Police noted that the African National Congress could not 
be thought to be at war with the South African Government and that 
rather it should be seen in terms of the state facing a “revolutionary 
onslaught.” This argument, according to Jacklyn Cock, was put forward 
simply to prevent ANC members claiming a prisoner of war status, a status 
which under the Geneva Protocols of 1977 is granted to those engaged in 
wars with colonial powers. The second is an instance where in order to 
circumvent the institution of an order brought by the End Conscription 
Campaign to restrain the South African Defense Force from harassment, 
the state argued that because the South African Defense Force (SADF) 
was on a “war footing,” such an intervention was outside of the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court.20
19 The idea of the red danger, or die rooi gevaar, came to refer to the threat of communism 
in the language of the apartheid state and its tactical positioning in relation to liberation 
movements. It also became synonymous with the idea of the black danger, or die swart 
gevaar, a racialized fear of black settlement in white urban areas dating back to the 1930s 
before the adoption of apartheid policy in 1948. James Selfe “The Total Onslaught and the 
Total Strategy: Adaptations to the Security Intelligence Decision-Making Structures under P 
W Botha’s Administration” (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Cape Town, 1987), 1–4. 
For more on the state security apparatus, see James Selfe, “South Africa’s National 
Management System,” in War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa, eds. Jaclyn 
Cock and Laurie Nathan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 149–58.
20 Jacklyn Cock, “Introduction,” in War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa, 
eds. Jaclyn Cock and Laurie Nathan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 1–13 (here 1).
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What this series of events did was place the military apparatus in South 
Africa in a precarious position both inside and outside of politics. Here, 
militarization was an ideological formation, with its power and influence 
operating as a social institution with its own networks of cultural memory. 
What it meant to be at war and to be prepared for war would come to 
define what the soldier was and what the civilian was, including their own 
histories of becoming as national identities. It would also, ironically, suture 
the enemy into the very fabric of that becoming. It was imperialism. It was 
total war.
It was in this guise of total war that apartheid as a bureaucratic structure 
would stage its last stand as a series of states of emergency, formalized 
periods of militarization, and the suspension of human rights in favor of 
humanitarian principles. More important, however, is that the idea of total 
war as it unfolds in South Africa (and considering the various military 
operations of the apartheid state further afield in Southern Africa) reveals 
to us a temporality around state violence and a relationship to imperialism 
that must be considered if we are to embark upon the work of entangling 
memory to achieve a more democratic mnemoscape. To understand how 
we can constitute a global mnemoscape, we must first look at how the 
skirmishes of encounter—the small wars of empire that came to constitute 
the pre-history of South Africa’s “total war”—are remembered.
The central feature of the discourse of total war is the inability to name 
war as anything but one homogenous and discrete temporality, a tempo-
rality that cannot but reproduce a teleology that ends in the nation-state, 
and one that produces a soldier with excess. The Battle of Salt River that 
would be deemed the inaugural military altercation in South Africa in 
1510, is one example which, when attended to, shows up the tension at 
the heart of this formation. That tension appears not in the historical peri-
odization or narrative structures that govern its retelling in the historiog-
raphy, but rather in its mnemonic movement: its deployment into cultural 
memory as a silent marker of what it means to be a soldier in South Africa, 
and what it means to be a South African soldier. The mnemonic structure 
that emerges here is a set of ideas and practices surrounding what is called 
veldcraft. As the story goes, Portuguese Viceroy of India Dom Franscisco 
de Almeida and his men engage an altercation with the indigenous Khoi 
people of the Cape that results in the death of de Almeida and his crew on 
the banks of the Salt River (near present-day Cape Town, South Africa) in 
1510. The skirmish, which is characterized by a specific “tactic” used by 
the Khoi—a “phalanx of oxen controlled by whistles and shouts”—is 
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recruited to produce a long historical view of the soldier who must defend 
the nation, or the warring subject who must protect the nation to come. 
The altercation, which dissuaded the Portuguese from pursuing any fur-
ther contact in Southern Africa for another 80 years, would come to mark 
the onset of a long history of practice of war that cut across the political 
positioning of competing military forces in the history of conquest and 
colonialism and resulted in a military practice that draws its key aspects 
from both colonized and colonizer. This military practice is called veld-
craft, and according to military historians it is a tactic that underwrites the 
Dutch Staatse Leger (State Army) doctrine, the commando system of the 
Boers during the South African War in the early 1900s, the regimental 
system of the Zulu army in the nineteenth century, Basotho horsemen and 
the modern South African soldier of the 1980s—all subsumed into a sin-
gle narrative of a national and geopolitically specific military strategy.21 
The South African soldier is born out of veldcraft, and veldcraft is the 
inaugural mnemonic discourse that becomes practice in the service of 
total war.
What we might call the mnemonic fragment that is the Khoi leading 
their livestock in military formation with non-vocal vocalizations is trans-
formed into tactic: its recollection, remembering, and calling into service 
directly subsumed into a discourse of practice, and critically, a practice, 
technique, and indeed apparatus that operates within the logic of defense 
and is by definition warring. It now cannot be rendered as anything other 
than this, and its recollection is bound to the state and to a particular tem-
porality associated with war. It is a practice however, that not only pro-
duces a long history of warring in Southern Africa but also produces a 
mnemonic discourse around land, voice, war, and the indigenous. It is in 
the land that cannot speak and must be spoken for (read, read) that the 
Khoi are subsequently buried through the transformation of this memory 
into practice.22 It is through what is called veldcraft—the very name 
21 Willem P. Steenkamp, “The Shaping of the South African Soldier, 1510–2008,” Journal 
for Contemporary History 34, no. 1 (2009): 207–22.
22 It is also ironic that the Battle of Salt River is also called the first war of resistance against 
European aggressors, with former state president Thabo Mbeki invoking it in relation to his 
project of African Renaissance which argued for an intellectual renewal of Africa. It is also in 
this sense that the category of veldcraft should be thought alongside ethnographic histories 
of indigeneity in South Africa, where the relationship between the Khoi and the San (often 
referred to by the derogatory term ‘Bushman’) to land and nature is one marked by a confla-
tion which is at the heart of the exclamation that the San are historically the closest to 
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replaces the Anglicized bush with its more located Afrikaans term, veld, 
implying control and dominion—that the memory of the Khoi and their 
aurality would travel in time and through time, timelessly.23 When this 
mnemonic fragment becomes a tactic, it transforms into a vehicle—a tech-
nique—for remembering that is practiced in relation to power. We might 
observe the ways in which historiography facilitates this process as the 
production of tradition; the Khoi disappear into their aural markers (the 
whistles and shouts) and indigenous tradition remains but only as warring. 
The small war of 1510 is subsumed into total war, unwittingly revealing to 
us the discursive traces that make up an untenable concept of war and a 
wartime that only history can hold.
The soldier must be the recipient of a nascent wartime, not only to 
carry the temporalities of the past into uncertain futures but also to 
embody its rhythm that is both kairos and chronos, both in time and on 
time. It comes to mark his or her body in the wake of unspeakable vio-
lence. It comes as no surprise that the transition—which was in itself a 
movement from a state of emergency to an emergent state—was haunted 
by how South Africa might resolve a crisis of military institution. What was 
a postapartheid army to look like and act, given the horrific reputation the 
South African army had crafted for itself both in Africa and abroad? How 
would it resolve the various categories of defender of the nation, catego-
ries that included insurgent, commandant, terrorist, and conscript?24
The latter is not a question that will be addressed here, but it points to 
another matter, that is, the ways in which the tension at the heart of the 
inability to name war in South Africa may have a longer if not more 
encompassing genesis. Adam Sitze reminds us that imperial war—often 
described as the “small wars” of empire and taking place in what is regarded 
in the metropole as peacetime—is critical to the very theoretical base of 
humanity’s earliest ancestors. See David Johnson, Imagining the Cape Colony: History, 
Literature, and the South African Nation (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 
2012), 10–34.
23 On the ways in which the idea of tribe and native congeal in the production of the 
Afrikaner and its stakes for considering identity politics, race, and nationalism in South 
Africa, see Suren Pillay, “Where do you belong? Natives, foreigners and apartheid South 
Africa,” African Identities 2, no. 2 (2004): 215–32.
24 See Lephophotho Mashike, “‘Blacks Can Win Everything, but the Army’: The 
‘Transformation’ of the South African Military between 1994 and 2004,” Journal of Southern 
African Studies 33, no. 3 (2007): 601–18.
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empire as such.25 Mary Dudziak emphasizes the relation between wartime 
and peacetime, and how this has effects not only in the realm of law, but 
also on the discipline of history by considering the ways in which the onset 
of war marks not an event but an era that is temporary.26 What Dudziak 
alerts us to is the ways in which war is textured by an eventness that exceeds 
event. It is no surprise therefore that war is a barometric structure for 
empire itself, as Sitze tells us; it not only provides the terms upon which to 
determine the overall health and status of an imperial endeavor, but also 
affects how empire thinks about justice, morality, and its ultimate goal. It 
is that which gives imperialism its meaning, its ultimate philosophical 
force. Interestingly, considering the ways in which apartheid has been the-
orized as an economic system designed to exploit the labor of black bodies 
and furthermore as an articulation of a neoliberal ideal, Sitze argues that 
there is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of imperial war that the 
imperial administrator must manage: a dialectic between war and capital. 
In essence, imperial war must save imperialism from its own suicidal 
drive.27 It serves to defer its own death. What can a time of war that is not 
wartime tell us about imperial time? How is the work of remembering—
that is, suturing the relationship between the past and present—to take 
place in the wake of such a complicated relationship between the historic-
ity of the present and a historicism of the past?
It was, after all, the fall of the Berlin Wall that not only ushered in the 
end of apartheid as a legal system but also a concept of historicity that 
would seek to reify the past as unchanging, unshifting, and static. It would 
also be the period that would give birth to memory studies proper. This 
historicity, which bears the battle scars of a modernist paradigm, cannot 
think the way memory does: in the present and with a drive toward recon-
stitution. The rise of a temporality—a mnemonic structure in and of 
itself—interested in how the past (re)-presents the present is one that 
uncovers for us the ways in which war and its scripts become visible. What 
we are calling the military industrial complex of the apartheid state—that 
network of state, violence, and world-historical force—is in fact total war: 
imperialism proper.
25 Adam Sitze, “The Imperial Critique of Imperial War,” Filosofia Politica 25, no. 2 (August 
2011): 315–34 (here 316).
26 Mary L. Dudziak, War-Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012).
27 Sitze, “The Imperial Critique,” 333.
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This is an argument we can only make now, in this present, given the 
ways in which the memory of wartime in South Africa is unresolved and 
contested. It is through wartime that the nation can be and is imagined in 
the present; an imagining that collapses the various divisions between 
colonial conquest, states of emergency, and global war. We can explore 
this most prominently in the example of the sunken troopship the SS 
Mendi, whose memory has been invoked multiple times in contemporary 
South African politics to imagine a long unbroken history of the quintes-
sential South African soldier.28 In particular, the SS Mendi becomes met-
onymic for the black soldier, or the infantrymen of the South African 
Native Labour Contingent: a battalion of black soldiers sent as labor to 
the frontlines in World War I, to not only face a war unarmed but to be the 
subjects of a testing ground for segregation.29 The iconic moment of the 
death drill—when a certain Reverend Isaac Dyobha led soldiers on the 
sinking ship in a dance of death—is central to the retelling of the narrative 
of the sinking of the SS Mendi. The death drill, as it is often recalled, is one 
that calls forth a unified, multiracial and multicultural national subject, 
and interweaves it into the figure of the soldier who must defend the 
nation to come. Dyobha led the men with the following invocation:
Be quiet and calm, my countrymen, for what is taking place is exactly what 
you came to do. You are going to die … but that is what you came to do… 
Brothers, we are drilling the death drill. I, a Xhosa, say you are my brothers. 
Swazis, Pondos, Basutos, we die like brothers. We are the sons of Africa. 
Raise your war cries, brothers, for though they made us leave our assegais in 
the kraal, our voices are left with our bodies.
In an act of re-membering, the death drill has found itself at the center 
of a novel titled Dancing the Death Drill by author Fred Khumalo drama-
tizing a black recruit of mixed racial heritage surviving the tragic sinking. 
The narrative hinges on its opening salvo: an unprecedented violent act in 
a Parisian restaurant is figured as an outburst of latent anger harbored 
from a betrayal as the SS Mendi sank. The betrayal is explored through a 
28 John Gribble and Graham Scott, We Die Like Brothers: The Sinking of the SS Mendi 
(Swindon: Historic England, 2017); Albert Grundlingh, “Mutating Memories and the 
Making of a Myth: Remembering the SS Mendi Disaster, 1917–2007,” South African 
Historical Journal 63, no. 1 (2011): 20–37 (here 31).
29 See Brian P. Willan, “The South African Native Labour Contingent, 1916–1918,” The 
Journal of African History 19, no. 1 (1978): 61–78.
 L. VAN DER REDE AND A. ERASMUS
127
reimagining of the complicity of the captain of the Darro, who refused to 
help the SS Mendi because of its black crew. In an almost foreboding sense, 
the tragedy is inserted into a network of collective memory closely tied to 
the idea of South Africanness born out of the transformation from trau-
matic memory into narrative memory that was the discursivity of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.30 The SS Mendi and the moment 
that comes to be associated with it—the dancing of the death drill as the 
ship sank—is immortalized in Khumalo’s novel Fred Khumalo not only 
through its title, but in the ways in which the death drill becomes the core 
temporal narrative device through which the novel simultaneously 
attempts to work through the tragic circumstances of the sinking of the SS 
Mendi and make sense of its return as a temporal object in the postapart-
heid present. In the final scene of the novel, the protagonist deploys the 
death drill—that sonically charged mnemonic device—as the quintessen-
tial structure of subject formation:
“I am dancing my death drill. No one can take it away from me. This death 
drill is my truth. They made me leave my spear, my shield, back home those 
many years ago. So I am going to fight with my words, turn my words into 
bullets. This dance is my history, my heritage, my story that they tried to 
suppress. This is my death drill, my dance of death, my dance of truth.” Like 
the men on the Mendi, he danced, the rhythmic slamming of feet gaining 
momentum with each movement. Slam-slam! Slam-slam!31
A specific articulation of wartime has provided the script through which 
the warring subject forces the past into the present, in ways that uncannily 
replicate the scripts of a historicity that would seek a teleological resolu-
tion. This resolution is made on the warring subject. What we are constru-
ing as war is memory masquerading as history, a linear, homogenous and 
causal notion of time that cannot move freely.
conclusion
What is being termed solidarity is a manner through which to account for 
a flattening of the mnemonic landscape—intended or otherwise. This flat-
tening has at its core a desire to constitute a world that remembers 
30 Cf Paul Gilroy, “Lecture I. Suffering and infrahumanity lecture II. Humanities and a 
new humanism,” Tanner Lectures (2014): 69.
31 Fred Khumalo, Dancing the Death Drill (Cape Town: Umuzi, 2017), 335.
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collectively, that puts its past together in moves that must be named soli-
darity. To entangle memory therefore is to constitute a temporality that 
might transcend the notion of progress that world history has given us as 
the ideal script. What the examples of Ethiopia and South Africa reveal is 
that attention must be directed toward the notion of the apparatus: juridi-
cal, imperial, mnemonic, disciplinary, technological, or otherwise. 
Thinking in terms of apparatus could be constitutive not only of how we 
might approach mnemonic solidarity as a call, but also how it is we might 
reckon with Africa in the moment of such a hailing. Indeed, what was 
made apparent in our examples was the question of technique: a working 
on the subject that cannot be neatly subsumed into what has been called 
the global mnemoscape. For example, Ethiopia proves critical if we are to 
think the mnemonic through its technicality; the Ethiopian Red Terror as 
an example of genocide sits precisely within that work of memory called 
forgetting. It is that expression of genocide, within a space never colo-
nized, that genocide studies largely refuses to remember. What is at stake 
in the Ethiopian example of the eddying of genocide and terror—of the 
swirling, mixing, and churning of two distinct violations of international 
law—is the question of the lived, human experience of the atrocities that 
still-now sear of their everyday. The Ethiopian Red Terror is largely forgot-
ten within the discourse of genocide; and yet remains always present in the 
memory of those who lived through and survived it. It is in relation to this 
that the desire for mnemonic solidarity and the democratization of the 
mnemonic discourses of genocide, colonialism, and war is a desire for 
abiding by the fluidity of memory. Said differently, it is a desire that ges-
tures toward making the practice those discourses not knotting but 
eddying.
Similarly, it is the uncertainty of memory as it is deployed to do the 
work of history that comes to churn the mnemonic in the case of South 
Africa. If temporality comes to mark the history of war in South Africa, it 
is because the soldier is a subject that travels across time and complicates 
how we configure war and its conceptual and discursive histories on the 
continent. The soldier is the subject that neither history nor memory can 
hold alone and is therefore a troubling prospect for a mnemoscape which 
must exceed the nation in its shape. It is precisely because total war and 
militarization cannot but must sit alongside each other that we are forced 
to recognize that perhaps what is considered universal must instead be 
thought as undemocratic. What mnemonic solidarity might then mean is 
an attentiveness to movement rather than situatedness. We are compelled 
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to read a global mnemoscape on the grounds of churning rather than 
entanglement. It is in the techniques through which memory is recruited 
to make sense of the disjointed time of war that we notice the intertwining 
of the work of history and memory. The whistle and shout and the death 
drill are both sonic mnemonic apparatuses that are both memory and 
transformed into memory and set to work to make sense of how the sol-
dier and its excessive subjectivity can be held in a larger national narrative.
The noun memory is, as we know, intrinsically entangled with the past, 
but when put to work, indeed sounded out a verb, it defies its temporal 
limits and when recalled it is once again present. Memory in the singular 
is a condensation of fragmented remnants of lives, histories, and narra-
tives—individual and collective, trans-generationally and locally textured. 
It is this capacity of the human that has germinated a field of study, and it 
is beyond the scope of this chapter to debate what precisely the work of 
memory studies is. Rather this chapter is concerned with how it is that the 
discourses of genocide, war, and colonialism contour the mnemoscape in 
ways that resist the neatness of rendering the objects of any of these dis-
courses discrete. It is a gesture toward working through the desire for the 
deterritorialization of the mnemoscape, as simultaneously contextually 
sanded by the local and global, but not universal. To put it another way, 
this chapter looks toward a democratization of the global mnemoscape 
that is not inherently liberal. To do so we turn to Africa as not a carto-
graphic and geological location but as a concept and methodology.
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